Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Why the U.S.–India Nuclear Accord is a Bad Deal

by Kingston Reif [contact information]

by Leonor Tomero [contact information]

Published in Survival 50:2 (April-May 2008)

In 'Why the US–India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal' (Survival, vol. 49, no. 4, Winter 2007–08, pp. 111–22), T.V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar claim that critics of civilian nuclear cooperation with India 'miss the point'. Their core argument is that the proposed March 2006 agreement 'strengthens rather than undermines' the non-proliferation regime. We contend that there are serious problems with Paul and Shankar's analysis which taken together leave us far less sanguine about the utility of nuclear trade with India.

According to the authors, the discriminatory nature of the nonproliferation regime has 'only reinforced India's opposition to the ... regime and led it to openly challenge its legitimacy'. But rather than integrating India into the non-proliferation mainstream, the proposed deal represents a dangerous blow to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Despite the fact that India is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, refuses to take on a legal commitment against future nuclear tests, has not stopped its fissile-material production for weapons (as the five recognised nuclear powers have done), and is insisting on 'India-specific' safeguards to its declared civilian nuclear facilities, Washington intends to reward India with privileges reserved only for countries in good standing under the treaty. To make matters worse, the recently concluded '123' agreement fails to uphold key nuclear non-proliferation provisions of US law such as making it clear that US–India nuclear trade will be cut off if India resumes nuclear testing.

Though the plan would put India's civilian nuclear facilities under international safeguards for the first time, New Delhi will be able to significantly increase nuclear-weapons production by redirecting its limited supplies of indigenous uranium for use in its weapons programme. An obvious danger overlooked by Paul and Shankar is that Pakistan will act to counter India's increased production by expanding its own nuclear capability.

Ultimately, Paul and Shankar side-step the issue of fissile-material production by arguing that India has been a responsible nuclear power and is therefore deserving of special treatment. However, while India has generally maintained controls over its nuclear technology, it has consistently refused to sign both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, several Indian nuclear scientists and companies have been sanctioned by the United States, some as recently as July 2006, for having transferred technology to Iran.

Paul and Shankar claim that states such as Iran and North Korea were interested in nuclear weapons long before the announcement of the Indian deal, 'and their decisions are independent of and unaffected by the US decision'. However, in making exceptions for India and not for others, the deal complicates ongoing negotiations with such states. Furthermore, US efforts to seek an India-specific exemption to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines have already weakened the group's cohesion and the norm against nuclear trade with states not party to the non-proliferation treaty. Pakistan has reportedly approached China about setting up a similar agreement, Israel has urged the Nuclear Suppliers Group to adopt a criteria-based approach to nuclear technology transfers, and Russia used the deal to justify its resumption of nuclear-fuel exports to India's Tarapur reactors (which US diplomatic pressure had stalled until the US–India deal was announced).

Of course, India remains an important American partner. Both countries share a mutual interest in fighting terrorism, promoting the spread of democracy, promoting economic development, and preserving energy security. The US–Indian relationship should be based on shared economic goals and democratic values rather than on a flawed nuclear deal. In creating a dangerous double standard, the deal will ultimately work to perpetuate the nuclear dangers America ought to be seeking to reduce.