Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Introduction: START I and Nuclear Weapons Reductions

by John Isaacs [contact information]

March 9, 2009

BACKGROUND

The landmark 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) provides a legally-binding basis for substantial, verified reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. START codifies the end of the Cold War nuclear competition, reduces real and immediate dangers associated with the retention of excess nuclear weapons, and provides both sides with legal rights to verify the other’s compliance built to endure future political disputes. However, START is due to expire in late-2009, leaving the future of nuclear arms reduction verification subject to the uncertainties of future international politics. The United States must work expeditiously with Russia to negotiate and conclude a new strategic arms reduction agreement that achieves deeper reductions in warheads and delivery systems and increasingly effective legally-binding provisions for verification and transparency.

START slashed strategic nuclear forces from 1990 levels of approximately 10,000 deployed warheads for each of the two sides to no more than 6,000 warheads apiece by December 5, 2001. The accord also limited each side to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles (land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles, plus heavy bombers) and mandated the destruction of most excess delivery systems. In addition, START established a far-reaching system of notifications and inspections that provides an accurate assessment of the size and location of each side’s forces.

START also prohibits interference with national technical means of intelligence, operating in a manner consistent with the recognized principles of international law. START bans the use of concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means. National technical means are buttressed by a system of cooperative measures, which make it easier for satellites to monitor the numbers and locations of strategic forces. START further bans most forms of telemetry encryption during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, which provides additional confidence that such tests are not being used for illegal purposes.

START provides agreed procedures for the conversion or elimination of delivery systems. A special system of notifications in numerical and geographical constraints helps control the numbers and locations of mobile ICBMs.

While the U.S. and Russia reached the START-mandated weapons ceilings back in 2001, START still provides a channel through which U.S. and Russian military leaders, bureaucrats, and experts can communicate, allowing them to discuss particular issues and settle disagreements. It provides U.S. and Russian political leaders with predictability and transparency about how each will handle the world’s largest and most deadly nuclear arsenals.

CURRENT STATUS

When the Bush Administration left office, the United States and Russia had not succeeded in reaching an agreement on the future of START, which is due to expire on December 5, 2009, unless extended by mutual agreement or superseded by a new strategic nuclear weapons agreement.

U.S. and Russian experts began discussions in March 2007 on follow-on measures to START, but the two sides have not been able to bridge differences on several core issues. Russia favors negotiating a new treaty that would reduce strategic nuclear warheads to fewer than 1,500 each using START counting rules and would also set limits on delivery systems. The Bush administration had sought further weapons limits and has agreed to SORT-like legally-binding transparency and confidence-building measures.

The inability to develop a common future strategy for START is nothing new. Since START was negotiated and signed, efforts to ratify and implement the follow-on START II of 1993 and plans to begin formal talks on a START III framework agreement have been sidetracked by differences between Washington and Moscow on other issues, primarily missile defenses. Instead of START II or START III, the United States and Russia agreed to the useful but very inadequate Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in May 2002, which calls for deeper reductions in operationally deployed strategic warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 each by the year 2012.

Unlike START, SORT does not establish any limits on strategic nuclear delivery systems, nor does it mandate the destruction of those delivery systems. According to the agreement, excess warheads may be stored, and no new verification mechanism was established. Making matters worse, the two sides were unable to agree on a common system for monitoring compliance with the limits on deployed warheads, and the treaty expires on the day its limitations take effect.

Today, the U.S. and Russia deploy some 3,000 to 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads, of which many are on a high level of alert. Each side stores thousands of additional strategic and sub-strategic nuclear warheads, many of which could potentially be redeployed within weeks or months. The United States is not sure about Russia’s current number of deployed strategic warheads because SORT did not establish a common set of counting rules.

Progress has resumed, however. On March 6, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Geneva produced an accord between the two countries to prioritize reaching an agreement on a replacement for START before the end of the year.

This article was written by Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association and originally was included in the 2009 National Security and Nonproliferation Briefing Book prepared by the Peace and Security Initiative