2005 BRAC Commission Holds First Meeting
NOTES ON THE FIRST MEETING OF THE 2005 BRAC COMMISSION
The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission held it’s first hearing today on Capitol Hill. Testifying before the commission were Daniel Else, national defense specialist at the Congressional Research Service and Barry W. Holman, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, The Government Accountability Office. The Center’s Christopher Hellman attended the session. These are his observations.
Mr. Else focused his presentation on the history of base closures, and the anticipated similarities and differences of the 2005 BRAC process to previous closure rounds. He noted the seven steps for base closures: Congress granting the authority to hold a base closure round; DoD’s assessment and creation of the list of proposed bases; the Commission’s review and submission of its list to the President; the President’s approval and submission to Congress; Congress’s opportunity to adopt a motion of disapproval; the specified time to enact closures and realignments, limited to no more than six years, and the potentially long-term environmental remediation of the location by DoD.
Mr. Else discussed the impact that the changing strategic environment has had on DoD’s basing requirements. These changes were highlighted by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which contrasted the Cold War force structure and strategy to the evolving force focused on mobility and deployability.
Mr. Else detailed changes to the original process that have been adopted by Congress in recent years. In 2001 a package was adopted that would require the Commission, if it proposed adding a base to the list recommended by the Pentagon, to allow fifteen days for DoD to explain why the base was not included as part of the original list. It increased the number of commissioners needed to add a base to the list from five to seven, and required that the Secretary of Defense be invited to testify at the relevant commission hearing when the determination on the base was being considered. In the 2004 defense authorization legislation, Congress included language requiring the Defense Department to consult with the governors of states with bases proposed for closure to determine the impact on public access roads, and to take into accounts the infrastructure requirements of a potential “surge” in military operations and end strengths. The 2005 authorization package included language that bases could not be put on “inactive” status (i.e. “mothballed”) and that no changes could be made to DoD’s proposed list unless at least two commissioners visited a base being considered for addition to the final closure list.
Mr. Holman’s presentation focused on the role of the GAO in the BRAC process, and issues that GAO considered needed attention. He noted that due the short time frame that GAO has to evaluate DoD’s proposed list and report to the commission (between forty-five and sixty days), a non-disclosure agreement had been negotiated between GAO and DoD that allowed GAO access to DoD’s evaluation and selection process.
Mr. Holman reported that as of September 2001 (the six year deadline set by statute for implementation of closures from the 1995 round of base closures), DoD had completed all of its required actions. Savings (referred to as “cost avoidance”) realized were $29 billion, and resulted mainly from lower personnel and operations & maintenance costs. These savings did not reflect the costs associated with environmental cleanup of the bases.
Mr. Holman discussed DoD’s expectations from the upcoming BRAC round. In addition to the benefits experienced in previous rounds – the elimination of surplus infrastructure and resulting costs savings – DoD is also anticipating benefits from the upcoming closures in support of current military transformation initiatives, coordinating with the upcoming relocation of U.S. forces currently based overseas, and increasing jointness among the service branches. Mr. Holman noted the potential positive impact to domestic “receiving” bases of U.S. overseas forces returning home. He also indicated that DoD reports available to GAO did not provide an adequate basis for estimating the number of bases likely to close or be designated for joint usage, or to estimate the true level of existing excess capacity.
Mr. Holman listed four areas that GAO felt deserved the Commission’s attention. First, he cited the existing limitation on the use of “privatization in place” initiatives, which can only be utilized if specified by the Commission, which is required to certify that such a plan is the most cost-effective choice available. Second, he identified the requirement that when estimating savings, consideration had to be given to the costs of a facility’s closure both to DoD and to other federal agencies. Third, he noted that past closures had in a number of cases, permitted the development of “reserve enclaves.” Rather than being the “minimum essential facilities” for reserve activities envisioned by the Pentagon, these installations had in some cases grown to sizes in excess of the original base. The costs of these facilities were not included in the savings estimates used to justify the closure of the original base. Finally, he cautioned the commission to pay attention to the true extent that the DoD’s proposed closures and realignments supported jointness, or “cross-servicing.”
A number of new issues where raised during the question and answer session by the Commissioners.
Environmental Cleanup Costs – Why are they not included in cost/savings analysis? Mr. Holman replied that in many cases the costs of environmental cleanup were dictated by the use the base would be put to after closure, and therefore could not be anticipated. Further, it was DoD’s position that these costs would have to be paid eventually regardless of BRAC, and that only the timing of the cleanup was altered by the closure.
Impact of Forces Returning From Overseas – Do the services’ plans regarding the relocation of forces to specific bases limit their consideration for closure? Mr. Holman replied that while some bases had been identified as likely receivers for a few returning units (mainly by the Army), these decisions were tentative, and that the BRAC process would “inform” decisions on the final disposition of these units, implying that BRAC would drive the relocation process, rather than vice-versa.
National Guard Bases – Does closing them require the governor’s approval? This issue has received considerable recent media attention, and was raised by several of the Commission members. Mr. Holman replied that GAO had not fully researched the matter. He informed the commission that the 1995 BRAC round did include Guard facilities. Mr. Else stated that the statutes mentioned in the media do not appear to be applicable. In one case they refer to reservists, not the National Guard. They also refer to the treatment of “units” (i.e. personnel) rather than “facilities.” He indicated that the Illinois State Attorney General had been asked for an advisory opinion. Commission member Samuel Skinner stated that it would be more useful for them to have a more definitive analysis prepared by DoD.
Jointness – Is “Going Purple” a Commission Responsibility? Mr. Else replied that as a CRS analyst he is not permitted to make a specific recommendation, but that the commission has the right to reflect on any information it feels is appropriate. His interpretation of DoD’s eight criteria for selecting bases for closure or realignment includes enhancing joint operations.
Privatization in Place – What are the GAO and CRS positions on this type of initiative? Mr. Holman reflected that while it was difficult to assess savings to the government of privatization, they don’t reduce infrastructure support costs. Even if the Pentagon sells the facility to a private entity, the government will still be forced to indirectly bear the costs of operating and maintaining the facility as part of the total cost of the contract.
The Most Important Lesson From Prior BRAC Rounds – Both Mr. Holman and Mr. Else agreed that while the BRAC process isn’t perfect, the integrity of the process is sound. But this integrity can be undermined if the specific steps of the process are not followed. It is essential that the integrity of the process be maintained.
For additional information or comments, contact Christopher Hellman at (202) 546-0795, Ext. 197 or chellman@armscontrolcenter.org