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Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Policy Memo: Issues for the 108th Congress

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February 20, 2003

As the 108th Congress begins a new budget cycle, new threats to global security are emerging while old threats are resurfacing. This policy brief by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation previews key nonproliferation and national security issues that Congress will confront in 2003, and provides recommendations for policymakers who are responsible for guiding U.S. policy in the face of these challenges.

NORTH KOREA

Since U.S. officials confronted North Korea in October 2002 with allegations of its clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, North Korea has expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, removed IAEA cameras and seals on nuclear facilities that suspended activity under the 1994 Agreed Framework, announced its withdrawal from the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and may soon resume operation of a 5-Megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon capable of producing enough plutonium for one nuclear weapon per year. North Korea could produce another five to six nuclear weapons in six months if it decides to reprocess plutonium from approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods currently stored at Yongbyon. In addition, North Korea has threatened to resume ballistic missile flight tests and to withdraw from the 1953 Armistice ending the Korean War.

Options for dealing with North Korea range from the undesirable to the unthinkable. Promises of economic aid in exchange for North Korea’s dismantlement of its nuclear program risk rewarding bad behavior and send a message to proliferators that nuclear weapons are effective tools of political coercion. However, threats of military force or economic sanctions could push North Korea to further acts of nuclear brinkmanship, and possibly lead to a costly and devastating military confrontation.

Recommendations:

  1. The United States should enter into negotiations with North Korea without giving the appearance of yielding to North Korean demands. Bush Administration officials should also avoid harsh rhetoric that would undercut negotiations.
  2. Congress should not seek to cut or prohibit humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea. Food must not be used as a weapon.
  3. Congress should consider approving, subject to a Presidential request, special assistance to support a peaceful settlement of the current impasse. It might include funds available for additional humanitarian aid and energy infrastructure assistance, should the President ask for such assistance.
  4. President Bush should appoint a senior-level official responsible for coordinating policy towards North Korea. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry was chosen to fill a similar role after North Korea flight-tested a Taepo-Dong II missile in 1998.

IRAQ

As the United States continues its military build-up in the Persian Gulf, the American public and U.S. allies remain divided on whether to launch military action against Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell argued before the U.N. Security Council on February 5 that Iraq continues to deny access to and deceive U.N. weapons inspectors. However, chief inspector Hans Blix, while critical of Iraq in his progress report to the U.N. Security Council on February 14, was optimistic that inspections could yield significant results if given more time.

Iraq represents an important test of whether multilateral nonproliferation regimes or unilateral pre-emptive military options are the most effective way of confronting proliferation. Although disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction capabilities is critical to global nonproliferation efforts, a premature use of force by the United States could undermine the utility of U.N. inspection efforts and will set a dangerous precedent for global security policy.

Recommendations:

  1. Weapons inspections in Iraq have not hit a dead end, and UNMOVIC should be given additional time to carry out its mandate. In addition, inspections should be strengthened by placing more inspectors and equipment on the ground in Iraq, and Iraq should be pressured to allow U-2 overflights upon little or no notice. U.N. inspectors should also be given access to U.S. intelligence information on banned Iraqi weapons programs so that they can do their job effectively.
  2. If military action against Iraq becomes necessary, the United States should seek unity among its allies on the multilateral use of force and specific authorization by the U.N. Security Council. Force should be considered only if, in the judgment of the UNMOVIC, Iraq stands in material breach of its disarmament obligations and shows no willingness to honor those obligations.

PAKISTAN

Although Iraq and North Korea pose the most imminent foreign policy challenges to the United States, Pakistan may prove to be the most worrisome source of nuclear proliferation in the world. The Central Intelligence Agency believes that Pakistan provided key uranium enrichment designs, technology, and machinery to North Korea as a quid pro quo for ballistic missiles received in 1997. Pakistan may have also provided North Korea with information on how to design and build a nuclear bomb. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Dr. A.Q. Khan, reportedly made at least 13 visits to North Korea in the past decade. According to one Pakistani opposition newspaper, as many as nine former Pakistani nuclear scientists have emigrated to unknown countries in the past six years.

Recommendations:

  1. The United States should pressure Pakistan to fully disclose the nature and extent of the assistance it provided to North Korea’s nuclear program. Such information is vital to understanding the scope of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program.
  2. The Bush Administration should seek assurances from Pakistan that weapons of mass destruction and related materials will not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states.
  3. The United States should continue its diplomatic drive to encourage India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes peacefully so that they are not driven to deploy operational nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

MOSCOW TREATY

Neither Russia nor the United States has ratified the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002. The treaty commits both countries to reduce their strategic offensive nuclear weapons arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by 2012. However, it does not require the destruction of a single nuclear weapon or delivery system, and contains no provisions to determine verification and compliance. Moreover, the treaty does not address Russia’s enormous stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons that poses an acute proliferation threat.

Recommendations:

  1. The Senate should ratify the Moscow Treaty, along with special conditions and restrictions that seek to improve verification, clarify the timetable for nuclear reductions, and destroy retired warheads.
  2. Congress should make additional funding available for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in order to assist Russia in carrying out its next wave of nuclear reductions under the Moscow Treaty.
  3. Congress should urge the Administration to cooperate with Russia in reducing the acute proliferation threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

U.S. nonproliferation programs that secure and dispose of Russian nuclear materials, dismantle former Soviet weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and engage former weapons experts in peaceful pursuits, are critical to preventing terrorist acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Although these programs have scored important, measurable successes in the last decade, much work remains to be done. Nonproliferation programs must be accelerated, expanded, and streamlined to have the best chance of continued success.

Recommendations:

  1. The White House should appoint a senior official in charge of coordinating and implementing all U.S. nonproliferation programs.
  2. The Bush Administration should further develop a strategic plan to guide all U.S. nonproliferation programs. The strategic plan should incorporate international participation in threat reduction as envisioned in the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
  3. Congress should empower the President with permanent authority to waive restrictions on CTR spending so that the program does not encounter crippling delays in implementation, as it did in 2002.

MISSILE DEFENSE

With President Bush’s announcement last December that he is planning to deploy several missile defense systems in 2004-5, this will be an important year for missile defense budgets, testing, and Congressional oversight. The Administration increased its request for missile defense in fiscal 2004 by nearly 30% to $9.8 billion, partially to fund the deployment of an untested system. U.S. law requires successful completion of operational testing before full-rate production of major defense acquisition programs begins. However, it was recently reported that the Defense Department is now requesting a waiver of this law for missile defense. Ironically,the Missile Defense Agency has also recently cancelled its next two intercept tests,and plans no intercept tests until late this year if the schedule holds. This circumvention of standard practices should give pause to lawmakers concerned about essential oversight and accountability. Further, plans for a space-based test bed may be an early indication of the Administration’s desire to place weapons in space.

Recommendations:

  1. Congress should approve no funding for deployment of missile defenses until those programs have successfully completed operational testing, as required by U.S. law. Funding should be restricted to research and development. Congress should reject the Pentagon’s request for a waiver of this important law.
  2. Congress should exercise its oversight authority in order to ensure a rigorous testing schedule for all developmental programs, to receive a full and detailed list of expenditures by each program and to identify specific areas of concern. For example, the booster rocket for the ground-based midcourse system has not yet been chosen and the selection process is already more than a year behind schedule. Similarly, the development of the SBIRS-Low radar has consistently been behind schedule and above cost estimates.
  3. Congress should urge the Administration to finalize and make public the specific missile defense programs it intends to pursue, as recommended by the Defense Science Board.
  4. Congress should hold hearings on the space-based test bed and its implications for the weaponization of space, international security, and missile defense funding.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The October 2001 anthrax attacks through the U.S. postal system demonstrated the frightening ease with which terrorists can acquire and use biological weapons. Operation Dark Winter, a simulated smallpox attack against the United States conducted in 2001 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Advancing National Strategies and Enabling Results (ANSER), and Johns Hopkins University, revealed that U.S. political leaders and public health “first responders” are unprepared to respond effectively to a biological attack.

Recommendations:

  1. The United States must take the lead in developing an effective verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.
  2. The Bush Administration should cooperate with other members of the Australia Group on improving information sharing, promoting adoption of effective national export control laws, and enforcing member compliance.
  3. Congress should support enhanced bio-detection capabilities at key points of entry into the United States, improved capabilities to respond to a biological attack, and evaluate the effectiveness of those technologies and capabilities.

BORDER SECURITY

Given the potential human and economic costs of an attack against the United States’ vulnerable transportation infrastructure with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), and the limited ability of U.S. border security personnel to screen incoming cargo to detect chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons, Congress must make securing U.S. borders against WMD a top priority.

In order to make responsible spending decisions, Congress must weigh several factors to determine the best response to this threat. Congress must balance the likelihood terrorists could successfully smuggle WMD into the United States against other homeland security priorities. Also, the costs of implementing a system to detect WMD at U.S. borders will be high, as may be the economic costs of intrusive inspections.

Recommendations:

  1. Congress should increase funding for the Customs Service’s Container Security Initiative and the Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programs that ‘push back’ U.S. borders and increase supply chain security, respectively.
  2. Congress should call upon, and provide resources to, the scientific community to develop chemical and biological detection devices for use at U.S. border crossings.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Congress created the Department of Homeland Security to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce U.S. vulnerabilities and minimize the impact from terrorist attacks that do occur. In November 2002, the Administration presented a reorganization plan outlining a time frame to implement the Department. Most agencies will be transferred by March 1, and, according to the plan, the transfer process will be completed by September 30, 2003.

Once established, the Department will consist of over 25 existing federal agencies. However, many more - by some counts over 100 - federal, state and local agencies contribute to homeland security. A successful homeland security effort will require communication, coordination, and cooperation among the Department and those agencies that remain outside of it.

Recommendations:

  1. Congress should require the Administration to provide regular updates on the progress and status of the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security, as well as detailed information on issues such as budget authority, logistical and management concerns, and how agencies adjust their strategies and programs to fulfill their new missions.
  2. Congress should require the Administration to draft a plan that details how the Department of Homeland Security, and those agencies that contribute to homeland security outside of the Department, will cooperate.

CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Some 88 House and Senate Committees have jurisdiction over homeland security; over 50 alone for the prevention of terrorist attacks. While the House created a Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 108th Congress, it shares jurisdiction with the standing committees and can thus not really centralize homeland security policy. The Senate has retained its pre-9/11 committee structure.

This fragmented approach hampers Congress’ ability to create and oversee a cohesive homeland security policy. Officials from the Department of Homeland Security must respond to many masters on the Hill that, at times, have competing interests. Additionally, the lack of a central budgeting authority for homeland security in general, and the Department specifically, makes it impossible to budget for homeland security and risks under-funding some mission areas, while creating redundancy in others.

Recommendations:

  1. The Senate should create a permanent Select Committee on Homeland Security, as the House has done, to oversee the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, standing committees that currently have jurisdiction over homeland security should create Homeland Security Task Forces. These Task Forces would represent their committee jurisdiction in front of the Permanent Select Committees, which would retain final say over homeland security policy.
  2. The Senate, as the House has done, should establish a Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee.