Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation warned that the U.S.-India nuclear agreement signed into law today, which reverses long-standing U.S. policy to allow nuclear trade with India, has gone from bad to worse as India pressed the administration to go back on its promises to Congress.

Leonor Tomero, Director of Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, stated: "This deal has gone from bad to worse. From beginning to end, India played hard ball and won. After the administration caved to Indian demands in negotiations for the past three years, dangerously undermining nonproliferation and disregarding Congress, it again sided with India against U.S. security interests and against Congress by trying to disregard the very minimal nonproliferation provisions included in recently-passed congressional legislation."

President Bush signed the legislation into law this afternoon and included a signing statement to allay India's concerns about the minimal congressional conditions that were included in the legislation. The statement noted, "The legislation does not change the fuel assurance commitments that the U.S. Government has made to the Government of India, as recorded in the 123 Agreement."

This statement contradicts the statements of policy by Congress in the legislation it approved last week related to the "Transfer of Nuclear Equipment, Materials, and Technology to India." Congress stipulated that it is U.S. policy to seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group or from any other source, and that any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.

The signing of the deal with India reportedly was delayed, despite Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's trip to New Delhi last Saturday, because of India's concern about the provisions in the congressional legislation and its preference to wait for the President to issue a signing statement about those provisions.

Tomero added: "The administration not only failed to protect U.S. interests and heed congressional conditions, but set up a framework that will allow India and other countries, including France and Russia, to reap the benefits of engaging in nuclear trade without any conditions."

It is expected that the U.S. nuclear companies will not be in a position to sign contracts with India for several months or years because India has not yet made a declaration of its safeguarded facilities or adhered to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage which is necessary to provide liability guarantees to U.S. industry. French and Russian companies stand to benefit from these circumstances.

Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation today expressed concern about this evening’s expected Senate vote to approve the U.S.-India nuclear agreement despite the dangers the agreement poses to long-term American security and non-proliferation efforts.

“Congress missed an important opportunity to remedy many problems with the agreement and prevent the damage to non-proliferation efforts that will result from this deal,” said Leonor Tomero, Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Tomero added: “Rushing this agreement through Congress, without careful consideration of its implications, just so outgoing administrations in both the United States and India could add it to their legacies was a mistake that will come back to haunt us. We needed clear rules of the road, not ambiguous language that enables India to expand its nuclear arsenal, exacerbates a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and complicates negotiations with Iran and North Korea.”

“At a time when the greatest threat to the security of the United States is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, the Bush administration, Congress, and India should be working to strengthen, not unravel, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remains our first and best line of defense against the spread of nuclear weapons,” concluded Tomero.

The U.S. Senate is expected to vote to approve the U.S.-India nuclear trade agreement Wednesday evening, October 1, at approximately 7:30 PM EST. The House of Representatives voted to approve the agreement on September 27 by a margin of 23 votes. The final vote in the House was 298-117, but because the agreement was on the suspension calendar, it required a two-thirds majority vote for passage.

A group of senators – including Russ Feingold (D-WI), Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), and Tom Harkin (D-IA) – today expressed opposition to the agreement because of the repercussions for non-proliferation efforts. Bingaman and Dorgan offered an amendment that would clarify U.S. policy and add a reporting requirement in the event India tested a nuclear weapon.

The U.S.-India nuclear agreement contains no guarantee that India will sign contracts with American nuclear and defense companies that are hoping to benefit from trade with India. This week, India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with France and is considering defense contracts for purchasing French fighter aircraft.

Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation today warned of the dangers of the U.S.-India agreement and urged the U.S. Congress to consider the implications of this far-reaching deal carefully.

The Bush administration submitted the agreement to Congress late yesterday evening (September 10). If approved, the agreement would allow nuclear trade with India, reversing decades of non-proliferation policy and undermining U.S. and international security. The administration is pushing for a congressional vote by the end of September.

"The greatest threat to the security of the United States is the proliferation of nuclear weapons," said Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, Ret.), Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "This deal significantly weakens U.S. and international security by granting an exception to the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and American laws, thereby undermining the entire non-proliferation regime and inviting violations by other nations."

"Congress should consider this agreement very carefully given its long-term implications," remarked Leonor Tomero, Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "It is now up to Congress to remedy the failures of this agreement and insist on adding some of the key conditions that Congress insisted on when it changed U.S. law to allow negotiations in 2006."

Tomero added: "The Bush administration ignored congressional conditions and gave away the store in its negotiations with India, with nothing to show for the deal now except having helped foreign companies, enabled the increase of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons materials in India, and seriously eroded a thirty-year norm of preventing nuclear proliferation."

Despite claims by advocates of the nuclear deal, there is no guarantee that India will ink contracts with American businesses. Liability issues actually make it less likely that U.S. firms will engage in nuclear trade with India.

Last week, the Nuclear Suppliers Group changed long-standing international rules to allow nuclear trade to India. The 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group is an international consortium that regulates international nuclear exports. The group was formed in response to India using assistance, intended for peaceful purposes, from Canada and the United States to conduct a nuclear explosive test in 1974.

For more information, see:
Put the Brakes on India's Nukes
U.S.-India Nuclear Energy Deal: What's Next?

Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation today urged the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is meeting today on the U.S.-India nuclear deal, not to capitulate to the Bush administration and permit an unprecedented exception in international nuclear trade rules for India.

Under pressure from the United States and India, the 45 countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international consortium that monitors nuclear exports, are being asked to approve an exemption for India without any conditions.

"As one of only three countries that has never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and by continuing to refuse to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or commit to stopping the production of nuclear weapons-usable material, India has shunned meaningful nonproliferation commitments," said Leonor Tomero, Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

The Suppliers Group will meet to discuss an exemption for India today and tomorrow, and is also expected to meet again on September 2. A group of Suppliers Group countries – including New Zealand, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland – has raised concerns about the consequences of the U.S.-India nuclear deal.

"The Nuclear Suppliers Group should not cave in to pressure by India and the United States and hastily approve the nuclear deal because of the dangerous implications for nuclear nonproliferation efforts," added Tomero.

Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, Ret.), Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, warned that "Granting an exception for India without conditions would undermine U.S. and international security by significantly weakening nuclear nonproliferation efforts at a time when nuclear weapons pose the gravest threat to the world."

Gard added: "The U.S.-India nuclear deal risks fueling a regional arms race with Pakistan, complicating negotiations over Iran, and unraveling the NPT, which has been the best defense against the spread of nuclear weapons for 40 years."

Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation today criticized the Bush administration's missile defense agreement with Poland, noting that the U.S. interceptors slated for deployment in Poland are technologically unproven and only confirm Russian suspicions that the system is really directed against Moscow, not Tehran.

After more than 18 months of hesitation, the United States and Poland on Wednesday suddenly signed an agreement to place American missile defense interceptors on Polish territory. Poland's acquiescence to the missile defense agreement after months of uncertainty is widely believed to be a result of Russia's recent aggressive actions in Georgia.

Unlike U.S. missile defense interceptors currently deployed in Alaska and California, which are powered by three-stage booster rockets, the interceptors planned for Europe will have only two stages. The two-stage configuration has yet to be tested, and many experts have expressed concerns about its readiness for realistic combat scenarios.

"The Pentagon itself has admitted that the effectiveness of the two-stage interceptor cannot be assumed," said John Isaacs, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Isaacs was referring to a recent report by Dr. Charles McQueary, the Department of Defense's Director for Operational Test & Evaluation.

"At least three flight tests are necessary for any determination of operational effectiveness," said Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret.), a missile defense expert who is chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "The Bush administration assumes an untested two-stage configuration will work, but military commanders cannot rely on untested systems."

"Missile defense, of course, is aimed at no one," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated today upon signing the agreement.

"If you believe that statement, you should believe that Russian forces are in Georgia merely to act as peacekeepers," added Isaacs. "If the system was aimed at no one, why was the agreement rushed to completion only days after Russia's brutish use of force against Georgia?"

While Russia should not have a veto over U.S. policy, the United States needs Russia's cooperation now more than ever to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program; negotiate deeper, binding, and verifiable reductions of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicle systems; and buttress programs that secure and safeguard Russian nuclear materials.

"Pursuing a system that antagonizes Moscow will make it all the more difficult to achieve these vital national security objectives," Gard concluded.

For more information, see the Center's recent policy briefs:
Russia Looms over U.S.-Poland Missile Defense Agreement
Missile Defense in Europe Falls to Next Administration

Washington, D.C. – Dr. Alan Pearson, Director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, will attend and blog from a major international meeting in Geneva next week.

The 2008 Meeting of Experts of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) will focus on the oversight and regulation of biodefense and other research in the life sciences, as well as measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity. These politically contentious issues have gained renewed attention in the United States following the FBI’s conclusion that the 2001 anthrax attacks were an inside job by Army biodefense researcher Bruce Ivins.

From Monday, August 18 - Friday, August 22, Pearson will post daily updates on the Center’s website here.

For background on the BWC, click here. For information on key issues addressed at previous meetings, click here.

Learn more about the Center’s Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program.

Washington, D.C. – Today's shocking revelation about the apparent suicide of a top Army microbiologist and lead suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks has intensified the need for a thorough investigation into the only significant bioterrorism attack on U.S. soil, said Alan Pearson, Director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

"The FBI must not let the death of Bruce Ivins deter it from completing a full and thorough investigation of the attacks," said Pearson. "The chance to prove Ivins' guilt before a court of law has been lost, but the need for a thorough investigation and a full accounting to the American people remains." CNN reported today that the FBI will soon close the case "because a threat no longer exists."

Pearson says that the number one question still to determine is whether Ivins was responsible for the attacks and, if so, whether he acted alone and with complete secrecy. "If Ivins was indeed responsible for the attacks, did he have any assistance? Did anyone else at the Army lab or elsewhere have any knowledge of his activities prior to, during, or shortly after the anthrax attacks?" questioned Pearson. "The FBI must see this investigation through to completion."

Pearson added that if it is established that Ivins or anyone else working at the government's biodefense lab at Fort Detrick, Maryland produced the anthrax used in the attacks or diverted anthrax powder from the lab's stocks, the implications would be significant.

"It appears increasingly likely that the only significant bioterrorism attack in history may have originated from right within the biodefense program of our own country," said Pearson. "The implications for our understanding of the bioterrorism threat and for our entire biodefense strategy and enterprise are potentially profound."

Learn more about the Center's Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program.

Two recent developments have all but ensured that the third missile defense site in Europe will not be completed by the Bush administration's 2013 target date, and that it will fall to the next President to determine the fate of the European deployment, according to a report released today by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

The report, "Missile Defense in Europe Falls to Next Administration," is available online.

Unlike U.S. missile defense interceptors currently deployed in Alaska and California, which are powered by three-stage booster rockets, the interceptors planned for Europe will have only two stages. The two-stage configuration has yet to be tested, and many experts have expressed concerns about its readiness for realistic combat scenarios.

"At least three flight tests are necessary for any determination of operational effectiveness," said Lt. General Robert Gard, a missile defense expert who is chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "The Bush administration assumes an untested two-stage configuration will work, but military commanders cannot rely on untested systems."

Besides the technical problems, the Czech and Polish governments are still far from giving final approval to place elements of the U.S. missile defense system on their territories. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act passed by Congress included a provision limiting construction on the third site until the Polish and Czech governments give final approval.

"Czech and Polish public opinion is strongly against the proposed deployment," explained Kingston Reif, a fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation who helped author the report. "These misgivings are rooted in concerns about national sovereignty, as well as fears that the interceptors will poison these countries' relations with Russia."

Missile defense in Europe also threatens to further sour U.S.-Russian relations because Russia vigorously objects to the system. While Russia should not have a veto over U.S. policy, cooperation with Russia is important for achieving critical U.S. security objectives.

"The threat posed by Iran's nuclear program, verifiable reductions of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, international terrorism, and securing Russian nuclear materials require a productive U.S.-Russian relationship," concluded Lt. General Gard.

The report, "Missile Defense in Europe Falls to Next Administration," is available online.

Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation today advised that the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the U.S. Congress not be bullied into making a hasty decision on the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, given the dangerous ramifications of the agreement for nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

New concerns have arisen recently as India makes a last ditch attempt to complete the agreement before the end of the Bush administration.

Leonor Tomero, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, noted that "India and the Bush administration have played fast and loose in negotiating this agreement, disregarding the clear conditions that Congress had stipulated."

"Given the discrepancies between the provisions that Congress insists on before completing the deal and the agreement that the administration negotiated with India, it is incumbent upon Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to give the agreement careful consideration and to not allow themselves to be rushed into a hasty decision," Tomero added.

Domestic political opposition within India held up the deal since last fall, but a political maneuver last week enabled Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to secure enough internal support, despite opposition from the Indian Communists, to push ahead with the deal.

The IAEA Board of Governors is expected to meet on July 28 to consider the safeguards agreement, after which the Nuclear Suppliers Group will be asked to exempt India from international rules barring nuclear trade with those states that do not accept full-scope safeguards agreements on all of their nuclear facilities.

"These are not trivial issues," added John Isaacs, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "This exemption would tie the hands of the next administration and greatly compromise U.S. and international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and materials."

The Nuclear Suppliers Group may meet in September. It is expected that at least two sessions will be needed to come to agreement. Once these two steps have been completed, the U.S. Congress will be free to vote on the final U.S.-India "123 agreement."

Time is running out, however, as the U.S. Congress is scheduled to adjourn for the year on September 26.

Washington, D.C. – In a new analysis released today comparing the conventional military capabilities of the United States and Iran, experts at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation conclude that the current threat posed by Iran is exaggerated by conflating it with Iran's potential, but far from certain, acquisition of a nuclear weapon in the future.

The side-by-side comparison is available online.

"It is dangerous to allow speculation about what Iran might be able to do in the future to permeate debates about the threat posed by Iran today," said Carah Ong, Iran Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "Conflating future and present threats creates an artificial sense of urgency about what the United States must do to protect itself."

Iran currently presents a number of serious problems for the United States. Iran could attack U.S. forces in Iraq or use its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah to attack Israel. However, by nearly every quantifiable metric, Iran does not presently represent an existential threat to the United States based on its conventional arsenal.

The United States will spend 99 times more on defense than Iran in the upcoming fiscal year. U.S. fighter aircraft outnumber Iranian aircraft 12.4 to 1, and American planes like the F-22 Raptor are far superior to aging Iranian aircraft.

In fact, out of 24 categories included in the comparison, Iran only possesses an advantage over the United States in two: artillery units and patrol and coastal combatant ships. These two advantages, however, would be meaningless in any imaginable conflict scenario.

"A comparison of the United States and Iran's conventional military capabilities demonstrates the overwhelming superiority of the United States," noted John Isaacs, Executive Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "People need to spend less time hyperventilating about the rhetoric of two unpopular leaders and more time using realistic assessments to formulate smart policies."

A nuclear weapon in the hands of Iran would be dangerous, and the United States must take steps to prevent this development. However, direct diplomatic engagement with Iran on the nuclear issue, without preconditions, is one method that the Bush administration has yet to try.

As the comparison makes clear, the United States would be engaging from a position of strength. A recent Gallup poll showed that 59 percent of Americans believe it would be a good idea for the President of the United States to meet with the President of Iran.

"Pursuing diplomacy with Iran is not going to be easy, and it will not resolve all of the outstanding issues overnight," concluded Ong. "But it is an approach that is worth trying, particularly given the disastrous consequences that would result from a military confrontation between the United States and Iran."

The side-by-side comparison is available online.