Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

How to Ratify the Test Ban Treaty

by Kingston Reif [contact information]

Published in World Politics Review on November 2, 2009

Ten years ago last month, the U.S. Senate failed to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. A decade later, the dangers posed by the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials to additional states and terrorists have increased dramatically. Stopping proliferation will require a global effort -- and an early, essential step in that effort must be U.S. ratification of the test ban.

The test ban is clearly consistent with U.S. security interests. Because the United States does not conduct nuclear tests and has no plans or the need to do so, the United States should take advantage of the security and political benefits that would come with ratification. A permanent test ban would close off the one reliable avenue -- nuclear testing -- by which other states might develop new, sophisticated weapons and/or increase the lethality of already existing arsenals.

In his April 2009 Prague speech envisioning a world free of nuclear weapons, President Barack Obama promised to "immediately and aggressively" pursue approval of the test ban. Given that the Treaty fell well short in 1999 of winning the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification, the Obama administration must wage a more aggressive campaign to build support for the treaty this time around. Such a campaign ought to include several elements.

1. Highlight the growing bipartisan consensus in support of ratifying the test ban.

In 2007, a bipartisan group of four senior statesmen, including former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Sen. Sam Nunn, called for "initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate...to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." The Treaty also enjoys the support of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.

In making its case, the Obama administration should emphasize that security experts from both parties support the test ban. In addition, it must mount a determined effort, both publicly and behind the scenes, to encourage additional experts to speak out in favor of the Treaty. Support would be especially welcome from the leaders of U.S. Strategic Command, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the three nuclear weapons laboratories.

2. Demonstrate that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council share the U.S. understanding of the test ban.

Critics argue that the test ban does not properly define a nuclear test. While the United States holds a "zero-yield" interpretation of the treaty, critics maintain that other countries believe the treaty allows very low-yield nuclear tests. To prevent any uncertainty on this issue from undermining the ratification effort, the administration should seek a formal agreed-upon definition among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council about what constitutes a nuclear explosion. This clarification should be obtained prior to submitting the test ban to the Senate.

3. Emphasize the benefits that would come with U.S. and Chinese ratification.

In addition to the United States, eight other countries must ratify the test ban before it can enter into force: China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. The Obama administration must mount a sustained diplomatic effort to secure these necessary ratifications. But it should also make clear that one or two holdouts should not prevent the United States from joining the treaty. A move forward by the United States will probably bring other countries along. If nothing else, China is likely to ratify if the United States does, a development that would result in all five original nuclear powers becoming parties to the test ban. This would further strengthen the global norm against nuclear testing, encourage other holdouts to ratify, and could activate a provisional entry into force of the treaty (along with the valuable verification and on-site inspection provisions that go with it).

In 1999, those who opposed the test ban did so on two main grounds: that the treaty is unverifiable, and that the U.S. nuclear deterrent cannot be maintained without testing. Due to the remarkable advances in the capabilities of the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program and the International Monitoring System, these concerns, which were always weak to begin with, no longer hold water.

Still, numerous political challenges to ratification remain. Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), who led Republican opposition to the Treaty in 1999, continues to vigorously oppose it. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has also expressed skepticism toward the test ban. As one arms control expert recently observed, "No arms control treaty has yet to receive the Senate's consent if the minority leader sides with his party's irreconcilables."

Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will require an extraordinary effort. But the case for the Treaty has never been stronger. It's time for the Obama administration to get moving before this unprecedented moment of political opportunity passes us by.