Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?
Report: Are New Nuclear Bargains Attainable?
Author: Deepti Choubey
Institution: Carnagie Endowment for International Peace
Date: October 8, 2008
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Policy makers have returned to the debate over whether and how total nuclear disarmament should take place. The notion that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is much harder without also reducing their number seems to be motivating much of this interest. Consequently, officials in both the United States and other nuclear-weapon states hope that in direct exchange for renewed action on disarmament, non–nuclear-weapon states will support nonproliferation efforts.
Such quid pro quo bargains are going nowhere fast because nuclear-weapon states and their non-nuclear counterparts are talking past each other. Nuclearweapon states fail to understand that these “bargains” are not seen as fair exchanges by non–nuclear-weapon states in light of long overdue and unfulfilled promises made by nuclear-weapon states.
Discussions with the foreign ministries of sixteen key non–nuclear-weapon states―including U.S. allies (within and outside of NATO); key leaders of the global south; and members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)―reveal that this tendency to craft quid pro quo bargains misreads the political landscape.
The debate in the United States about the feasibility of nuclear disarmament has been overly focused on steps that nuclear-armed states should take, without serious attention being given to the views of non–nuclear-weapon states that have an important role to play on both the nonproliferation and disarmament agendas. This lack of understanding has limited the range of policy options under consideration.
Although the foreign ministries disclosed that there are no automatic or immediate bargains to be had in the near term, they did indicate that a reorientation in U.S. policies and approaches could create the conditions for future bargains.
On both the nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, America’s leadership and authority have eroded so far that they have imperiled U.S. national security. There is a way forward, if American policy makers recognize that disarmament is not altruism. Instead, disarmament is vital to U.S. national security. Many countries must take corrective action to improve the nonproliferation regime, but the United States has the best capacity to do so.
With the alignment of a new U.S. administration, the sheer impact U.S. action can have on the international regime, and the impending 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the United States has a serious opportunity to reclaim its leadership.
This analysis:
- Provides U.S. officials with a “reality check” about the environment in which they seek to advance their nonproliferation agenda.
- Identifies for the United States a clear and practical step-by-step approach to engage non–nuclear-weapon states in pursuit of enhancing U.S. national security goals.
- Includes non–nuclear-weapon state reactions to nonproliferation initiatives and calls on non–nuclear-weapon states to make use of what may be only a limited window of opportunity for them to maximize their agenda and respond to positive signals from the United States.
It is time for the United States to set a new agenda for the world that affirms the U.S. commitment to disarmament, renews efforts for interim steps, and sets a leading example for others. Such an effort could result in the United States reclaiming its leadership of the nonproliferation regime and increasing global security.

