An Army Goes Scrounging
Christopher Hellman, Military Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
In recent days the Pentagon has been on the defensive over the lack of adequate armor for military vehicles operating in Iraq, and other equipment critical for protecting U.S. military forces in the field. There is now a widespread image of American service personnel picking through scrap heaps searching for steel plate and bulletproof glass to upgrade their vehicles with what the troops refer to as “hillbilly armor.”
Yet the shortages of force protection equipment for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan became apparent almost immediately after combat operations began almost two years ago, particularly among Guard and Reserve units. Inadequate supplies of body armor, highly-armored vehicles, and other equipment vital for what the military refers to as Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) – the type of vicious, house-to-house fighting seen in Fallujah and numerous other Iraqi cities — were being reported both up the chain of command and in the media even as President Bush was declaring “mission accomplished” in May 2003.
Still, after twenty months of combat operations, these problems persist, a situation made even more incomprehensible given the fact that the two companies providing the majority of the armor kits for U.S. military vehicles have both indicated that they are operating below capacity, and are simply awaiting the go-ahead for additional equipment from the Pentagon.
Unfortunately, the continuing shortages described by Army Spc. Thomas Wilson in his question to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld are not new news. They have been problems for many years, dating back before the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. They reflect the inertia symptomatic of most large bureaucracies, the Pentagon even more so than most. While much has been said in Washington about “military transformation,” and the services have gradually, and in many cases grudgingly, begun to think “outside the box,” the fact is that the Pentagon by and large continues to support, train and equip a force predicated on the type of maneuver warfare that characterized the Cold War and was largely reflected in the 1991 Gulf War.
Meanwhile, places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and Somalia – smaller conflicts against less sophisticated foes — have nevertheless provided clear hints about the challenges a modern military faces when it becomes an occupational force. The Pentagon has worked to lighten and increase the mobility of its force, and become increasingly reliant on the effectiveness of dominant air power. Yet it has been slow to recognize the changed nature of modern combat operations, those no longer shaped by traditional battle lines and instead dominated by unconventional tactics – a situation more reminiscent of Vietnam than of a land war in Europe.
As we at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation observed a year ago, “this shocking state of affairs is largely the result of the continued misallocation of resources by the Pentagon, which persists in funding the priorities of the past at the expense of the needs of the present and preparing for the challenges of the future. Such shortages will continue as long as the Pentagon retains its outdated focus on its Cold War mission, rather than the operations that constitute the military’s actual combat requirements.” As recent events have shown, this statement remains true today.
For additional comments or permission to reprint this article contact Christopher Hellman at (202) 546-0795, Ext. 197, or chellman@armscontrolcenter.org