(Washington, D.C) – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation released today a detailed budget analysis in response to the Obama administration’s release of its Fiscal Year 2011 defense spending request.

The analysis is available online.

The Obama administration’s FY 2011 Pentagon spending request totals $708.3 billion, an increase beyond inflation of $9 billion, or 1.3 percent, over FY2010 expected appropriations. In addition to this initial $708 billion, the administration has requested $18 billion for nuclear weapons activities at the Department of Energy (DoE) and $7 billion for additional non-DoD defense related activities.

From 2000-2009, the Defense Department’s base budget grew steadily, at an average increase of 4.3% (after adjusting for inflation) each year.

Laicie Olson, a defense analyst at the Center, stated, “While the President’s request this year continues the pattern of growth in defense spending, it is at a lower rate than during the years of the Bush administration.”

“Though the military budget remains disproportionately large in comparison to non-military defense spending, we support the Pentagon’s continued efforts to cut or reduce wasteful and ineffective programs such as the C-17 aircraft and the expeditionary fighting vehicle,” Olson added. “But there is still much cost-cutting and re-prioritization to do.”

The Center’s complete analysis, including weapons programs to watch and a recap of the FY2010 request, is available online.

Washington, D.C. – Arms control experts at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation praised the bipartisan nuclear security agenda reiterated by President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address.

“The President deserves praise for his continued efforts to lead a bipartisan nuclear security agenda that addresses the grave threat posed by nuclear weapons,” said Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, the Center’s chairman. “As the President said, he has embraced the vision of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan through a strategy that reverses the spread of nuclear weapons and seeks a world without them.”

In his speech, the President identified key steps toward reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons, including finalizing an agreement between the U.S. and Russia to verifiably reduce their nations’ nuclear weapons stockpiles, securing loose nuclear materials around the world in four years, holding a nuclear security summit with global leaders in Washington, D.C. in April, and dealing with the threats posed by North Korea and Iran.

Gard added, “Nearly every national security expert agrees that terrorist use of nuclear weapons against the United States is our gravest security threat. The best way to address the threat of nuclear terrorism is by securing vulnerable nuclear materials and verifiably reducing nuclear stockpiles, just as President Obama has pledged to do.”

“Today there is a growing bipartisan consensus that the current nuclear status quo is no longer tenable,” said the Center’s executive director John Isaacs. “21st century threats require 21st century solutions, and the President has already taken crucial first steps toward securing our nation from the threat of nuclear weapons.”

Indeed, just hours before giving the State of the Union, the President spoke with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and the leaders agreed that the negotiations to complete a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which reduces the countries’ nuclear weapons stockpiles, are nearly complete.

“These first steps, including an expected finalized new weapons reduction treaty with Russia, are important and should be applauded,” Isaacs added, “but we still have a long way to go.”

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation is one of the nation’s oldest and largest organizations dedicated to reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons.

Washington, DC: On Tuesday, January 26, the Graham-Talent Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism released its one-year report card evaluating the government's ability to protect the United States from the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

The Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons offers an alternative view on the bioterrorism threat, arguing that the threat is not as severe as portrayed by the Commission. The Working Group further argues that the U.S. government should take a balanced approach to preparedness that builds public health capabilities to respond to all infectious disease threats and other public health problems facing our nation.

According to the scientists, “The bioterrorist threat has been greatly exaggerated. Continuing to emphasize and spend billions of dollars on measures to specifically counter bioterrorist threat scenarios distorts our national understanding of the important issues in public health, and diverts scarce scientific talent and resources away from more pressing public health and natural disease threats.”

Instead, they argue, "improving the capability to respond to natural disease outbreaks, which currently present the major problem," would "provide much greater public health benefit and ... significantly strengthen resistance to bioterrorism."

The Scientists Working Group was founded in 1989 and has been affiliated with the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC since 2003. Working Group members have extensive experience with biological weapons issues. For twenty years, they have worked to reinforce the norm against biological weapons, promote national and international measures to prevent their development and use, and encourage national and global measures for combating infectious diseases.

The full statement by the Working Group is available here.

A list of Working Group members is available here.

Washington D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, one of the nation’s major arms control organizations, gave President Barack Obama a grade of “A” for transforming United States nuclear weapons policy during his first year in office and an “Incomplete” for completing the new policy initiatives he has launched.

John Isaacs, the Center’s executive director, praised the President for “elevating the attention of the world on the 23,000 nuclear weapons remaining across the globe and the danger that some of these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists.”

Isaacs added: “President Obama’s forthrightness about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the need to take immediate action to avoid a nuclear holocaust constitute the most significant remarks by an American President on nuclear disarmament in the last half century.”

On April 5, after less than three months in office, President Obama delivered one of the most significant speeches of the nuclear age. He stated:

“As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it . . . I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

On September 24, the President secured unanimous United Nations Security Council approval for the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (U.S Army, ret.) the Center’s chairman, emphasized that “while Obama’s first year vision was vital, the ultimate judgment on Obama’s performance will be based on how he begins to realize this vision over the coming months and years.”

Gard pointed to the following key steps ahead:

• Completion and ratification of a new nuclear reductions treaty with Russia;
• Commencement of negotiations with Russia on the next nuclear reductions agreement, ideally down to a level of 1,000 nuclear weapons total for each side;
• Completion of a Nuclear Posture Review that revamps American nuclear policy;
• A new budget providing resources to begin securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within three or four years;
• A successful Global Nuclear Security Summit in April;
• A successful Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty Review Conference in May;
• The launch of an aggressive campaign to win ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
• An international agreement to launch talks to end the production of fissile materials for military purposes;
• Successful negotiations with Iran and North Korea to terminate their nuclear weapons programs.

“This President deserves the Nobel Peace Prize for his vision and the initiatives he has launched, and we will work closely with him to realize that vision,” concluded Gard.

Washington D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation expressed concern about this evening’s House of Representatives vote to approve the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009 (H.R. 2194), which threatens to complicate American diplomatic efforts with Iran.

The legislation amends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 by expanding economic sanctions against Iran’s gas and petroleum sector. The bill was brought to the floor Tuesday under suspension of the rules. It passed by a final tally of 412 to 12.

The Iranian opposition movement opposes sanctions, and the Obama administration has reportedly asked the Senate to hold off on passing its own version of sanctions legislation.

“This legislation may constrain President Obama’s flexibility as the United States and its international partners continue to pursue a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear program,” said Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, Ret.), Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “Rushing to pass unilateral petroleum sanctions may send the signal that the United States is no longer interested in engagement,” continued Gard.

Gard added: “The overriding goal of the international community must be to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for civilian purposes. If sanctions become necessary to increase international pressure on Iran, multilateral sanctions targeted at the Iranian leadership and Revolutionary Guard would represent a more effective and unified signal to Iran.”

Leonor Tomero, Director for Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, remarked: “Unilateral petroleum sanctions risk strengthening the hands of Iran's theocratic ruling class and hurting regular Iranians.”

Tomero added: “Unilateral sanctions play into President Ahmadinejad’s effort to cast Iran’s noncompliance with its international obligations as a problem with the West, rather than a potential threat to global security and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

Washington D.C. – Tomorrow’s expiration of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which contains legally-binding verification measures, should be looked at in the broader context of negotiations with Russia on a soon-to-be finalized “New START” agreement, experts at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation said today.

In a joint statement released Friday, the United States and Russia pledged “to continue to work together in the spirit of the START Treaty following its expiration, as well as our firm intention to ensure that a new treaty on strategic arms enter into force at the earliest possible date.”

John Isaacs, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said: “The expiration was expected, which is why the Obama administration has strongly pushed to finalize negotiations on New START.”

Isaacs added: “Even though there will be no replacement by December 5, there is no reason to panic since both sides are actively finalizing a new treaty.”

Leonor Tomero, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, noted: “Once New START is signed, both sides will be obligated under international law not to take any action contrary to its provisions, even if New START does not enter into force for a few months.”

Tomero added: “Let’s not lose track of the significant progress that is being made on verifiable, legally-binding reductions that will both lessen the danger posed by nuclear weapons and strengthen U.S.-Russian relations.”

Once New START is submitted to Congress, the U.S. Senate will consider whether or not to consent to ratification. A vote is expected sometime in the spring, and 67 votes are required for approval.

For more information, visit the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation’s START Briefing Book.

Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation praised the Obama administration today for outlining broad areas of cooperation with India and not rushing nuclear energy negotiations, which could further undermine nuclear weapons non-proliferation efforts.

The United States and India are still negotiating a subsequent arrangement that would lay out the details for whether and how the United States would give its consent to India for reprocessing U.S.-origin fuel. Reprocessing separates plutonium from nuclear waste. While India plans to use the plutonium to fuel power reactors, plutonium can also be used to make nuclear weapons. India used plutonium derived from U.S. and Canadian nuclear energy assistance intended for peaceful purposes to conduct its first nuclear weapons test in 1974.

Leonor Tomero, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, noted: “Despite pressure to reach agreement on this controversial issue in time for an Obama-Singh announcement, the Obama administration did not rush to finalize a deal that would undermine nuclear nonproliferation efforts, and instead emphasized cooperation on renewable energy, education, and science.”

“Unlike the previous administration, which made concession after concession on the U.S.-India nuclear deal at the expense of nuclear non-proliferation, the Obama administration is negotiating carefully to ensure that the U.S.-India deal does not further erode non-proliferation efforts and lead to legitimizing reprocessing as a fuel management option,” she added.

The U.S.-India agreement for nuclear cooperation reached last year included a provision allowing India to reprocess as long as India reprocessed the waste in a new declared facility under safeguards. A subsequent arrangement is necessary to outline a detailed accord. U.S. State Department and Indian officials conducted a final round of talks over the weekend in an attempt to finalize the deal. Disagreements reportedly remain on the number of reprocessing facilities as well as inspection and safety provisions.

The Obama administration canceled Bush administration plans for near-term deployment of reprocessing facilities in the United States. As Tomero explained, “Rushing to give India consent to reprocessing U.S.-origin nuclear fuel would complicate U.S. efforts to convince other countries, such as South Korea, not to reprocess.”

South Korea is currently seeking reprocessing rights from the United States in the context of a new U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement to succeed the current agreement which expires in 2014.

Washington D.C. – In a letter to Congress, 24 leading nuclear experts urged policymakers to take into account the proliferation risks associated with laser uranium enrichment and requested that Congress conduct an inquiry into the proliferation risks associated with this technology.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently reviewing a license request by Global Laser Enrichment, a partnership led by General Electric-Hitachi, for a laser enrichment facility outside of Wilmington, North Carolina. The experts’ letter requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission consider proliferation consequences during the licensing process.

The full text of the letter, which was sent to Chairs of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, House Energy and Environment Subcommittee, Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, is available online.

The letter noted that the planned Global Laser Enrichment Commercial Facility would complicate diplomatic efforts to discourage the use of this technology in other countries. It stated, “If the United States demonstrates that it is a commercially viable technology, it will dangerously undermine U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts by making it much more difficult to dissuade other countries from acquiring this technology.”

Concerns stem from the technical characteristics of this specific method of uranium enrichment make it easy to conceal, and consequently extremely difficult for international nuclear inspectors to detect. The letter noted that laser isotope separation “enables an enrichment facility to be smaller in size and to use less power than other methods of enrichment such as centrifuge or gaseous diffusion which are currently used to make low-enriched uranium fuel for use in nuclear power plants.”

Laser technology would be used as an alternative to centrifuge or gaseous diffusion to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel. The use of this uranium enrichment technology could detract from U.S. and international security efforts to detect and monitor nuclear programs worldwide as global interest in nuclear power grows. If enriched to a concentration of 20 percent uranium 235 or higher, enriched uranium can be used to make nuclear weapons.

A laser uranium research program in Iran escaped detection in 2002. Another laser enrichment research experiment was also detected in South Korea in 2004 after several years. The discovery of undeclared centrifuges enrichment facilities in Iran, at Natanz in 2002 and more recently at Qom, underscore the importance of being able to detect covert facilities that could be used to make nuclear weapons-usable material.

Several experts also previously sent comments (available online) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Washington, D.C. -- In response to President Barack Obama's appearance today before the United Nations General Assembly, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation released the statement below.

"In his historic April 2009 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama outlined a number of concrete steps the United States would take to address the nuclear weapons threat head-on. The President is now taking these steps and leading by example in order to move the world closer to reducing the danger posed by nuclear weapons.

The United States plans to introduce a resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament during a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council to be chaired by Obama on September 24. In addition, Obama designated Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to lead the U.S. delegation this week at the conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The White House also intends to host a global nuclear security summit in Washington in April 2010.

Obama's September 24 UN appearance will mark the first time that a U.S. president has presided over a special session of the Security Council. This sends a clear and powerful signal that the United States will reestablish its leadership position on arms control. Obama's draft resolution reaffirms U.S. support for key commitments that the Bush administration shunned, including ratification of the Test Ban Treaty and a pledge not to target non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear weapons (known as negative security assurances).

If agreed to, the resolution will be only the second Security Council resolution in history to call on all states to join the Test Ban Treaty. It could pave the way for the nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states to take steps to reduce nuclear dangers at the May 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Such steps might include relaunching negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty to ban the production of nuclear fissile material for weapons purposes (known as a fissile material cutoff treaty).

Clinton's appearance at the Test Ban conference this week is a change from the previous administration, which failed to send a delegation to the last four meetings of the conference. Ratification of the Test Ban Treaty is clearly in the U.S. national interest. Since the United States does not conduct nuclear tests and has no plans or need to do so, the United States should take advantage of the security and political benefits it would gain from ratification. A permanent Test Ban Treaty would strengthen efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and materials by making acquisition harder and more politically costly. The Test Ban Treaty's provision for a global network of monitoring stations and on-site inspections would greatly enhance the international community's ability to deter and detect potential cheaters.

Finally, Obama will also host a global nuclear security summit in Washington in April 2010. First announced in the Prague speech, the summit will work towards raising the global standard for effective nuclear security. The President noted that the world should not wait for a terrorist attack to address this looming threat.

These steps to address the world's gravest threats are laudable. Obama has taken an aggressive stance on preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and demanding that nations adhere to their international treaty obligations. An endeavor of this magnitude will take the leadership of the United States in concert with the other states."

In response to the Pentagon's announcement today that it intends to modify plans for the U.S. missile defense system in Europe, experts at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation concluded that the decision is technically and politically wise.

The Obama administration intends to use SM-3 interceptors, at first based on Aegis destroyers and later based from ground-based sites, instead of going forward with the Bush administration's plan for ten ground-based interceptors in Poland along with a radar system in the Czech Republic.

"The decision to revamp the missile defense plan in Europe is based on technological reality rather than rigid ideology," said John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "The Obama administration's proposal is a better choice for U.S. and European security."

The Bush administration's proposed Poland-based interceptor, which would have been a two-stage variant of the three-stage U.S. interceptor already deployed in Alaska and California, has not yet been built and would not even undergo its first test until 2010. The Bush administration's proposed configuration would not have protected NATO members Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania from current Iranian missile threats because the system was not designed to cover this area. On the other hand, the Obama administration's SM-3 configuration is designed to protect all of Europe by approximately 2018.

"The proposed interceptors for Poland have not even been built, much less tested. The Obama administration is killing an idea, not a program, and replacing it with a more technologically-promising system," remarked Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

Aegis destroyers are already deployed worldwide and the SM-3 interceptor has proven successful in 19 of 23 tests since 2002. The SM-3 interceptor is also specifically designed to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, which are the most dangerous near-term threat posed by Iran. As Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly said earlier this year, "ninety-nine percent of the threat today" is from short- and medium-range missiles.

Iran is years away from possessing the type of long-range ballistic missile that could threaten most of Europe and the continental United States. Though intelligence estimates vary, the broad consensus is that Iran, without substantial foreign assistance (which Western intelligence would likely detect), is not likely to possess a ballistic missile topped with a nuclear weapon capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States until 2015 at the very earliest. Under the Obama administration's plan, upgraded SM-3 interceptors that are more capable of defending against intermediate- and long-range missiles will be deployed as they become available over the next decade. Thus, as the Iranian threat potentially evolves, the U.S. missile defense system will evolve along with it.

While supporters of the European proposal are attempting to characterize the Obama administration's decision as a sign of a slackening U.S. commitment to Eastern European allies or NATO, this is false. First, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen labeled the Obama administration's decision "a positive first step." The U.S. relationship with its NATO allies is crucial for European security, restraining Russian aggressiveness, and retaining support for U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States is not abandoning missile defense in Europe; it is restructuring capabilities to better counter threats that currently exist.

Second, while Poland and the Czech Republic sought the system in order to secure U.S. support in the face of recent Russian assertiveness, the system was not designed, and the Bush administration reiterated over and over again that it was not intended, to defend these countries against Russia. The United States pledged earlier this year to provide Poland with a Patriot missile battery that will help defend against Russia. The United States also has agreed in recent years to provide Poland and the Czech Republic with F-16 fighters and unmanned aerial vehicles, a sign of Washington's commitment to their security.

"The U.S. security commitment to Poland and the Czech Republican remains as steadfast as ever," added Isaacs. "Framing this decision, which was based on technical factors, as a litmus test of whether the United States is committed to Eastern Europe or willing to stand up to Russia represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation."

KEY FACTS ON MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

The proposed U.S. missile defense system in Europe was designed to protect Europe and the United States from intermediate- and long-range missile threats from Iran which do not currently exist.

• The Congressional Budget Office projected that the Bush administration's proposal would cost between $9 billion and $14 billion over 20 years.
• Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, noted in a recent interview that 99% of the ballistic missile threat today is from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
• U.S. analysis of Iran's ballistic missile programs have consistently overestimated the speed of Iran's development of new, more advanced missiles. As Gen. James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated last month, "We believed that the emergence of the intercontinental ballistic missile would come much faster than it did...The reality is, it has not come as fast as we thought it would come."
• An April 2009 report of the U.S. Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center stated that "With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015."
• In a Joint Threat Assessment of Iran's nuclear and missile potential released in May 2009, a team of U.S. and Russian scientists estimated that if Iran decided today that it wanted to develop an ICBM, it "will not be able, for at least ten to fifteen years, to master independently the 'critical technologies' for advanced...[intermediate range ballistic missiles] and ICBMs because it does not have the scientific, economic, and industrial infrastructure for developing these critical technologies."

The proposed interceptors for Poland have not even been built, much less tested. The Obama administration is killing an idea, not a program.

• In October 2007, Dr. Charles McQueary, the Department of Defense's Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, issued a report on the proposed European missile defense system. The report concluded that "the effectiveness of the European assets cannot be assumed."
• In 2008, Dr. McQueary stated that the missile defense capabilities upon which the European interceptors would have been based "will not support a high level of confidence in its limited capabilities...additional test data under realistic test conditions is necessary to validate models and simulations and to increase confidence in the ability of these models and simulations to accurately predict system capability."
• According to the final report of the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, which included such conservatives as former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and former FBI Director James Woolsey, missile defenses designed to counter long-range threats have "demonstrated some capability against unsophisticated threats," but "this...system is now incapable of defending against complex threats." The Commission encouraged "a substantial role for defenses against short- to medium-range missiles," but warned that "defenses against longer range missiles should be based on their demonstrated effectiveness and the projected threat from Iran and North Korea." The Obama administration's plans for missile defense in Europe are in keeping with the Commission's recommendations.