Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Domestic Base Closures: Historical Background

The issue of closure or realignment of military installations is as old as the world’s militaries themselves. As the size, types and roles of the military change, so too must the infrastructure that supports it. The proper bases, training and logistical support facilities are essential components of preparing and supporting any military force. Outdated or surplus facilities place an unnecessary burden on the military; or worse, fail to adequately support the force.

Over the past two decades, the United States has experienced difficulties in closing military bases, although the Defense Department has maintained that it is important to do so in order to meet the reduced requirements of a smaller force of changing makeup. This lack of movement has been in large measure due to a statute enacted by Congress in 1977 (P.L. 95-92), which required the secretary of defense to submit any requests for closure or realignment of a base to Congress as part of the annual appropriations process. Each submission had to be accompanied by an analysis of the budgetary, economic, strategic and environmental impacts of the proposed changes, and was ultimately subject to congressional approval. Such procedures made closing bases very difficult in practice, and no major closures occurred between 1977 and 1991.

As a result of continued DoD pressure, a consensus emerged that a significant number of U.S. military installations at home and abroad could be closed without adversely impacting U.S. national security. Members of Congress remained leery, however, fearing that certain bases would be closed, while others kept open, for political, rather than national security reasons. According to some members, DoD officials would, on occasion, use the threat of closing a particular base if an individual member refused to support a specific Pentagon program.

THE 1988 BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

In order to insulate the base closure process from political pressures, Congress devised a complex procedure for selecting bases for closure. The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-526) relied on an independent commission to make closure recommendations, followed by an “all-or-nothing” fast-track vote for approving proposed closures. Under this system, once started, closures were very difficult to stop.

Under the process, DoD proposed a list of bases for closure or realignment. A commission of 12 members – all appointed by then Secretary of Defense James Carlucci – reviewed the recommendations, and was permitted to add or delete bases. The commission’s recommendations were then forwarded to the president, who could also seek changes in the list. The president would then submit the list to Congress. If a disagreement arose between the president and the commission over the contents of the list, the president could halt the process by refusing to forward the recommendations to Congress.

Upon receiving the list, Congress had to pass a joint resolution of disproval within 45 days to block the closures. If Congress failed to act within that time, or either house did not pass the resolution, then the closures would automatically go in to effect. Congress had no power to change the list, and had to accept or reject it in its entirety.

The first base closure commission released its report on Dec. 29, 1988. It recommended the full closure of 86 bases, including 16 major facilities (defined as those with 300 or more civilian employees); the partial closure of five bases; and the realignment of 54 – a total of 145 impacted bases. The commission estimated that this would generate an annual savings of $693.6 million in reduced operating expenses and a 20-year savings of $5.6 billion (current dollars). The secretary of defense was required to complete all recommended actions by Sept. 30, 1995. Congress did not pass a resolution of disproval, and the first base – Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire – was closed on March 31, 1991.

After submitting its final report, the 1988 BRAC commission was disbanded.

THE 1991 BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

In 1990, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney submitted a list of bases to Congress to consider for closure. However, Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, rejected the list, stating that the bases selected fell disproportionately in the districts of Democratic members. According to Aspin, the only fair way to develop a new list of base closures was through another commission. As a result, Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510).

The new BRAC commission would consist of eight members selected by the president, with the advice and consent of the Senate. In selecting commission nominees, the president was to consult with the Speaker of the House in appointing two members, the Senate majority leader on two others, and the House and Senate minority leaders on one appointee each. The commission was to be responsible for overseeing three base closure rounds, in 1991, 1993 and 1995 - dates that were selected to conform to non-election years.

Under the 1990 law, the secretary of defense would submit to the commission a list of recommended closures and realignments for review. The commission, after completing its review and making any changes, would then forward its list to the president for approval, who would in turn, transmit it to Congress. If the president could not approve the list, in whole or in part, he was required to convey his rationale to Congress and the commission. The commission would then transmit to the president a revised list. Unlike the 1988 process, the president could not stop the process.

The 1990 law included a number of important provisions not included in the 1988 law. First, it directed the secretary of defense to ensure that environmental restoration at the closing bases was completed as soon as possible. It specifically authorized the DoD to provide “outplacement assistance” – job placement and retraining – to DoD civilian employees at installations being closed or losing civilian jobs due to realignment. The law also established a specific base closure account, where revenues from sales of real property at bases being closed would be deposited and used to cover costs associated with the relocation of forces to new bases.

The 1990 law also required DoD to develop and publish its proposed criteria for selecting bases for closure. After a period for public comment, the final criteria were published in the Federal Register on Feb. 15, 1991. Congress had 30 days to pass a joint resolution of disapproval, but no resolution was adopted. As a result, DoD was directed, when selecting bases for realignment or closure, to consider the following criteria:

In April 1991, DoD released its proposed closure list. It included a total of 71 bases, with 48 recommended for closure and 28 recommended for realignment. DoD estimated that the costs to implement these closures would be $5.7 billion between FY’92 and FY’97, with as much as $1.9 billion offset from asset sales. DoD estimated that total savings during that period would be $6.5 billion, with an annual recurring savings of $1.7 billion beginning in FY’98.

Based on DoD’s proposal, the 1991 commission issued a preliminary list in May, and its final list on July 1, 1991. It contained 82 bases, including 26 major closures. The commission’s list closely resembled DoD’s, but contained several notable exceptions. The commission recommended that Fort Chafee (AZ) and Fort Dix (NJ) be realigned, while Fort McClellan (AL), Orlando Naval Training Station (FL), Whidbey Island Naval Air Station (WA), and Moody Air Force Base (GA) remain open. DoD had selected all six bases for closure. The commission estimated that the proposed closings would cost $4.1 billion over the period FY’92 through FY’97, but would result in annual savings of $1.5 billion thereafter. President George Bush approved the recommendations on July 10, and Congress did not act on a resolution of disproval within the 45 days provided by the statute.

THE 1993 BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Despite his defeat in the November 1992 elections President George Bush submitted his list of eight nominees for the 1993 Commission to the Senate on Jan. 5, 1993, in order to comply with the base closing law’s statutory deadline. The Senate confirmed the nominees. Defense Secretary Les Aspin submitted his recommendations for closure to the commission on March 12. It included 165 bases, including 31 major closures and 12 major realignments. DoD estimated that net costs of $1.7 billion in fiscal years 1994 through 1996, with nets savings of $5.7 during fiscal years 1997 through 1999, and $3.1 billion annual savings from then on.

The commission forwarded its closure recommendations to President Bill Clinton on July 2. It numbered 175 installations, including 35 major closures and 27 major realignments. The commission estimated that one-time closure costs would be $7 billion, with net savings of $4.0 billion between FY-94 and FY-99, and annual savings of $2.3 billion thereafter.

The commission’s recommendations differed fairly significantly from those of DoD. The commissioners rejected DoD’s recommended closure of six major installations and realignment of four major bases. The commission recommended that Fort McClellan (AL); Meridian Naval Air Station (MS), South Weymouth Naval Air Station (MA), Oakland Naval Supply Center (CA), and the Philadelphia Aviation Supply Office (PA) be kept open, while Homestead Air Force Base (FL) be realigned. Removed from the realignment list were Fort Monmouth (NJ), Letterkenny Army Depot (PA), New London Naval Submarine Base (CT) and McGuire Air Force Base (NJ). The president nonetheless forwarded the list to Congress, which did not act on a resolution of disproval.

THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

President Bill Clinton submitted his list of seven nominees (commission chairman former Sen. Alan Dixon (IL) was nominated and confirmed in Oct., 1994) on March 2, 1995. [Footnote – in order to meet the statutory requirement that a list be submitted by Jan. 3, Clinton submitted a “placeholder” list on Dec. 1, 1994.] Defense Secretary William Perry submitted his recommendations for closure to the commission on Feb. 28. It included 146 facilities, with 34 major closures and 26 major realignments. DoD estimated that one time costs of $3.8 billion, with a net savings of $4.0 billion during fiscal year 1996 through 2001, and continued annual savings of $1.8 billion.

The commission forwarded its closure recommendations to Clinton on June 30. It contained 132 installations, including 28 major closures and 21 major realignments. The commission estimated that one-time closure costs would be $3.6 billion and annual savings of $1.6 billion.

The commission’s recommendations differed from those of DoD significantly more than in past years, dropping 13 bases from the Pentagon’s list, while adding nine new bases. These included, for closure, Oakland Army Base (CA), Fort Holabird (MD), Oakland Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (CA), Chicago O’Hare IAP Air Reserve Station (IL), and McClellan Air Force Base (CA). Added for realignment were Guam Public Works Center and Kelly Air Force Base (TX), and for [disestablishment] were McClellan Defense Distribution Depot (CA), and the San Antonio Defense Distribution Depot (TX).

After initial speculation that Clinton would reject the list, he approved it as submitted. In his transmittal letter to Congress, he expressed his concerns about the potential economic impact of the proposed closures on Texas and California.

On July 26, the House National Security Committee defeated a resolution of disproval introduced by Rep. Frank Tejeda (D-TX), by a vote of 43-10. The full House rejected the resolution on Sept. 8 by a vote of 345-75. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution, and the Commission’s recommendations were therefore adopted.

PRIVATIZATION IN PLACE

DoD’s initial report to the 1995 commission expressed strong opposition to the closure of Kelly Air Force Base (TX) and McClellan Air Force Base (CA), calling instead for an overall realignment and consolidation of the Air Force’s five Air Logistics Centers [Footnote: The other three being Hill AFB (UT), Robins AFB (GA), and Tinker AFB (OK)]. Citing “significant excess capacity and infrastructure in the Air Force depot system,” the commission recommended the closure of McClellan AFB and ALC and the Kelly ALC, and the realignment of Kelly AFB.

With the 1996 presidential election already looming on the horizon, and concern about the massive job loss that would occur in two politically critical states (estimated employment at Kelly was 16,000 at the time the closures were announced, and a further 11,000 at McClellan), the Clinton administration briefly considered rejecting the commission’s recommendations. The White House and the Pentagon came up with an alternative – keeping jobs at these facilities, while shifting them to the private sector.

Defense Secretary William Perry explained the concept, dubbed “privatization in place.” The bases would be closed, however, rather than have their functions transferred to another location, DoD would “keep the key skilled workers at those bases there and working, but now under contract to a private contractor, instead of as a government depot.” [Press availability with Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov, July 7, 1995] The actual closures of the facilities would not occur for five years. Independent defense contractors would then bid on government work to be done on site, using the former government employees already at the facilities rather than their own employees.

LEGAL CHALLENGE TO THE BASE CLOSURE PROCESS

On July 8, 1991, a group including members of Congress filed suit in federal court challenging the base closure process. The action was the result of the commission’s recommendation to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, which the claimants stated failed to comply with the requirements set forth in the 1990 Base Closure Act. The federal court found against the plaintiffs, who then appealed, first to the federal appeals court and ultimately to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court issued its ruling on May 23, 1994. In it, the court upheld the decision of the federal court, stating that under the 1990 law the base closure process was not subject to judicial review. Responding to the Supreme Court’s decision, chairman of the commission, Jim Courter said, “this decision will bring a long-awaited sense of finality to a process that was created for that very purpose…[and without which] the entire base closure process…would be thwarted.” [“Courter Applauds Supreme Court Decision,” Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission press release, May 24, 1994.]

[For additional information, see Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 128 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994).]

EVENTS SINCE 1995

Starting with the FY’98 budget request, the Pentagon has asked Congress for authority to perform additional BRAC rounds each year, despite strong congressional opposition. Congress has, on occasion, considered BRAC legislation, but bills calling for further base closures were soundly defeated in both the House and Senate in 1997; and again in the Senate in 1999, at which time the House did not address the issue. Base closure opponents, citing the Clinton Administration’s “privatization in place” initiative, accused the White House of tampering with the process and undermining its integrity by politicizing it. Armed with this rationale, Congressional opponents were able to beat back repeated attempts by the Pentagon close additional facilities. For all intents and purposes, further base closures were considered a dead issue as long as President Clinton was in office.

On April 2, 1998, the Pentagon released “The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure,” in an attempt to convince Congress to approve additional rounds of military base closures in 2001 and 2005. According to the report, the military had 23 percent excess base capacity. The Pentagon estimated that the closures already approved would produce savings of $25 billion through 2003 and $5.6 billion annually thereafter. The additional closures were expected to save a further $21 billion from 2008-2015, and $3 billion in every successive year.

In a prepared statement accompanying the report, then Defense Secretary William Cohen said, “Our need is clear and compelling. The Department of Defense has more base capacity than is required to meet the needs of our fighting forces. Eliminating this excess capacity will save the department billions of dollars. These resources will help ensure that the department can sustain our high state of readiness and provide our troops with modern weapons.”

BRAC IS BACK

In 2001, with a new, and Republican, Administration in the White House, congressional opponents of base closures found themselves unable to hold back the tide any longer. As part of its fiscal year 2002 budget request, the Pentagon sought an additional round of base closures in 2003. The Senate version of the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act included language permitting an additional closure round in 2005, while the House version did not. Yet with President George W. Bush threatening to veto any version of bill that came to his desk without base closure authorization, Senate base closure supporters – in particular Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-Va.), ranking committee Democrat Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and committee member John McCain (R-Ariz.) – were able to push through language permitting a new round of closures.

The new legislation called for a slightly different process than that which guided the closures in the 1990s. First, it expanded the number of commissioners from eight to nine, in order to avoid tie votes. Second, it increased the number of commissioners needed to add a base to DoD’s proposed closure list from a simple majority of five to a super-majority of seven. Despite the fact that the legislation delayed the closure date requested by the Administration by two years, President Bush approved the package. While supporters of the delay stated that it would allow the economy to improve and thus cushion the blow of additional closures, many analysts viewed the delay as a window of opportunity for BRAC opponents to rally their supporters and overturn the measure.

Congressional base closure opponents have tried repeatedly, if unsuccessfully, to capitalize on this opportunity. During consideration of the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization Act, the House included language in its version of the legislation that would have required a unanimous vote of nine commissioners to add a base to the closure list, rather than the seven-vote super majority. While this language was later dropped, the final version of the legislation included another House provision requiring at least two commissioners to visit a base before it could be selected for closure.

These efforts to water down the BRAC process continued during Congress’s consideration of the FY’04 authorization package, particularly in the House. In May 2003, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness included language in its version of the bill repealing the 2002 base closure authority, despite threats by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that he would recommend that that President veto any legislation that significantly altered the BRAC process. Later the full House Armed Services Committee eliminated this provision, requiring instead that any closure round would have to preserve sufficient basing infrastructure to support a significantly larger military force than currently existed, and that another that required the Secretary of Defense to designate at least 50 percent of domestic bases as “essential,” and thus exempt from closure. The committee did, however, reject a proposal to delay the closure round until 2007. The Senate, however, continued to support the BRAC process by rejecting an amendment canceling the 2005 closure round offered by Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N. Dak.) and Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) during floor consideration of its authorization legislation. The final version of the legislation signed into law by the President did not include the House language, and permitted the 2005 BRAC round to go ahead as scheduled.

The House and Senate were once again at cross-purposes on the base closure issue during consideration of the FY’05 defense authorization legislation. The version of the legislation that the House Armed Services committee sent to the floor included language that would effectively delay the process for two years, and the full House soundly defeated an amendment to strike the delaying language by a vote of 162-259. Meanwhile the Senate continued to support further closures, defeating an amendment by Sen. Trent Lott canceling the 2005 BRAC round by 47-49. As in previous years, and facing a veto threat from the President if the BRAC process was obstructed, the Senate position prevailed, and the final version of the legislation allowed the base closure process to continue.