North Korea: Expert Policy Prescriptions
Issue Brief November 6, 2003
North Korea is one of the only nation-state adversaries of the United States and its regional allies that is currently, and possibly rapidly, developing nuclear weapons. Stopping North Korea’s nuclear program is imperative for international security and should be an immediate priority for the Bush Administration.
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
On October 19th, the Administration altered its rhetoric on the crisis by signaling its willingness to discuss a multilateral security agreement in East Asia. President Bush maintains, however, that a bi-lateral non-aggression treaty is not an option. While North Korea at first disregarded the U.S. statements, it reversed course a week later and said it would consider the proposal and agreed in principle to a new round of six-party talks. Specific dates for the talks have not been set.
On November 4th, with the concession of its European and Asian allies, the Bush Administration announced that construction of two light-water reactors promised to North Korea as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework was suspended. An official vote on the suspension will take place on November 21st. The step is essentially the final death blow to the Framework, which temporarily froze the North’s nuclear program, and the Administration has shown no intention of restarting the project as part of any future agreements. North Korea has not responded to the announcement.
As Washington works to reconcile internal differences on U.S. policy towards Pyongyang and formulate a negotiating strategy for halting North Korea’s current nuclear weapons program, policy experts across the United States continue to produce prescriptions for resolving the stand-off. These recommendations are of particular value now in ensuring that a new round of multilateral talks will achieve substantive results.
POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS AT A GLANCE
CHARLES PRITCHARD
Former Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea
A multilateral security guarantee is a good thing, but “America should work out the details bilaterally with North Korea. Do we really want China and Russia with Japan and South Korea, the other parties to the six-nation talks with North Korea crafting the language of a security guarantee that binds the US?” The guarantee should be conditional at first, remaining in effect “as long as North Korea maintained the freeze and was actively dismantling its nuclear program.” A freeze on the North’s nuclear activities is the minimum acceptable outcome for future six-party talks.
Source: Article by Charles Pritchard, “A Guarantee to Bring Kim into Line,” The Financial Times, October 10, 2003
MICHAEL O'HANLON
Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution
“Faced with this dilemma, we need to think bigger.” The strategy should be: “offer much more to North Korea but demand far more in return.” For this plan to succeed properly, cooperation amongst the six parties involved is crucial. The procedures would be as follows: U.S. gives North Korea security assurances, ease (eventually lift) trade sanctions, and pledges to provide at least $2 billion in aid per year in order to jump start the North Korean economy. In return, North Korea would verifiably halt its nuclear ambitions, reduce conventional forces, allow inspectors to reenter the country, eliminate chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, and begin a human rights dialogue with the outside world. If successful, North Korea would be “radically transformed” and the agreement would be “assisted suicide for the Stalinist ways of the North Korean regime.”
Source: Op-ed by Michael O’Hanlon, “Think Bigger on North Korea,” The Washington Post, September 17, 2003
HENRY KISSINGER
Former Secretary of State
The United States cannot allow North Korea to turn the negotiations process into a delaying action. There must be a time limit. Any negotiation must also link the security concerns of all countries in the region, including North Korea. Components of such an agreement include: “a denuclearization of North Korea that is complete, verifiable and irreversible; a commitment by the non-nuclear members of the six-power forum not to engage in military nuclear programs; giving North Korea an opportunity to enter the international political system with the provisos described; and a commitment by all the parties not to use force in relation to each other provided that the nuclear provisions of the agreement are observed (a multilateral rather than a bilateral non-aggression pledge).”
Source: Op-ed in the San Diego Union-Tribune, August 17, 2003
REPRESENTATIVE CURT WELDON (R-PA)
Vice chair of the House Armed Services Committee
A ten-point plan for North Korea involves two stages with simultaneous action required in each. The first stage includes a signed one-year nonaggression pact from the United States; renouncement of nuclear weapons and research programs by North Korea; North Korea rejoining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; a six-party Korean Economic Development and Security Initiative; and official recognition of North Korea by Washington.
A second stage, upon satisfactory completion of the first stage, includes establishing the U.S. nonaggression pact as permanent; North Korea ratifying the Missile Technology Control Regime; Pyongyang agreeing to observer status with the Helsinki Commission and improvement of human rights; implementation of a multilateral threat-reduction program to eliminate North Korea’s entire nuclear weapons program; and establishment of a direct inter-parliamentary relationship between the U.S. Congress and the North Korea Supreme People’s Assembly.
Source: “A 10-Point Plan for N. Korea,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 20, 2003
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE, CO-CHAIRED BY MORTON ABRAMOWITZ AND JAMES LANEY AND DIRECTED BY ERIC HEGINBOTHAM
Senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
The United States must restore a healthy alliance with South Korea and form a broader coalition of partners prepared to reach a settlement with North Korea. A high-level, full time coordinator should also be appointed within the U.S. government to help establish a unified policy approach and serve as a lead negotiator.
An interim agreement is key to a longer term settlement and an indicator of North Korean intentions. Pyongyang should be required “to readmit inspectors, freeze its nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities, and turn over its spent nuclear fuel. In return, the United States would pledge not to attack the North as long as the agreement remained in effect and would agree not to stop other countries from providing assistance to the North.”
Source: “Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge,” Task Force Report, May 19, 2003 http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Korea_TF.pdf
JIMMY CARTER
We must have direct negotiations with the North Koreans in order to “make our demands quite clear.” The U.S. should sign a mutual non-aggression treaty with the North Koreans under two conditions: North Korea “stops all nuclear weapons development” and “stops all selling of long-range missiles.” These two conditions should act as a strict ‘redline’ for North Korea not to cross. If they decide to do so, “the non-aggression pact would be terminated.”
Source: Interview with PBS, March 21, 2003
SELIG HARRISON
Senior Scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy
“Both sides have to do things that take the gun away from the head of the other, and it has to be done simultaneously.” North Korea has to commit to stop reprocessing fuel rods in Yongbyon and allow inspectors back into the country. At the same time, the U.S. must “make a contingent pledge not to attack North Korea with force of any kind” in return.
Source: Interview with The National Interest, March 5, 2003
THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND THE CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, TASK FORCE ON U.S. KOREA POLICY, CHAIRED BY SELIG HARRISON
The United States should negotiate directly with North Korea “on all issues of concern to both sides, including the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons capabilities, its food and energy needs, and the full normalization of political and economic relations, provided that North Korea pledge not to reprocess the irradiated fuel rods…and permit the return of inspectors to resume their monitoring.”
The Task Force also recommends renegotiating the Agreed Framework; ending the Korean War; replacing the armistice machinery; lowering the U.S. military profile; supporting North Korean economic development; and reducing migration to China.
Source: Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers and New Opportunities for the United States, Task Force Report, February 2003.
JOEL WIT
Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies and former State Department coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework
Among the steps that the Bush Administration should take for resolving the North Korea crisis are appointing a “Korea Czar,” reassuring North Korea of U.S. pledges not to use force against it and to respect Pyongyang’s national sovereignty, and negotiating a new bilateral agreement, “once the current crisis is reversed.”
Source: Article by Joel Wit, “A Strategy for Defusing the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2003.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Expert prescriptions for U.S. policy toward North Korea reveal several common themes and provide functional objectives for the Bush Administration as it develops a policy for ending the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Proposals that the United States puts forth at future multilateral talks should be built on such preliminary goals.
- The North Korea situation must be treated as a top threat to U.S. national security and made an absolute priority by the Bush Administration.
- A high-level, experienced coordinator must be appointed without delay to manage U.S. policy toward North Korea and to forge a strategy for resolution of the crisis.
- A “road map” should be produced to outline the stages by which the United States will advance negotiations, including what steps it will seek from North Korea, and what it will offer in return. This road map should include a timetable for completing each stage.
- The Bush Administration must deliver an agreement for the American people that reaffirms the Administration’s responsibility to ensure that a nuclear dictatorship in North Korea will not become a permanent threat to peace and security.
Additional Resources:
See http://64.177.207.201/pages/16_458.html for background information on the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and other nonproliferation treaties.