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U.S. Needs to Get Tough with Pakistan

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by Peter W. Galbraith [contact information]

Published in the Boston Globe on January 3, 2008

President Bush recently described Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, as an "absolutely reliable ally" in the war on extremists and a man of his word. In fact, Pakistan's record under Musharraf is one of broken promises while tolerating acts harmful to U.S. interests. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto, weeks after a U.S.-brokered deal for her return to Pakistan, underscores the bankruptcy of the current approach. Instead of treating Pakistan like the ally it isn't, the country should be treated like the national security problem it has become. Moreover, Bush should be careful with his language. The United States needs to be tough with Pakistan, not gullible.

Pakistan's military has a long history of thumbing its nose at the United States, and getting away with it. In 1982, the then-dictator, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, assured Congress that "Pakistan has neither the means nor the intention of developing a nuclear explosive device." Congress took Zia at his word, making arms sales and assistance conditional on Pakistan sticking to Zia's promise. It was, of course, a lie, and in 1990 the first President Bush cut off military assistance and halted the delivery of F-16 aircraft that Pakistan had already paid for. Instead of insisting that Pakistan keep its word, U.S. officials took the Pakistani side of the argument, insisting the cut off was unfair.

Pakistan got the planes and, after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, billions in U.S. military assistance to fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The New York Times recently reported that the Pakistani military has diverted half of this assistance for use against India, apparently with no reaction from Bush. Pakistan's military has learned from experience that the United States does not monitor its assistance. In the 1980s, Congress appropriated billions to assist the Afghan resistance fighting the Soviet Army. Although Congress clearly intended this money to go to a coalition of Afghan parties that included pro-Western moderates, the Reagan administration and CIA allowed Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency to funnel the bulk of the funds to the two most radical, and anti-American, Islamic parties. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the principal beneficiary of the agency's distribution of US tax dollars in the 1980s, fights today alongside the Taliban.

The United States should get tough with Pakistan. Bush should insist that Pakistan become a real ally in the war on terrorism. In recent years, the Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistan's nuclear establishment have been pursuing their own anti-American agenda, in violation of Pakistan's supposed official policy. The intelligence agency has supported the Taliban and continues to maintain contact with Islamic radicals, including possibly Al Qaeda. A.Q. Khan, head of Pakistan's nuclear program, sold nuclear weapons technology and materials to America's worst enemies: North Korea, Iran, and Libya. It is not remotely plausible that Musharraf did not know or acquiesce in these activities.

The United States should insist that Pakistan's elected leaders have full control over all of Pakistan's national security programs, including the nuclear file and the Inter-Services Intelligence. The agency should be restructured, or better, abolished. It is a bastion of anti-Western and antidemocratic sentiment. And, Bush should make clear that he does not believe that Khan acted on his own. At a minimum, the United States should insist that Pakistan make Khan, and his records, available to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The United States could signal its new approach by sponsoring a Security Council resolution appointing a UN investigator to look into the murder of Bhutto. When a suicide bomber blew up former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, the Bush administration helped lead the effort to pass such a resolution. The Bhutto killing raises similar questions, including as to why there was no Pakistani security or police protecting her.

Instead of praising Musharraf as a man of his word, Bush should tell him that he will no longer tolerate unkept promises or be satisfied with obvious lies.

Peter W. Galbraith 202-546-0795

Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith is the Senior Diplomatic Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where his work focuses on Iraq, the greater Middle East, and conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, specifically in the Balkans, Indonesia, Iraq, India/Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. Galbraith has authored numerous books, including, most recently, The End of Iraq (2006).