Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Three Weapons Systems to Watch in 2009

by Travis Sharp [contact information]

February 26, 2009

F-22 Raptor

The Air Force officially still wants 381 F-22 Raptor aircraft, an advanced 5th generation tactical fighter, although recent reports suggest that Air Force officials may be willing to settle for only 243 aircraft. Bush administration defense officials expressed repeatedly their preference that only the planned investment schedule of 183 F-22s be purchased due to budgetary pressures. “The reality is we are fighting two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the F-22 has not performed a single mission in either theater,” Secretary Gates said in February 2008. Added Gates: “I think that something along the lines of 183 [F-22s] is a reasonable buy.” Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn told the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2009 that the F-22 would “be a key issue for the early strategy and program-budget reviews that the department will conduct over the next few months.”

Based on the most recent Pentagon estimate, the F-22’s per unit cost, which includes both research and development (R&D) and procurement funds, is $351 million per plane in FY 2008 dollars. The final FY 2009 base budget included $3.4 billion in procurement funding, plus an additional $1 billion in R&D and modification, to pay for the last production lot of 20 Raptors, which will bring the total to 183 aircraft. However, in its base budget appropriation Congress also included $523 million in advance procurement funding so that the Obama administration could keep the F-22 production line open and purchase more aircraft if it so chooses. The FY 2009 Defense Authorization bill stipulated that the new administration must certify no later than March 1 whether or not procuring more F-22s is in the national interest of the United States.

In January 2009, 194 representatives and 44 senators signed letters to President Obama encouraging him to continue building Raptor fighters. The domestic benefits of F-22 production were touted in both the House and Senate versions of the letter. Others have called for cancelling the Raptor program. For instance, the Center for American Progress published a December 2008 report arguing that the F-22 “is nearly useless for irregular warfare” and, while still providing “a strong silver-bullet force,” should be canceled immediately to save $12 billion over the next four years.

In a letter to congressional leaders, Secretary Gates wrote that $600 million for four F-22s would be requested in the extra FY 2009 war supplemental. This potential inclusion of Raptor money in the supplemental, which would increase the total program quantity to 187 from 183 aircraft, has made Lockheed Martin bullish that a full production lot of F-22s will be purchased for FY 2010.

DDG-1000 Destroyer

The DDG-1000 destroyer is a new class of surface combatant that is mired in controversy. The ship’s stated mission is to provide naval fire-support and land-attack capabilities, but the vessel’s large size – a displacement of 14,500 tons, far larger than the Navy’s other surface combatants – make it more appropriate for open ocean warfare against another naval power.

The Navy originally planned to acquire 16 to 24 DDG-1000s. Navy officials later testified to Congress in 2005 that their requirement had dropped to between eight to 12 ships. In February 2006, the Navy's planned procurement of DDG-1000s was cut to just seven vessels. Then, in July 2008, , the Navy announced that it had decided to terminate the DDG-1000 program after only two ships, both of which already had been paid for, and instead buy at least eight, and maybe more, additional DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Press reports indicate that Secretary Gates approved the Navy’s plan to cancel the DDG-1000.

The outcry from Congress was massive, however, particularly from the New England congressional delegations where the ships are built. Sensitive to this criticism, the Navy soon reversed itself and decided to push for a third DDG-1000, citing concerns about the “stability of the industrial base” and the need to “continue the development of advanced surface ship technologies.” The latter justification reinforced the view held by some analysts that the DDG-1000 has degenerated into a “technology demonstrator” that will never enter full-scale production and instead will be used to experiment with designs for future ship classes.

Based on a leaked internal DOD estimate, the DDG-1000’s per ship cost now stands at $6 billion. But Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition John Young, a fierce champion of the ship, dismissed this figure. Using the most recent official Pentagon estimate, the DDG-1000s per unit cost, which includes both R&D and procurement funds, is $4.1 billion per ship in FY 2008 dollars. In comparison, the DDG-51’s per unit cost is $1 billion per ship. The final FY 2009 base budget, covering only part of the cost, provided $1.5 billion in procurement funding, plus some additional R&D funds, for the third DDG-1000 and instructed the Navy to finance the remaining cost in the FY 2010 budget. The bill also appropriated $200 million in advance procurement for the DDG-51 if DOD and the Obama administration decide to truncate the DDG-1000 acquisition program in favor of a return to DDG-51s.

Future Combat Systems

Future Combat Systems (FCS) is the Army’s principal modernization program, but its advanced technology and overlapping, interwoven development schedules make it a high-risk venture. It consists of a suite of 14 manned and unmanned systems interlinked through a sophisticated communications network. FCS is designed to replace current Army systems such as the M-1 Abrams battle tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. Pentagon plans call for FCS to achieve initial operational capability by FY 2015 and full operational capability by FY 2017, with incremental system “spin-outs” being deployed along the way. Speculation persists that all 15 FCS-equipped brigade combat teams will not be in the field until 2030. During the campaign, President Obama pledged to “slow our development of Future Combat Systems.”

Cost considerations are front and center in debates over FCS. Based on the most recent Pentagon estimate, FCS’s program cost has skyrocketed from $92 billion in 2003 to $159 billion today, a 73% increase. This cost growth comes despite the fact that the Army reduced its FCS plan from a proposed suite of 18 systems to only 14 systems. The final FY 2009 base budget provided $3.2 billion in R&D funding and $155 million in procurement funding for FCS.

Confident future cost estimates are difficult to prepare because there have been few demonstrations of how well FCS technologies are developing. As the Government Accountability Office noted in a 2008 report, “The knowledge demonstrated thus far is well short of a program halfway through its development schedule and its budget. This portends additional cost increases and delays as FCS begins what is traditionally the most expensive and problematic phase of development.” The Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense reported in 2006 that FCS will cost American taxpayers between $203 billion to $234 billion by the time it is completed. The Army rejected the CAIG estimate because it included assumptions about future work that are not currently built into the system’s purview. However, the Army also has said it would consider sacrificing requirements or altering operational concepts to keep FCS alive under available funding ceilings.

CAIG is scheduled to produce an updated cost estimate in 2009, which has become a make-or-break year for FCS with two key reviews: the System of Systems Preliminary Design Review and the FCS Milestone “Go or No Go” Review. All eight Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV) went through Preliminary Design Review in late January and, according to head FCS spokesman Paul Mehney, “permission will be granted to enter detailed design for all eight MGV variants in early February.”

FCS is not only controversial because of its eye-popping price tag. The program raises important questions about future missions for U.S. ground forces, particularly in light of lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chief among these are:

• Should DOD first clarify which service(s) have jurisdictional control over unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) before the Army develops them as part of FCS?
• Will high-tech FCS systems prove useful in stabilization, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations where forging close relationships with locals, training indigenous armies, policing, and building civilian institutions and infrastructure are the keys to success?
• Does the time needed to deploy an FCS-equipped brigade – which the Congressional Budget Office puts at 19 to 23 days whether by air or by sea – undermine its usefulness in combating asymmetrical threats that are here today and gone tomorrow?
• Is FCS fundable in light of competing budgetary pressures, especially the plan to increase the end strength size of the Army?