Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Bush Administration Should Halt Nuclear Development

by Robert G. Gard [contact information]

by Leonor Tomero [contact information]

By Lt. General Robert Gard, Leonor Tomero, and Achraf Farraj
Published in the UCSD Guardian on November 5, 2007

The University of California manages Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a facility leading the development of the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead or RRW, the first new hydrogen bomb designed by the United States in 20 years.

Students and faculty at the university therefore have a unique role to play in actively questioning this misguided U.S. nuclear weapons policy and UC system's involvement in its implementation.

The Cold War is over and the threat of an all-out nuclear war with Russia has greatly diminished. Despite the fact that the United States still has nearly 10,000 nuclear warheads, the Bush administration argues that new nuclear weapons are needed to ensure "long-term confidence in the future stockpile." The administration's original argument was that plutonium pits, the cores of existing nuclear weapons, were aging and becoming "unreliable" -- thus explaining the catchy nickname.

This argument is misleading, and ignores recent scientific findings. A 2006 JASON report, a pre-eminent nuclear advisory group established by members of the World War II-era Manhattan Project, found that plutonium pits safely and reliably function for at least 90 years -- over twice what had been estimated previously. Given the age of the oldest existing nuclear weapons in our stockpile, the U.S. nuclear deterrent is therefore guaranteed for at least another 50 years.

Other factors negate the need for new nuclear weapons. The safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons is certified annually and closely monitored under life-extension programs using computer-generated models. The weapons' reliability is also based on more than 1,000 tests.

A resumption of nuclear testing would violate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a mainstay of the nonproliferation regime, which the United States already signed. Developing new nuclear weapons would signal to the world that the United States, despite its overwhelming conventional military superiority, believes it necessary to upgrade its nuclear arsenal.

A recent study prepared for the Department of Defense observed, "The world sees us as shifting from nuclear weapons for deterrence and as a weapon of last resort to nuclear weapons for war fighting and first use." This perception gives emerging world powers like China another reason to feel threatened by the United States and may embolden aspiring powers to seek their own homegrown nuclear weapons.

Developing new nuclear weapons undermines our diplomatic leadership in stemming the spread of nuclear weapons by undermining our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments. Many states that gave up the right to acquire these weapons have expressed concern that the United States is not living up to its end of the bargain under the NPT to work toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Building new nuclear weapons will not make us safer. It will do nothing to deter terrorists, and it will not improve our strategic relationships with other countries. It will only undermine efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, extend outdated Cold War-era thinking, shirk our international commitments, waste a lot of money and threaten our long-term security.