Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Local Priorities vs. National Interests in Arms Control

by Travis Sharp [contact information]

Published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Online on August 28, 2009

A B-2 bomber completes wind-up turns at bank angles of up to 60 degrees (USAF)

Article summary below; read the full text online

While beliefs about national sovereignty and international law matter, when it comes to arms control treaties, ideological considerations rarely trump pork-barrel politics. Would a senator from a state dependent on the nuclear weapons complex oppose an arms control treaty not on the basis of ideology, but because the treaty would mean the loss of jobs or funding in their home state? Absolutely.

As such, the Senate could become a stumbling block in President Barack Obama's plans to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal and strategic triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. While past treaties such as START I and SORT were approved overwhelmingly by the Senate, those agreements didn't alter the triad's fundamental configuration. Warheads and delivery vehicles were retired, but the constellation of bases and supporting defense contractors, though reduced, remained in place. The force posture being considered by the Obama administration, however, challenges the long-standing status quo and therefore threatens the local interests of many senators.

With a two-thirds Senate majority of 67 votes needed for approval, treaties in the 111th Congress must not only attract support from all 60 caucusing Democratic senators, they must also win affirmation from at least seven Republicans. Based on the guidelines laid out by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the upcoming START follow-on shouldn't be hindered by the 67-vote threshold. But what happens after the next round of negotiations, when warhead numbers will really begin to be lowered?

At least 20 states derive significant economic benefits from the U.S. strategic triad. If both senators from all 20 key states adhere to traditional congressional behavior and vote purely on local interest, at least 40 senators could oppose an arms control agreement negotiated by the Obama administration. This total would be enough to derail any treaty in the Senate, especially if senators decide to work together in a 40-vote bloc to protect all three legs of the triad. If these lawmakers were joined by Republicans ideologically opposed to arms control, any treaty would be doomed.

To overcome these political facts of life, there are two things the Obama administration must do. First and foremost, the administration must consult constantly with senators from key states. If senators feel that the White House is legitimately taking their viewpoints into account during treaty negotiations, they are much more likely to support the final product. Second, the administration must relentlessly reiterate that the future of the planet is at stake. The more forcefully President Obama makes the case that nuclear weapon reductions are bigger than any one lawmaker's narrow local interests, the better his chances of winning Senate approval.