History, Design, and Prospects for Improving Pakistan's Nuclear Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)
By Max Postman
March 5, 2008
"History suggests that the most enduring problem for the security of nuclear weapons, materials and information is the people who work in and manage the nuclear weapons complex," wrote Zia Minn, Director of the Project on Peace and Security at Princeton University, in December 2007. To manage this risk, the United States and other countries with nuclear programs have instituted Personnel Reliability Programs (PRP), centralized sets of rules and processes designed to ensure that the individuals developing, managing, and guarding nuclear weapons are trustworthy. PRP subjects applicants and current employees to personal interviews, extensive background checks, and psychological and medical examinations. The aim is to identify individuals who are unfit for highly sensitive nuclear work due to factors like drug and alcohol use, mental illness, or political radicalism.
Personnel Reliability Programs are a crucial defense against the unauthorized use or transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, and knowledge. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has generated a huge amount of international concern based on the country's political instability and burgeoning Islamic radicalism. The risk to international security posed by Pakistan's nuclear weapons depends in no small part on the quality of the country's PRP. An examination of the origins, content, and future of that program clarifies the extent of the risk and the prospects for mitigating it.
HISTORY OF PAKISTAN'S PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM
Until Pakistan's first nuclear test in 1998, the Pakistani nuclear program was essentially the exclusive fiefdom of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the infamous chief Pakistani nuclear scientist who sold illicit uranium enrichment technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. President Pervez Musharraf assumed centralized military control over the nuclear program in 1999 and established the National Command Authority to oversee the entire nuclear complex. This new professional authority included both civilian and military leaders who worked to institute some measures to prevent the unauthorized use or transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials. However, the screening of sensitive personnel was still a "disjointed and fragmented process" for which no one agency was accountable. There was no "dedicated personnel reliability program (PRP)" in Pakistan until after 9/11, according to Carl D. Sagan, Co-Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.
The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 jolted the United States into recognizing the importance of global nuclear material security, particularly in countries like Pakistan that have large radical Islamic movements. Only a few days after 9/11, then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was discussing nuclear security--including personnel reliability--with the Pakistani government, according to a 2001 article in the New York Times. Later that month, a delegation of U.S. military and intelligence officials traveled to Islamabad to discuss the issue in person.
The United States began providing direct assistance to the Pakistani nuclear security program sometime after 9/11 with the aim of setting up a Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) modeled on the one used by the United States. The process of improvement in Pakistan was gradual: In 2002, the Italian non-proliferation NGO Landau Group released a report on Pakistani nuclear security based on their visit to Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (the military institution responsible for managing the nation's nuclear arsenal), during which they interviewed several important figures in the Pakistani nuclear security system. They reported that while a PRP had been put into place, senior nuclear officials were exempt from background investigation. Clearly, U.S. assistance did not lead immediately to a satisfactory personnel screening process.
As the Wall Street Journal reported, it was not until 2005--four years after the United States began providing "sensitive" nuclear security assistance--that Pakistan was able to set up a bonafide U.S.-style Personnel Reliability Program. Some of the impetus for improving the PRP came from the 2004 discovery of A.Q. Khan's black market nuclear materials network. Matthew Bunn, a former White House advisor on international nuclear materials security, told PBS that "I think it's pretty clear that a series of fairly substantial upgrades in security measures, and control measures, and personnel reliability measures have been taken in Pakistan" since the discovery of the Khan network.
DESIGN OF PAKISTAN'S PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM
The Pakistani Personnel Reliability Program now involves the following procedures, as outlined in two separate in-depth accounts by the Wall Street Journal (which interviewed top officials in the program) and the Landau Network. According to these two accounts, the Pakistani PRP applies the following screening measures to individuals involved in developing, operating, and securing the nation's nuclear weapons:
- Background checks that may take "up to a year"
- Screening and monitoring of family and relatives
- Investigation of religious background and beliefs to detect "radicalism"
- Probationary monitoring of new employees "for months" before they are granted access to "sensitive areas"
- Monitoring by fellow employees, who issue reports to superiors on personnel reliability
- "Periodic" psychological exams
- Monitoring of the phone activity and travel of top program officials
- Repetition of screening process every two years
However, this description of the Pakistani PRP is almost entirely derived from interviews with Pakistani officials, who may be inclined to overstate the program's scope and effectiveness.
PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING PAKISTAN'S PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM
Almost every analysis of Pakistan's precarious nuclear security contains an obligatory recommendation to "strengthen" the Personnel Reliability Program, but few observers provide details as to how this should be accomplished. Simply increasing the amount of U.S. aid to Pakistani nuclear security may be politically difficult given congressional Democrats' reluctance to continue writing blank checks to the Musharraf government. Even if it were politically viable, increasing the quantity of aid is probably an insufficient measure, given the Pakistani government's apparent tendency to spend targeted U.S. counter-terrorism aid on other programs.
So, if the United States government hopes to directly improve Pakistan's Personnel Reliability Program, two steps must be taken. First, the aid process must be reformed to ensure that targeted assistance for nuclear security actually gets spent on nuclear security. Second, it will be necessary to identify weaknesses in the Pakistani PRP and provide solutions in the form of PRP best practices.
To date, the United States has used its own PRP as a model for Pakistan, but such an approach risks conflating best practices with current practices. As Zia Miann, Director of the Project on Peace and Security at the Woodrow Wilson School, has argued, the track record of America's nuclear security program--including the PRP--"isn't encouraging, to say the least." Between 1975 and 1990, almost one out of every twenty individuals who had been cleared by the U.S. PRP was stripped of their certification due to factors like drug and alcohol abuse or professional negligence.
Additionally, the Pakistani PRP must be responsive to unique cultural circumstances. One of the most important concerns of the Pakistani PRP must be identifying religious radicalism among sensitive personnel. However, religion is much less of a security issue in the United States, and this is reflected in the design of the U.S. PRP--which Pakistan has emulated. DoD 5210.42-R, the 47-page Department of Defense directive outlining PRP standards for personnel involved with nuclear weapons, does not contain a single reference to "religion." "Alcohol," by contrast, is mentioned 36 times. While Pakistan's PRP does attempt to screen employees based on religious radicalism, the U.S. PRP appears to offer little or no guidance on this practice.
Clearly, the United States' Personnel Reliability Program is not up to the task of serving as a best practices model for the design and implementation of Personnel Reliability Programs globally. Creating such a model will require going beyond current U.S. practices and drawing on the experience and recommendations of current and former U.S. officials, foreign governments, NGOs, and the private sector. There is a high level of public concern with Pakistani nuclear security, and with good reason. However, repetitively calling for the aimless "strengthening" of Pakistan's Personnel Reliability Program will not solve the problem. The establishment of a true set of PRP best practices will serve as a necessary game plan for the strengthening of these programs in Pakistan and in other countries of concern. As an added bonus, the process could yield valuable insights for improving America's own Personnel Reliability Program.
Max Postman is a contributing researcher for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. He blogs about nuclear weapons issues at Nukes of Hazard. Contact Postman at max.postman AT gmail DOT com.