Iran Says No, Now What?
Report: Iran Says No, Now What?
Author: George Perkovich
Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Date: September 2008
CLICK HERE FOR THE FULL TEXT OF THE REPORT.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This policy brief provides a three-step approach the U.S. can take in its approach to getting Iran to stop uranium enrichment and plutonium-separation activities. It also provides a recommendation of incentives to offer Iran in exchange for cooperation.
Key Recommendations:
Give Iran one last, time-limited chance to negotiate suspension of its fuel-cycle-related activities.
To rally Iranian and international support for this approach, the United States should explicitly state that it will not use force against Iran except as a response to an Iranian act of aggression, which would include any new moves to acquire nuclear weapons. Public threats of force are counterproductive against Tehran today anyway; they inspire not accommodation but belligerence and resistance.
Break off negotiations with Iran. Focus on developing a consensus approach that includes Russia and China.
If, as seems likely, Tehran rejects a clearly stated last opportunity to negotiate, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (the P-5 plus 1) should cease negotiating with themselves, stop chasing after Iran with more incentives, and instead conclude that Iran has no intention of complying.
Clarify the international redline.
The United States and the Security Council could define their redline for Iran as weaponization, further violation of nonproliferation obligations, or withdrawal from the NPT. (States may withdraw when they are in good standing with the NPT’s terms, but not when they are in breach of its terms, as Iran currently is.) In return for accepting the suboptimal, but still meaningful, redline of no weaponization, the United States and the Security Council should insist on an understanding that the use of military force would be authorized if evidence emerged of new or previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear weaponization activities, or other violations. Similarly, Iran would be subject to reprisal if it sought to withdraw from the NPT while it remained noncompliant with IAEA and UN Security Council resolutions.
Clarify the consequences of Iran’s coming clean
The UN Security Council could clarify that Iranian admission of past weaponization activities, coupled with willingness to accept that the NPT violation required “restitution,” would not necessarily lead to further sanctions or punitive action. One probable demand would be that Iran suspend uranium enrichment while taking agreed steps to build international confidence that it would not threaten regional peace and security. In return, after the defined period transpired, the IAEA and Security Council nuclear dossiers would be closed and Iran would be restored to good standing and allowed to resume peaceful development of its fuel-cycle capabilities under agreed safeguards.
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