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1. The CTBT would guard against the renewal of the nuclear arms race. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would limit the ability of nuclear weapons states to build new nuclear weapons by prohibiting “any nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions.” The ban on nuclear explosions would severely impede the development of new, sophisticated nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear powers. While countries could build advanced, new types of nuclear weapons designs without nuclear explosive testing, they will lack the high confidence that the weapons will work as designed. Thus, the Treaty can impede a nuclear arms buildup by five declared and three undeclared nuclear weapon states.
2. The CTBT would curb nuclear weapons proliferation. Under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, “threshold” states would be prevented from carrying out the types of tests required to field a modern nuclear arsenal. While a country could develop nuclear weapons for the first time without conducting nuclear explosions, the bomb design would be far from optimal in size and weight and its nuclear explosive power would remain uncertain. The CTBT is therefore vital to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, where these weapons could destabilize international security.
3. The CTBT would strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The conclusion of the CTBT is a key element in the global bargain that led to the signing and the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In May 1995, non-nuclear states agreed to extend that Treaty in May 1995 with the understanding that Article VI measures in the original treaty — like the CTBT — would be implemented. At the May 1995 NPT extension conference, all nations agreed to “The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996.” Ratification of the CTBT would further legitimize U.S. non-proliferation efforts and lay the basis for universal enforcement of the CTBT, even against the few nations that may not sign.
4. Nuclear testing is not necessary to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal. The U.S. has a solid and proven warhead surveillance and maintenance program to preserve the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear test explosions and this program is being augmented through the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SBSS). Although some of the projects that are part of the SBSS program are not essential to the maintenance of the stockpile, many objective experts — both critics and supporters of the program — agree that the program can ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile without resorting to nuclear explosive testing. Through inherent safety features and operational procedures, U.S. nuclear forces are configured to preclude accidental nuclear detonations and minimize the dispersal of radioactive material in the event of an accident. In addition, the nuclear warhead designs of operational U.S. nuclear weapons incorporate additional modern safety features. Since the institution of a new annual warhead safety and reliability certification process in 1995, U.S. nuclear weapons have been twice certified without nuclear test explosions.
5. The CTBT is effectively verifiable. The CTBT would put into place an extensive, global array of 170 seismic monitoring stations, 80 radionuclide monitoring stations, 11 hydroacoustic monitoring stations, and 60 infrasound monitoring stations to detect and deter possible nuclear test explosions. Monitoring capabilities would be especially sensitive at and around the established nuclear test sites. With this monitoring system, the CTBT would — with high confidence — be able to detect nuclear test explosions that are militarily significant. In addition, the CTBT would provide an additional deterrent against potential test ban violations by establishing on-site inspection (OSI) rights that could allow detection of the radioactive gases leaking from an underground nuclear test.
6. The CTBT would substantially enhance current U.S. monitoring capabilities. Whether or not the CTBT is ratified, U.S. intelligence agencies will be tasked with monitoring nuclear weapons programs of the nuclear powers and the efforts of non-nuclear states and groups to attain nuclear weapons. The Treaty will make that task easier by establishing a far-reaching international monitoring system across the globe that would augment existing national intelligence tools. Clearly, U.S. intelligence capabilities to detect nuclear tests and nuclear weapons development programs would be far better with the CTBT.
7. The CTBT would enhance the international norm against nuclear testing. If the five declared nuclear weapon states ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it will strengthen the global norm against testing and weapons development that helps make the nuclear “have-not” nations far less inclined to develop nuclear weapons. The U.S. has not tested a nuclear weapons since 1992 when Congress passed and President Bush signed the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell legislation establishing a moratorium on nuclear testing. This law, which is remains in effect, says that the U.S. may not conduct a nuclear test explosion unless another nation conducts a test. CTBT ratification would help bring other nations in line with U.S. policy.
8. The CTBT is supported by a large majority of the American people. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is supported by a large majority of the American people. U.S. public support for a nuclear weapons test ban has remained consistently high since the early days of the Cold War. The most recent poll, conducted in September 1997 by the Mellman Group, revealed that 70 percent of Americans support United States ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty.
9. The CTBT is the longest-sought initiative to help reduce nuclear weapons dangers. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty marks an historic achievement pursued by Presidents since Dwight D. Eisenhower. For forty years, Presidents and activists have worked for an end to nuclear testing. Previous negotiations have been hindered by international incidents, the failure to compromise at key times, and most importantly, the political dynamics of the Cold War nuclear arms race itself. Ratification of the CTBT would mark an important milestone in the effort to end the nuclear arms race.
10. The CTBT would protect human health and the environment. Since 1945, six nations have conducted 2,046 nuclear test explosions—an average of one test every nine days. These tests spread dangerous levels of radioactive fallout downwind and into the global atmosphere. A 1997 National Cancer Institute Study estimates that fallout from only 90 U.S. nuclear tests will likely cause 10,000-75,000 additional thyroid cancers in the U.S. Underground testing also poses environmental hazards: each blast spreads highly radioactive material underground; many underground nuclear explosions have vented radioactive gases. The Energy Department reports that 114 of the 723 U.S. nuclear tests since 1963 released radioactive material into the atmosphere.