Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Non-Proliferation Agenda for Congress: the FY 2005 Budget Process

As the 108 th Congress proceeds through a new budget cycle, halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) dominates the international security agenda. President Bush has announced an aggressive non-proliferation strategy for 2004. However, the budget request for Fiscal Year 2005 does not fully support this strategy. This Issue Brief by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation outlines key non-proliferation issues that Congress faces in 2004, and provides recommendations for lawmakers who are responsible for guiding U.S. policy and appropriating FY2005 government funds in the face of major proliferation challenges.

Threat Reduction Assistance and Non-Proliferation

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), passed by Congress in 1991, helps the former Soviet Union secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Over the past decade, the original program budget has more than doubled and is now spread across three agencies – the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State. The result is a confusing labyrinth of projects and jurisdictions; but the program is one of the most important tools in protecting Americans from the threat of WMD.

The Department of Defense houses the CTR program, which provides funds for transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The Department of State coordinates export and border control programs and efforts to provide former Soviet scientists and engineers with research grants so that they will not sell their know-how to terrorists or rogue states. Programs to secure nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons facilities are managed by the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE also assists in employing former weapons scientists, disposing of Russian plutonium, and shutting down plutonium-producing reactors. Other non-proliferation programs at DOE develop detection technology for preventing the proliferation of WMD worldwide.

A summary of requested funding for threat reduction and other non-proliferation programs in FY2005 and full descriptions of these programs are available on the Center’s website at http://64.177.207.201/pages/16_549.html.

U.S. Programs with Russia

U.S. nonproliferation programs that secure and dispose of Russian nuclear materials, dismantle former Soviet WMD and delivery systems, and engage former weapons experts in peaceful pursuits, are critical to preventing terrorist acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Although these programs have scored important, measurable successes in the last decade, much work remains to be done. At the current level of funding, it will take 13 more years to safeguard Russia ’s facilities and material.

In 2001, the Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board released a report card on DOE’s nonproliferation programs with Russia . The task force that compiled the report card, chaired by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler, recommended that the United States spend $30 billion over 10 years on programs with Russia . However, the current funding level of $1.7 billion per year, which includes non-proliferation programs with countries outside the former Soviet Union , falls far short of that goal.

Lack of cooperation on the part of the Russians must also be overcome to implement these programs effectively. Moscow has shown reluctance to allow U.S. access to Russian weapons facilities and remains locked in a legal dispute with the United States over protections for American agencies and contractors in Russia . The Bush Administration is examining revisions to existing laws to protect U.S. contractors - who are in the country to construct factories for destroying Russian plutonium and to convert weapons production sites into peaceful facilities - from liability should any accidents occur involving radioactive material. Russia has rejected the liability terms and construction of a new facility for converting plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for civilian power plants has been delayed at least a year.

Programs with Other Nations

Last year, for the first time, Congress approved expansion of Nunn-Lugar programs to other nations outside the former Soviet Union by authorizing the President to spend $50 million of un-obligated Nunn-Lugar funds elsewhere in the world. While Iraq and Libya are logical places to start, there are numerous other countries where the United States has little knowledge about weapons development and amounts of fissile material that may have been produced. It is critical to start dealing with these other countries so that terrorist groups or rogue states do not gain access to dangerous materials or scientists skilled in WMD research and development.

In addition to the $50 million authorization for CTR expansion, the FY 2005 DOE budget request includes an increase of over $3 million for nonproliferation export control programs targeted at countries outside the former Soviet Union . A growing portion of DOE’s International Materials Protection and Cooperation program is also dedicated to the Megaports initiative that installs radiation detection equipment at major international shipping ports. Even with this progress, much more needs to be done.

The President’s FY2005 budget request cuts $41.6 million from the Department of Defense CTR program and provides no major new initiatives in Department of Energy nonproliferation programs. These programs must be accelerated, streamlined, and expanded to other countries to have the best chance of continued success.

Recommendations:

• Amend Nunn-Lugar legislation so that CTR funds can be used in countries such as Libya , where remaining sanctions prohibit its implementation, or institute waivers for the same purpose on a case by case basis.
• Restore budget levels for Department of Defense CTR initiatives and authorize expanded cooperation with other states that need funding and expertise to secure WMD materials.
• Call for a series of high-level diplomatic meetings between U.S. and Russian officials to engage in working discussions about efficient CTR implementation and to resolve disputes over liability.
• Raise the level of funding for U.S. nonproliferation programs to levels more consistent with the 2001 recommendations of the Baker-Cutler Task force, which called for $30 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation efforts (still less than 1% of the military budget).
• Establish a high-level office to oversee nonproliferation programs across the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State. A nonproliferation office similar to the office of the Global AIDS Coordinator would provide this issue with the attention that it deserves; allow for a centralized approach and coordination across agencies, and foster the appointment of special envoys to oversee U.S. efforts on multiple proliferation fronts.

FISSILE MATERIAL CLEAN-OUT

Hundreds of tons of nuclear materials are stored at facilities around the world under inadequate security. Research reactors operating with highly enriched uranium (HEU) at university sites are a large component of this problem. A “global cleanout” is advocated by Center Board Member Matthew Bunn and others at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government as a means for removing plutonium and HEU from the most vulnerable facilities throughout the world that have this material. [1] The FY2005 budget request for the Department of Energy includes $45 million for ongoing programs to facilitate an “International Nuclear and Radiological Cleanout.” This funding is directed primarily at Russia and the former Soviet states, with allocations for clean-up of approximately a dozen vulnerable research reactor facilities in other countries. The request does little to advance the Congress’s FY2004 assessment, buttressed by an additional $5 million appropriation, that more money must be spent on removing material from vulnerable sites elsewhere in the world. [2]

Recommendations:

• Implement an emergency “global cleanout” by working with the G-8 and other nations to fully and securely remove nuclear material from the world’s vulnerable sites and provide incentives to facilities to give up their weapons-usable material and infrastructure for processing that material.
• Increase DOE funding for International Nuclear and Radiological Cleanout activities and designate additional countries and facilities for assistance.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush in May 2003, is a U.S.-led effort to stop shipments of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, as well as missiles and goods that could be used to deliver or produce such weapons, to terrorists and countries suspected of trying to acquire WMD. Sixteen countries are now actively engaged in the initiative. There is no designated office or defense budget line item associated with the PSI, and international concerns remain over the legal ramifications of the initiative. Yet, it is an important step in implementing nonproliferation activities outside a treaty-based regime.

Recommendations:

• Encourage cooperation with countries such as China , South Korea and Russia who are vital to this effort but reluctant to sign on to the PSI due to concerns about the program’s legal status.
• Support a clarified role for the PSI as an official program with a designated staff to oversee its principles and legal authority.

Container Security Initiative

Efforts to prevent WMD terrorism on U.S. soil receive only a small fraction of funding within the new Department of Homeland Security. The Customs and Border Protection Container Security Initiative (CSI), designed to protect U.S. security through the monitoring of ocean going containers, should be supported and expanded. The initiative allows for: 1) establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers; 2) pre-screening containers before they arrive at U.S. ports; 3) using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers; and 4) developing and using tamper-proof containers. Port-of-origin screening allows streamlined entry at U.S. ports for shipments that do not pose security risks. Governments representing 19 of the top 20 ports have agreed to implement CSI. 17 ports are listed as “CSI operational.”

Recommendations:

• Encourage and facilitate immediate expansion and implementation of CSI at other ports besides the top 20 and eventually all ports that ship to the United States .
• Approve the FY 2005 budget request for CSI, which is an increase of $25 million over the FY 2004 funding level.
• Elevate the importance of WMD terrorism prevention, particularly port and border security, in the Department of Homeland Security’s mandate.

BLACK MARKET WMD

The founder of Pakistan ‘s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, recently admitted to selling nuclear technology and know-how to Iran , North Korea , and Libya . This unprecedented breech of the nonproliferation regime reveals the significant threat to global security from some nuclear states, with or without the involvement of the government. In addition, little has been done about smaller countries that are known or suspected depots for the sale and exchange of arms and, potentially, WMD materials. One confirmed arms market and potential WMD exchange is in the Transdniester region of the former Soviet republic of Moldova . Another threat comes from U.S. ally the United Arab Emirates , which for 20 years has served as a transfer point for illicit commerce and aided Khan’s black market network. It is imperative to U.S. and global security that such networks are shut down.

Recommendations:

• Pressure governments of suspected arms depot countries to shut down black market commerce.
• Support the criminalization of proliferation by the United Nations and in national legislation.
• Strengthen programs to prevent “brain drain,” including financial and psychological incentives to prevent nuclear scientists and engineers from selling technology and know-how to black market operatives.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

The IAEA, the U.N.’s agency dedicated to promoting safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies, has nuclear safeguards agreements with more than 140 states intended to verify that each country is honoring its international commitments not to use nuclear energy programs for nuclear-weapons purposes. The safeguards system is critically important to the security of the United States and the entire international community. Last year, the IAEA carried out over 2,500 inspections at nearly 600 facilities in 70 countries and played a vital role in new inspections agreements with Libya and Iran . U.S. support for the IAEA has fluctuated with administrations and must be reaffirmed. President Bush has called for strengthening of the IAEA, including establishment of a special committee on safeguards and verification, but has not bolstered U.S. voluntary funds to the agency. As part of the United Nations system, the IAEA has international legitimacy, extensive experience in verification and inspections, and is cooperatively funded.

Recommendations:

• Immediately pass implementing legislation for the IAEA Additional Protocol, approved for ratification by the U.S. Senate on March 31, 2004, which calls for individual countries to expand their reporting of nuclear activities and grant broader rights of access to IAEA inspection teams.
• Approve an additional $20-$30 million one-time appropriation, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office, to implement the Additional Protocol, and $10-$15 million per year for recurring costs.
• Support an increase in the U.S. voluntary contribution to the IAEA and encourage similar action by other nations.

New Nuclear Weapons

The President’s FY2005 budget request again calls for research funding for new nuclear weapons, such as low-yield “mini-nukes” and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, and for reducing the time required to achieve nuclear test readiness to 18 months. These programs undermine U.S. nonproliferation demands on other countries and the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and send a signal to foreign governments that the United States is ramping up its own nuclear capabilities. While Administration officials state that this funding is for research only, DOE’s Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) suggests that program activity will accelerate after the feasibility research is completed and lead to eventual testing of designs.

Recommendations:

• Hold fast to Congress’s FY2004 budget decision to cut in half funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and reject the Administration’s FY2005 request of $27.6 million for the program.
• Refuse to shorten the time necessary for conducting a nuclear test and pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to assure U.S. allies and adversaries that the United States is committed to eliminating reliance on nuclear weapons.

For additional information, contact: Molly Pickett (202) 546-0795 ext. 119 mpickett@armscontrolcenter.org

[1] Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan ( Washington . D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Univeristy, March 2003).

[2] William Hoehn, “Analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2005 Nonproliferation Budget Request,” Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, February 2004.