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Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination- Russia

Program Description

This program dismantles and destroys Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ICBM silos and launchers, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles and launchers, and heavy bombers.

Nuclear Weapons Storage Security - Russia

Program Description

Nuclear Weapons Storage Security projects include:

• Physical security enhancements for nuclear weapons storage sites;
• The Automated Inventory Control and Management System (AICMS), designed to enhance Russia’s ability to track strategic and tactical nuclear weapons scheduled for dismantlement;
• The Personnel Reliability Program, designed to boost the reliability of Russian individuals who have access to nuclear weapons.

Program Accomplishments

• Provided 123 “Quick Fix” security fencing and sensor systems to warhead storage facilities in Russia. 33 sets have been installed.
• Constructed a Security Assessment and Training Center to test security upgrades. Testing has been completed on all of the security equipment supplied to Russia.
• Completed certification of AICMS hardware and software.

Weapons Transportation Security- Russia

Program Description

The Weapons Transportation Security Program provides high-security railcars and trucks for transporting retired nuclear weapons to dismantlement facilities, and provides emergency response equipment and training for Russian security personnel.

Program Accomplishments

• 150 rail shipments completed by end of December 2002.
• 134 rail shipments had transported between 2,500-4,000 warheads to consolidation or dismantlement sites in Russia by November 2002.
• 150 supercontainers purchased and delivered to Russia.
• 115 modification kits installed on railcars and guard cars, and 5 mobile emergency response modules delivered.
• Established an Information Analysis System (IAS) and Training Center in St. Petersburg in 1998 to manage and support emergency response activities to nuclear weapons accidents.
• Installed and upgraded hardware and software systems that support IAS.

Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination- Ukraine

Program Description

Provides U.S. assistance to Ukraine for the elimination of former Soviet strategic bombers, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), air-to-surface missiles, and missile fuel and production facilities.

Program Accomplishments

• Completed elimination of 27 Tu-95 “Bear” bombers, 11 Tu-160 “Blackjack” bombers, and 483 Kh-55 “Kent” ALCMs in May 2001.
• Initiated project to eliminate Tu-22M and Kh-22 ASMs in June 2001.
• Initial 8 Tu-22Ms eliminated by April 2002.
• Awarded contract for elimination and disposal of remaining 31 Tu-22M Backfire bombers and 225 Kh-22 ASM in July 2002.

WMD Proliferation Prevention

Program Description

The WMD Proliferation Prevention program was initiated in FY2003 to work to enhance the capabilities of military, security, border guards, and customs agents in non-Russian former Soviet Republics to prevent, deter, detect, and interdict illegal trafficking of WMD and related materials, and to respond effectively to incidents at the border.

Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention

Program Description

This program works to enhance the safety and security of dangerous biological agents at former Soviet biological weapons facilities, dismantle biological weapons production infrastructure, and support joint research with former Soviet bio-weapons experts.

Program Accomplishments

• Dismantlement: Working to eliminate bioweapon production infrastructure at the Joint Stock Company facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. Two buildings have already been dismantled.
• Security Enhancements: In cooperation with the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), six project agreements (2 Bio-Security, 2 Bio-Safety, and 2 Animal Vivaria Upgrades) have been approved and are underway.
• Collaborative Research: 13 project agreements have been signed and are underway; 11 more are in various stages of development.

Chemical Weapons Destruction- Russia

Program Description

This program’s main project is to help build a chemical weapons destruction facility in the Russian town of Shchuch’ye to eliminate nearly 2 million artillery shells and missile warheads filled with 5,400 tonnes of lethal nerve agents. The program also helps eliminate former Soviet chemical weapons production infrastructure.

Concerned that Russia has not fully disclosed all information relevant to its chemical weapons program, Congress has withheld funding for construction of the Shchuch’ye facility. The prohibition was relaxed in FY 2002 by adding a set of legislative conditions that, if fulfilled, would allow Shchuch’ye construction to proceed. The FY 2003 and FY 2004 Defense Appropriations Bills allowed President Bush to waive the conditions. The President exercised this waiver authority in January 2003. Yet, the FY 2005 request for the Shchuch’ye budget is reduced by nearly $35 million.

• Completed design and site preparation for the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons destruction facility;
• 15 buildings demilitarized or destroyed at the former chemical weapons production facility at Volgograd;
• Munitions preparation building demilitarized at Novocheboksarsk;
• Complete demilitarization at Volgograd scheduled for 2004 and at Novocheboksarsk for 2006.

Program Accomplishments

Defense and Military Contacts

Program Description

The overall objectives of this program are to encourage Russian denuclearization and nonproliferation, enhance stability through regular military exchanges, assist Russia and the former Soviet republics in restructuring and downsizing their militaries, and to facilitate democratic reforms. Types of exchanges include joint search and rescue exercises, disaster relief exercises, and joint staff talks.

Program Accomplishments

The United States and the countries of the Former Soviet Union hold around 200 events each year to promote understanding between militaries and civil-military relations.

Nonproliferation and Verification R&D

Program Description

This program focuses on two key areas:

• Proliferation Detection: Developing and demonstrating technologies to prevent nuclear materials diversion, identify and characterize nuclear weapon activities in states of concern, counter nuclear smuggling, and verify nuclear arms reduction.
• Nuclear Explosion Monitoring: Develop and field ground-based and satellite-based sensors capable of detecting, locating, identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions occurring in the atmosphere, in space, underground, or underwater.
• A third program, Chemical and Biological National Security, was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security in FY 2003. This program develops, demonstrates, and delivers technologies and systems that will improve the U.S. capability to prepare for and respond to chemical or biological attacks.

Program Accomplishments

• Completed an advanced prototype LIDAR sensor and conducted flight tests.
• Transferred a prototype wide band radio frequency technology to a user for testing.
• Used experimental data from the Multispectral Thermal Imager (MTI) satellite to assess the utility of nonproliferation remote sensing technologies.
• Launched a GPS satellite with two new-generation nuclear detonation detection sensors in January 2001.
• Developed and deployed a system utilizing environmental sampling and DNA analysis to provide early detection of a biological attack at the Winter Olympic Games.
• Demonstrated a chemical detection system in the Washington, DC Metro.

Nonproliferation and International Security

Program Description

There are four major functional areas of the Nonproliferation and International Security Program:

• Nonproliferation Policy: Includes fuel cycle technology development programs such as the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program; supports global nonproliferation regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention; supports regional nonproliferation initiatives, especially in South and East Asia; promotes warhead dismantlement and fissile material transparency. FY 2005 efforts include purchase and security of HEU from research reactors in Russia.
• International Safeguards: Supports implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; fosters international cooperation on additional safeguards measures; and improves the security and accountability of weapons-usable nuclear material in several former Soviet republics
• Export Control: Regulates U.S. nuclear-related exports; supports multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee; and works with Russia and the Newly Independent States to develop strong, effective export controls
• Treaties and Agreements: Supports implementation of nonproliferation and international security initiatives, agreements, and treaties; and responds to unanticipated nonproliferation requirements that are important to U.S. national security

Program Accomplishments

• Completed canning of 3,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies at the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan. The material contained several tons of weapons grade plutonium.
• Secured all of North Korea’s spent nuclear fuel under IAEA safeguards (prior to 2003), as required by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
• Reached preliminary agreement with Russia on the cost of spent fuel management and the pilot shipment site for the Russian Fuel Return Program.
• Trained and conducted dialogues on nonproliferation and cooperative monitoring with officials and experts from the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and East Asia.
• Demonstrated two technologies- a digital camera for real-time analysis of suspect shipments and an analyzer capable of identifying specific dual use materials- to U.S. Customs that could improve control over nuclear exports.

International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation

Program Description

The Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program upgrades physical security at Russian nuclear facilities. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has identified 105 nuclear sites in the former Soviet Union that require security upgrades. The sites contain roughly 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material.

They include:

• 53 Navy nuclear sites
• 11 Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) weapons complex facilities
• 10 Strategic Rocket Forces sites
• 31 civilian nuclear sites.

The Department of Energy hopes to complete all security upgrades by 2008. The FY 2005 budget emphasizes protecting Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces sites. The MPC&A program also assists in building Russia’s capability to operate and maintain security upgrades, ultimately without U.S. support.

• The Material Consolidation and Conversion program aims to consolidate weapons-usable material into fewer buildings at fewer sites.
• The Radiological Dispersion Devices (Radiological Threat Reduction) program works to secure radiological sources at Russian nuclear waste sites.
• The Second Line of Defense program helps detect illicit traffic in nuclear and radioactive materials through installation of radiation detection equipment at border crossings. In addition, the program helps blend down highly enriched uranium at civilian nuclear sites, strengthens trucks and rail cars used to transport nuclear materials, conducts training courses on nonproliferation and materials control, and conducts inspections of nuclear sites.

A new project in this program area is the Megaports initiative, which works with other governments to train law enforcement officials and supply key international ports with equipment to detect nuclear or radioactive materials before they reach the United States.

Program Accomplishments

• Russian Navy Nuclear Complex: Completed rapid upgrades at 39 Navy sites that store or handle about 60 metric tons (MT) of weapons usable nuclear material and several hundred at-risk warheads. Comprehensive upgrades are complete at 8 sites and underway or planned for 10 additional sites. Comprehensive upgrades on 100% of the 11 Navy fuel and other nuclear material storage sites were budgeted for completion in FY 2004
• Strategic Rocket Forces: Initiated MPC&A upgrades at 16% of the projected 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites (currently 14 sites have been approved for upgrades by the U.S Government).
• MINATOM Weapons Complex: The MINATOM Weapons Complex consists of seven sites and three Enterprises of the Nuclear Weapons Complex (ENWC) containing approximately 500 metric tons (MT) of weapons usable nuclear material. Rapid security upgrades at these sites are 22% complete and comprehensive updates are 4% complete.
• Civilian Nuclear Sites: Of the 31 (18 in Russia, 13 in Newly Independent States) sites holding 40 MT of weapons usable nuclear material, 98% have received rapid upgrades with the other 2% expected to be completed by the end of FY 04. 54% have received comprehensive upgrades (98% were expected to be completed by the end of FY 03).
• Rapid Upgrades include establishing controlled areas and limits on personnel access to nuclear material, implementing the “two-person rule”, conducting baseline inventories, bricking up windows, hardening doors, installing locks and steel cages, and implementing random guard controls.
• Comprehensive security upgrades include hardening facilities to allow relocation of guards closer to the target, installing interior and exterior detection systems, closedcircuit television systems, monitoring and assessment systems, electronic access control systems, central alarm monitoring stations, enhancing radio communications, and conducting advanced computerized inventories of nuclear materials.
• The MCC Program has reduced the total number of buildings containing nuclear weaponsusable material from 162 to 139 in the former Soviet Union. More than 3.25 metric tons of Russian HEU has been converted to LEU. 141 Trucks and 59 rail cars have been hardened for transporting nuclear materials. Radiation detection equipment has been installed at 12 border crossings.

Russian Transition Initiative

Program Description

Beginning in FY 2002, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program were combined into a new program, the Russian Transition Initiative. The RTI program seeks to prevent the “brain drain” of Russian weapons expertise to proliferating states or terrorist groups by engaging Russian weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians in long-term, peaceful activities. In addition, NCI projects focus on diversifying the economies of Russia’s ten “closed” nuclear cities in order to create opportunities for commercial business development, as well as civilian sector jobs. Currently, issues of liability protections for American workers and contractors in Russia are stalling these initiatives but are expected to be resolved within the next year.

Program Accomplishments

• Since 1994, the NCI and IPP programs have engaged over 14,000 former Soviet weapon scientists, engineers, and technicians at over 200 institutes and initiated over 400 projects.
• In January 2003, the IPP program and Luxoft, a Russian software company, opened a facility to teach software programming to former Soviet nuclear weapons researchers. The facility, located at Moscow’s Kurchatov Institute, will eventually train 500 scientists and engineers to enter the global information technology industry
• In December, 2001, the U.S. initialed an NCI Access Arrangement with Russia to allow acceleration and expansion of NCI projects in the closed cities.
• The NCI program has achieved a 15% reduction in the physical footprint of the Avangard nuclear weapons plant in the closed Russian city of Sarov. Russia signed a closure agreement to cease nuclear weapons work at Sarov by 2003.
• Open Computing Centers have been established in Sarov and Snezhinsk, through which scientists can perform contract research in software development and computer modeling. Nonproliferation Centers were also created in the two cities to engage scientists in nonproliferation analysis and research and to promote a culture of nonproliferation in Russia.
• Non-profit International Development Centers were opened in Zheleznogorsk and Snezhinsk to help diversify the economies of the closed cities.
• In January 2002, the U.S. and Kazakhstan launched a joint effort, under the auspices of the IPP program, to create new commercial opportunities at the ULBA Metallurgical plant in Kazakhstan, a former nuclear weapons facility. The project will develop the capability to separate low-enriched uranium (LEU) from uranium concentrates for sale to commercial reactors around the world. Another joint effort at the ULBA plant, launched in July 2002, will help convert the facility to produce copper beryllium for commercial applications. Together, the two joint projects are expected to create at least 200 new jobs for former Soviet weapons experts.

HEU Transparency Implementation

Program Description

In February 1993, the U.S. agreed to buy 500 tons of high-enriched uranium- the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear weapons- derived from Russian nuclear weapons. The agreement covers a period of 20 years. The HEU transparency program is intended to provide confidence that the low-enriched uranium sold to the United States is indeed weapons-origin. Transparency is ensured through on-site monitoring teams, portable non-destructive assay instruments, and permanently installed monitoring equipment. Russian representatives are also allowed to monitor activities at U.S. facilities where downblended Russian HEU is processed.

Program Accomplishments

• Monitored the conversion of 201 metric tons of HEU since 1995, enough material to make 8,040 nuclear bombs. The United States Enrichment Corporation, acting as the executive agent of the HEU agreement, has paid Russia approximately $3 billion for the LEU derived from the HEU.
• During 2003, the program conducted 23 monitoring trips to the four Russian uraniumprocessing facilities, and the Transparency Monitoring Office was staffed for 150 days – resulting in approximately 256 monitoring days at the facilities.
• On June 19, 2002, the United States and Russia signed a new implementing agreement establishing flexible, market-based pricing terms for the remaining 11 years of the HEU purchase agreement.

International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation

Program Description

In cooperation with foreign governments and international organizations, this program focused on developing, implementing, and sustaining improved safety at nuclear facilities in order to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences.

Program Accomplishments

• Facilitated the closure of the Chernobyl plan in Ukraine and the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan
• Under the Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program, projects were completed in nine countries at 26 nuclear sites with 67 reactors. This program closed out in FY 2003 and remaining funds were transferred to the Nonproliferation and International Security program.

Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production- Russia

Program Description

In fiscal 2003, the Energy Department took over the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program from the Defense Department. The program facilitates the shutdown of Russia’s three remaining weapons-grade plutonium reactors. In return, the U.S. will modernize an existing fossil fuel plant in Seversk and construct a new fossil fuel plant in Zheleznogorsk in order to meet Russia’s energy needs. The program also focuses on improving reactor safety pending shutdown.

Program Accomplishments

• On March 12, 2003, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev signed Implementing Agreements for the shutdown of Russia’s plutonium production reactors and replacement with fossil fuel plants. The reactors have approximately 15 years remaining in their operational lifetimes, and could produce 25 metric tons of plutonium during that time span.
• On May 27, 2003, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced that the National Nuclear

Security Administration had awarded contracts to Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical Services for shutting down the Russian reactors. The contracts are worth approximately $466 million.

Accelerated Materials Disposition

Program Description

The Department of Energy proposed this program in FY 2004 to explore options for accelerating the disposition of Russian fissile materials, including purchasing additional Russian HEU for use in U.S. research reactors, purchasing additional Russian HEU to downblend into LEU for storage in a LEU reserve in the United States, and accelerating conversion of U.S. and Russian research reactors so that they can use LEU fuel. The initiative did not receive Congressional support for FY 2004 and is not requested in FY 2005.

Fissile Material Disposition- U.S. Program Description

Program Description

This program is responsible for eliminating U.S. stockpiles of surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium and ensuring that these materials are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and international accountability. Approximately 38 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 174 metric tons of HEU have been declared surplus.

The current U.S. approach to plutonium disposition relies almost exclusively on the irradiation of Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel to dispose of surplus plutonium. Funding for an alternative approach, immobilization in ceramic glass, was zeroed out in fiscal 2002.

In accordance with the September 2000 U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, two facilities will be built in the United States at the Savannah River Site (SRS): a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility and a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. Construction was originally scheduled to begin in FY 2004 but has now been postponed until May 2005. This is primarily due to Congressional requirements that construction of the U.S. and Russian facilities be done in parallel and concerns about liability protections for U.S. workers in Russia. The U.S. approach to HEU disposition involves blending the material down to low-enriched uranium for use in power or research reactors.

Plutonium Disposition- Russia

Program Description

Under an agreement signed on June 4, 2000 by former President Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the United States and Russia each pledged to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium either by immobilizing it or converting it into mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor fuel. Through the Plutonium Disposition in Russia program, the United States is assisting Russia in constructing a facility to disassemble nuclear warheads and a MOX fuel fabrication facility. The United States will simultaneously build similar facilities in the United States (see above: Fissile Material Disposition – U.S.) The two countries pledged to initially dispose of 2 metric tons of plutonium per year, with the eventual goal of doubling that rate.

Currently, issues of liability protections for American workers and contractors in Russia have delayed construction of the MOX fuel facility until May 2005.

Program Accomplishments

• Secured $300 million in pledged funds from the United Kingdom, Japan, and France to support plutonium disposition activities.
• Completed an equilibrium core design for Russian VVER-1000 reactors to enable them to burn MOX fuel.
• Helped developed gas turbine, modular helium reactors to expand plutonium disposition activities in Russia.

Offsite Source Recovery Project

Program Description

Under this program, the United States recovers excess and unwanted domestic sealed sources from non-DoE sites, and places them in storage at DoE facilities to reduce the risk of their possible use in a radiological dispersal device.

Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (formerly Science Centers and Bio Redirection)

Program Description

The Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise program consists of three efforts:

• Two centers, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine, provide grants and contracts for peaceful research and development projects to former Soviet weapons experts.
• The Bio-Chem Redirection Program seeks to engage former Soviet biologists and chemists in peaceful pursuits related to the environment, health and agriculture as an alternative to providing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile expertise to terrorist networks or proliferant states.
• The Bio Industry Initiative (BII), mandated by Congress to counter the threat of bio-terrorism, reconfigures large-scale former BW production facilities in Russia (the only USG program that does this) and accelerates drug and vaccine development for highly infectious diseases. Of an estimated 15-20 large-scale production plants in the former Soviet Union, BII has engaged twelve, ten of which had not previously worked with the ISTC and had been closed to outsiders.

Program Accomplishments

• Through December 2003, the ISTC had funded 2,000 projects valued at US $600 million, providing grant payments to over 58,000 scientists and engineers from the former Soviet Union.
• Through 2000, the STCU had approved 290 projects valued at US $42 million, providing opportunities for approximately 6,700 scientists and engineers.
• The Centers have together partnered with 98 organizations from private industry and scientific institutions on 76 partner projects representing $24.1 million in funding. As of May 2003, the Centers had produced 270 commercially sustainable, patentable ideas.
• With BII assistance, the Bioconsortium, a group of eleven former BW weapons institutes, has identified several vaccines and therapies with strong commercial potential, including a nanotechnology-based vaccine platform that could be a key to biodefense.

Additional Information

International Science & Technology Center

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund

Program Description

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) permits rapid response to unanticipated or unusually difficult proliferation challenges and opportunities to 1) prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems and materials; 2) destroy existing weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems and materials; and 3) limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons and delivery systems.

The NDF helps fund a Dangerous Materials Initiative (DMI) to assist other countries in establishing effective accounting and control mechanisms to secure radioactive materials, pathogens, and precursor chemicals. DMI is a collaborative effort across several U.S. government agencies and with international partners.

Program Accomplishments

In August 2002, a contribution from the NDF helped return two bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia back to Russia.

Additional Information

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund

IAEA Voluntary Contribution

Program Description

The voluntary U.S. contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency supports strengthened nuclear safeguards and inspections efforts.

Additional Information

International Atomic Energy Agency

CTBT International Monitoring System

Program Description

U.S. contributions to the CTBT Preparatory Commission fund the ongoing work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat and development of the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions.

Additional Information

CTBTO

Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance

Program Description

Managed by the State Department Office of Export Control Cooperation, this program originally provided radiation detection equipment and other assistance - including legal, licensing, and enforcement training and equipment - to interdict nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Faced with changes in the proliferation threat, the program has expanded to include states on potential smuggling routes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as to potential “source countries” in South Asia and countries with major transshipment hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The program also funds export control assistance programs managed by the Department of Energy, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Program Accomplishments

• Purchased three vans equipped with radiation detection equipment for Russia and one additional van for Poland.
• Placed 20 dedicated Program Advisors at U.S. Embassies to help coordinate and implement the program.
• Helped several countries in the Former Soviet Union draft and implement new comprehensive export control laws.
• Provided training and equipment Central and Eastern European governments used to apprehend stolen radioactive material and sensitive goods.
• Provided Malta with sophisticated x-ray equipment to screen cargo at its major transshipment port.
• Launched a program to provide software and training to Russian industry to help it comply with Russia’s export control process.
• Conducted joint vehicle inspection training for Pakistani Customs and border guard personnel at a U.S.-Mexico border crossing.
• Held several important regional fora, including ones at Almaty, Kazakhstan (June 2003), Sydney, Australia (July 2003), and Budapest, Hungary (September 2003).
• From fiscal 1998 through 2001, the program provided $40.2 million to the U.S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to the U.S. Coast Guard, $4.9 million to the Energy Department’s International Export Control Program, $4.5 million to the Energy Department’s Second Line of Defense Program, and $0.5 million to the Energy Department’s Special Technologies Program.

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)

Program Description

KEDO is responsible for implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea by financing and constructing two light water nuclear reactors and providing deliveries of heavy fuel oil to North Korea until the first reactor begins operation.

With North Korea’s 2002 admission that it has continued to clandestinely pursue a nuclear weapons program in violation of the Agreed Framework, a statement it has since retracted, the future of KEDO has been called into question. Deliveries of heavy fuel oil were suspended in December 2002, and construction of the light water reactors ceased after North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003.

Section 562 of the FY 2003 omnibus appropriations bill restricted U.S. funding for KEDO, but authorized the President to waive the restriction in order to provide up to $5 million for KEDO administrative expenses only. If the funds are not used for KEDO expenses, they can be reprogrammed to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Bush Administration requested no new funding for KEDO for Fiscal Years 2004 or 2005.

Civilian Research and Development Foundation

Program Description

The State Department provides grants to the Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), a non-governmental, non-profit foundation created by the United States government to accelerate the redirection of former Soviet weapons scientists to civilian work.

Program Accomplishments Around half of CRDF’s research grants engage former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful, civilian pursuits. Since 1995, CRDF has engaged over 1,000 scientists in over 300 projects costing approximately $16 million.

Additional Information

U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation

Nonproliferation and Export Control (NEC) Cooperation Program (Department of Commerce)

Program Description

The Bureau of Industry and Security (formerly the Bureau of Export Administration) at the Department of Commerce works with governments and NGOs in Russia and around the world to assist in developing the necessary legal foundations for effective export controls, improving licensing procedures, enhancing enforcement of export controls, and using technology to track exports.

The NEC’s Technical Information Center (TIC) supports the program by providing an interactive forum for the representatives from participating countries to explore export control options and select processes and procedures that are tailored to individual country requirements through technical training and instructional workshops and through the exchange of ideas and sharing of resources.

Program Accomplishments

• In 2002, 50 NEC Cooperative Events were held with various countries, including 15 with Russia.
• By the end of 2001, the Bureau of Export Administration had helped arrange almost 40 export control workshops on Russia, engaging more than 550 enterprises.

Additional Information

Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Department of Commerce: Non-proliferation and Export Control Cooperation (NEC) Program