Department of State Non-Proliferation Programs
March 15, 2004
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (formerly Science Centers and Bio Redirection)
Program Description
The Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise program consists of three efforts:
- Two centers, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine, provide grants and contracts for peaceful research and development projects to former Soviet weapons experts.
- The Bio-Chem Redirection Program seeks to engage former Soviet biologists and chemists in peaceful pursuits related to the environment, health and agriculture as an alternative to providing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile expertise to terrorist networks or proliferant states.
- The Bio Industry Initiative (BII), mandated by Congress to counter the threat of bio-terrorism, reconfigures large-scale former BW production facilities in Russia (the only USG program that does this) and accelerates drug and vaccine development for highly infectious diseases. Of an estimated 15-20 large-scale production plants in the former Soviet Union, BII has engaged twelve, ten of which had not previously worked with the ISTC and had been closed to outsiders.
Program Accomplishments
- Through December 2003, the ISTC had funded 2,000 projects valued at US $600 million, providing grant payments to over 58,000 scientists and engineers from the former Soviet Union.
- Through 2000, the STCU had approved 290 projects valued at US $42 million, providing opportunities for approximately 6,700 scientists and engineers.
- The Centers have together partnered with 98 organizations from private industry and scientific institutions on 76 partner projects representing $24.1 million in funding. As of May 2003, the Centers had produced 270 commercially sustainable, patentable ideas.
- With BII assistance, the Bioconsortium, a group of eleven former BW weapons institutes, has identified several vaccines and therapies with strong commercial potential, including a nanotechnology-based vaccine platform that could be a key to biodefense.
Additional Information
“Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003— Chapter 3: International Responses.
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
Program Description
The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) permits rapid response to unanticipated or unusually difficult proliferation challenges and opportunities to 1) prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems and materials; 2) destroy existing weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems and materials; and 3) limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons and delivery systems.
The NDF helps fund a Dangerous Materials Initiative (DMI) to assist other countries in establishing effective accounting and control mechanisms to secure radioactive materials, pathogens, and precursor chemicals. DMI is a collaborative effort across several U.S. government agencies and with international partners.
Program Accomplishments
In August 2002, a contribution from the NDF helped return two bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia back to Russia.
Additional Information
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
IAEA Voluntary Contribution
Program Description
The voluntary U.S. contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency supports strengthened nuclear safeguards and inspections efforts.
Additional Information
International Atomic Energy Agency
CTBT International Monitoring System
Program Description
U.S. contributions to the CTBT Preparatory Commission fund the ongoing work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat and development of the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions.
Additional Information
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
Program Description
Managed by the State Department Office of Export Control Cooperation, this program originally provided radiation detection equipment and other assistance - including legal, licensing, and enforcement training and equipment - to interdict nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Faced with changes in the proliferation threat, the program has expanded to include states on potential smuggling routes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as to potential “source countries” in South Asia and countries with major transshipment hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The program also funds export control assistance programs managed by the Department of Energy, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Program Accomplishments
- Purchased three vans equipped with radiation detection equipment for Russia and one additional van for Poland.
- Placed 20 dedicated Program Advisors at U.S. Embassies to help coordinate and implement the program.
- Helped several countries in the Former Soviet Union draft and implement new comprehensive export control laws.
- Provided training and equipment Central and Eastern European governments used to apprehend stolen radioactive material and sensitive goods.
- Provided Malta with sophisticated x-ray equipment to screen cargo at its major transshipment port.
- Launched a program to provide software and training to Russian industry to help it comply with Russia’s export control process.
- Conducted joint vehicle inspection training for Pakistani Customs and border guard personnel at a U.S.-Mexico border crossing.
- Held several important regional fora, including ones at Almaty, Kazakhstan (June 2003), Sydney, Australia (July 2003), and Budapest, Hungary (September 2003).
- From fiscal 1998 through 2001, the program provided $40.2 million to the U.S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to the U.S. Coast Guard, $4.9 million to the Energy Department’s International Export Control Program, $4.5 million to the Energy Department’s Second Line of Defense Program, and $0.5 million to the Energy Department’s Special Technologies Program.
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
Program Description
KEDO is responsible for implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea by financing and constructing two light water nuclear reactors and providing deliveries of heavy fuel oil to North Korea until the first reactor begins operation.
With North Korea’s 2002 admission that it has continued to clandestinely pursue a nuclear weapons program in violation of the Agreed Framework, a statement it has since retracted, the future of KEDO has been called into question. Deliveries of heavy fuel oil were suspended in December 2002, and construction of the light water reactors ceased after North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003.
Section 562 of the FY 2003 omnibus appropriations bill restricted U.S. funding for KEDO, but authorized the President to waive the restriction in order to provide up to $5 million for KEDO administrative expenses only. If the funds are not used for KEDO expenses, they can be reprogrammed to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Bush Administration requested no new funding for KEDO for Fiscal Years 2004 or 2005.