Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Obstacles to Negotiating a New START Agreement

by Kingston Reif [contact information]

October 30, 2009

In May 2009, the United States and Russia began formal negotiations on a follow-on agreement to replace START I, which expires in December 2009. The two sides hope to complete negotiations by the end of this year, with a Senate vote on ratification expected early next year. This timeline could get pushed back, however, if the two sides are unable to resolve their differences on a number of key issues.

Based on news reports, conversations with Russian and American experts, and discussions with senior U.S. officials, numerous problems remain.

1. How to narrow the wide delivery vehicle range

At their July summit meeting in Moscow, President Obama and President Medvedev agreed that the START follow-on agreement will limit each side to no more than 1,500 to 1,675 warheads on no more than 500 to 1,100 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers). The wide range for delivery vehicles reflects the opening positions of the two countries. Russia reportedly proposed a limit of 500 while the United States proposed a limit of 1,100. Such a wide range will almost certainly not be in the Treaty, as the United States and Russia will have to agree either to a single number or a narrower range.

2. How to deal with counting rules and upload capacity (i.e. capacity to add nuclear weapons to existing missiles in a short period of time)

While the 1991 START I agreement includes limits on delivery vehicles and specifications on permitted weapons systems, the 2002 Moscow Treaty does not count delivery vehicles. The Bush administration preferred to count only those warheads on deployed missiles as well as warheads maintained in the active stockpile at U.S. bomber bases. This allowed the United States to reduce the size of its operationally deployed stockpile by removing or “downloading” warheads from delivery vehicles while leaving the number of missiles and bombers close to previous levels.

Russia officially opposes this way of counting because it gives the United States the flexibility to quickly increase or “upload” warheads from its reserve stockpile to ready-to-fire missiles. Though the Obama administration has stated that the follow-on agreement will limit both warheads and delivery vehicles, the United States would like to retain maximum flexibility to deploy the number of warheads on its deployed missiles as it sees fit.

To maintain this flexibility, there would have to be more intrusive monitoring and inspection provisions than those contained in the START I agreement. Some Russian observers have suggested that additional inspections of delivery vehicles might not be enough to allay Russian concerns. Ultimately, the two sides must reconcile these different ways of counting (and agree to an accompanying verification regime) to reach a meaningful agreement.

3. How to deal with missile defense

Russia is concerned about U.S. missile defense plans, which is why the two sides have noted an “interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.” Yet it is also clear that the Obama administration intends to keep missile defense on a separate track from reductions in strategic offensive arms. In fact, Obama and Medvedev have stated that the START follow-on agreement will deal only with strategic offensive arms. As Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak put it in early April "whether...absence of agreement...on BMD, whether it’s a showstopper for the follow-on to START, I would say no."

4. How to count U.S. missiles, bombers, and submarines that have been converted to conventional roles

According to the latest START data exchange, the United States has 5,916 warheads attributed to 1,188 delivery vehicles. In reality, the United States “actually” deploys approximately 2,200 warheads on approximately 850 delivery vehicles. This discrepancy is attributable in part to the fact that while the United States has converted its B-1 bomber force and four out of 18 Trident submarines to non-nuclear roles, they still count against the START I limits. The Treaty counts force levels based on the total number of warheads each delivery vehicle can carry, not on how many warheads the vehicles actually do carry.

In order for these and other systems that no longer have a nuclear role not to count under the START follow-on limits, the two countries will have to agree on counting and verification provisions that both countries can live with. U.S. plans for a conventional prompt global strike capability – launching conventional warheads long ranges on ballistic missiles – will also have to be addressed. Given the difficulties associated with distinguishing between a nuclear and a conventional payload, Russia is likely insisting that strategic systems be counted whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads.