Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Backgrounder on Proposed U.S. Arms Sale to the Middle East

by Carah Ong [contact information]

by Travis Sharp [contact information]

August 9, 2007

"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children...This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron."

- President Dwight Eisenhower, "The Chance for Peace," Speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953^[1]

OVERVIEW OF THE DEAL

In July, it was announced that the United States plans to sell at least $20 billion in advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. In separate but related deals, U.S. military aid to Israel will go up 25% to $30 billion over ten years, and aid to Egypt will be renewed at an unchanged rate ($13 billion over ten years).

The precise makeup of the exports to Saudi Arabia and the GCC has not been determined, but the list of weapons is expected to include:^[2]

• Air-to-air guided missiles
• Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), highly advanced satellite-guided bombs^[3]
• Fighter upgrades
• New naval vessels

The export of cutting edge weapons like JDAMs would be an improvement over arms Saudi Arabia has previously received from the U.S. in terms of quality, but it is not clear how much the deal would increase annual sales in dollar terms. The U.S. sold Saudi Arabia $15 billion in weapons over the last nine years. How much of an increase this deal constitutes will depend on the period of time over which it unfolds.^[4]

The proposed arms deal is opposed by some in Congress. Representatives Anthony Weiner (D-NY) and Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) have announced that they will sponsor legislation blocking the proposal "the minute Congress is officially notified."^[5] Congress has the power to block foreign arms sales under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, but any joint resolution of disapproval has to pass both the House and Senate and avoid a presidential veto.^[6]

BUSH ADMINISTRATION JUSTIFICATIONS

The Bush Administration has three primary rationales for the arms deal:

Counter-Balancing Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda
A senior Administration official involved in the negotiations for the deal told the Washington Post July 28 that it was "part of a larger regional strategy...We're paying attention to the needs of our allies and what everyone in the region believes is a flexing of muscles by a more aggressive Iran. One way to deal with that is to make our allies and friends strong."^[7] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the Gulf arms package would "help bolster forces of moderation and support a broader strategy to counter the negative influences of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran."^[8] Not coincidentally, the states receiving arms under this deal are majority Sunni, while Iran is majority Shia.

Strengthening Defense and Political Cooperation
The Administration sees American arms exports to the Gulf States as a way to fortify U.S. influence in the region. This deal helps dissuade the Gulf States from opting to purchase Russian or Chinese weapons, which would result in an increase in Russia and China's regional influence and a relative decrease in American influence.

Showing Commitment in Advance of a Possible Withdrawal from Iraq
A senior defense official said the deal was designed to assure Middle Eastern allies that "Regardless of what happens in the near-term in Iraq that our commitment in the region remains firm, remains steadfast and that, in fact, we are looking to enhance and develop it."^[9] The deal aims to allay fears among allies that a U.S. troop withdrawal or reduction in Iraq will herald broader American disengagement from the international scene in general and the Middle East in particular.

PROBLEMS WITH THE DEAL

The proposed arms deal has a number of shortcomings:

Countries in the Middle East need more diplomacy and democracy, not more missiles and bombs
Although Secretary Rice has previously disavowed the policy of achieving regional stability by propping up undemocratic regimes, that is what the deal in effect achieves.^[10] America should be working with Saudi Arabia to improve political freedom and women's rights. Instead, this deal rewards an oppressive monarchy whose human rights record has not met expectations of improvement following the accession to the throne of King Abdullah in August 2005.^[11]

Saudi Arabia is actively undermining the Iraqi government and therefore should not be entitled to U.S. assistance
Saudi Arabia is, at best, an unwilling contributor to the chaos in Iraq. Approximately 45% of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops in Iraq are from Saudi Arabia.^[12] U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Zalmay Khalilzad has implied that Saudi Arabia is "pursuing destabilizing policies" with regards to Iraq.^[13] Failure to condition military aid to Saudi Arabia on ending these troubling practices in Iraq is misguided.

As previous experiences with Iran and Iraq illustrate, selling arms to strategic allies can backfire if the regime or relationship changes
The U.S. engaged in large-scale intelligence sharing with Iraq and supplied the country with cluster bombs in the 1980s, only to fight the Iraqi military in 1991 and again in 2003.^[14] Iran made one-third of its defense purchases from the U.S. during the 1970s, but this deal would arm other countries to counterbalance Washington's former patron.^[15] Using deadly technologies as the currency of friendship is a dangerous practice with unpredictable results and should not be pursued so haphazardly.

NOTES

^1. Available online

^2. Rachel Stohl, "The Saudi Arms Deal: Congressional Opposition Grows," Foreign Policy in Focus (August 6, 2007).

^3. GlobalSecurity.org, "Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)."

^4. Stohl, "The Saudi Arms Deal: Congressional Opposition Grows."

^5. Patti Waldmeir, "Bush Faces Saudi Arms Hurdle," MSNBC (July 29, 2007).

^6. Richard Grimmett, "Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process," Congressional Research Service (December 20, 2002).

^7. Robin Wright, "U.S. Plans New Arms Sales to Gulf Allies," Washington Post (July 28, 2007).

^8. Ellen Knickmeyer, "Gulf States Buy Arms With Wary Eye on Iran," Washington Post (August 4, 2007).

^9. David Cloud, "U.S. Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal To Saudi Arabia," New York Times (July 28, 2007). Subscription only.

^10.Washington Post editorial, "Arms for 'Stability'," (August 1, 2007).

^11. Human Rights Watch, "Overview of Human Rights Issues in Saudi Arabia," World Report 2007 (December 31, 2006).

^12. Ned Parker, "Saudis' Role in Iraq Insurgency Outlined," Los Angeles Times (July 15, 2007).

^13. Zalmay Khalilzad, "Why the United Nations Belongs in Iraq," New York Times (July 20, 2007). Subscription only.

^14. Michael Dobbs, "U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup," Washington Post (December 30, 2002).

^15. John P. Miglietta, American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992, Lexington Books: New York, 2002, pp. 59.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (USA, ret.), interview with Uprising Radio (July 31, 2007).

Carah Ong, interview with Your Call radio (August 8, 2007).