Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

House Continuing Resolution H. J. Con. 20 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Highlights

by Leonor Tomero [contact information]

January 31, 2007

The House Appropriations Committee approved and submitted to the full House its draft of the continuing resolution which will take the place of FY07 Appropriations bills and run until September 30, 2007. A vote is expected in the House on January 31, 2007 and in the Senate next week.

The continuing resolution provides funding at the same level as FY06 for most programs, with a few exceptions.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS THAT RECEIVED NEW FUNDING UNDER THE CONTINUING RESOLUTION

The total funding for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation under the continuing resolution is $1,683,339,000 (compared to $1,631,151,000 in FY06).

International Nuclear Material Protection & Cooperation: $472.7 million under the continuing resolution (compared to FY06 appropriations of $422.7 million and FY07 budget request $413.2 million)

The CR provides $472.7 million for FY07, a $50 million-increase over FY06 funding and $59.5 million over the FY07 budget request. These added funds are a welcome increase and reflect the House and Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Committees' determination that these programs are crucial to minimizing the risk of nuclear terrorism and progress on work that should be accelerated. This program secures fissile material, nuclear warheads, and expertise in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. It contains funding for implementing measures agreed to at the Bratislava meetings in February 2005 where Presidents Bush and Putin "agreed to a number of nuclear security initiatives to accelerate Russian-U.S. cooperative efforts." Much of the funding in this program will go towards the Second Line of Defense and the Megaports initiatives to install monitoring systems on Russian borders and at major ports worldwide in an attempt to monitor potential smuggling of nuclear material. This program, and specifically securing material at the source, are important to prevent smuggling of nuclear material, as the likelihood of successfully securing or disposing of the material at the site of origin is greater than successfully tracking and intercepting the material if it is diverted.

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI): $115.5 million under the continuing resolution (compared to the FY06 appropriation of $97 million and the FY07 budget request of $106.8 million).

The continuing resolution funding of $115.5 million represents a welcome increase of $18.5 million over the FY06 appropriation and a $9 million-increase over the FY07 budget request.

This program secures vulnerable nuclear material around the world, by providing for the conversion of research reactor cores using high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium as well as for the return of US-origin research reactor spent fuel and Russian-origin highly-enriched uranium.

Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative - Spent Fuel Reprocessing and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): up to $121 million under the continuing resolution ($80 million + possible additional $41 million provided to the overall Energy Supply & Conservation account) (compared to FY06 appropriations of $80 million for R&D and $50 million for implementation; and FY07 budget request $250 million)

The continuing resolution maintains the $80 million for R&D provided under the FY06 appropriations (for the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative) and adds $41 million to the overall Energy Supply & Conservation account beyond the additional money provided for renewable energy and energy efficiency. Thus DOE has the latitude to apply this added $41 million to GNEP.

DOE unveiled its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership this past year, claiming that the program would help minimize nuclear waste, decrease the proliferation risk and allow the significant expansion of nuclear energy globally, and especially in developing countries. This initiative would reverse a thirty-year policy of refraining from US commercial spent fuel reprocessing because of proliferation and economic considerations.

The Administration requested $250 million in FY 2007, most of which would be applied to the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (which conducts R&D on reprocessing and transmutation technologies). The funding was intended to include initiating work towards conducting demonstration facilities for reprocessing and advanced burner reactor. Since unveiling the program a year ago, DOE has proposed at least four different version of its plan to reprocess spent fuel. The House Energy & Water Appropriations Committee had cut the funding by more than half, allocating $120 million. Skepticism from key lawmakers including the House Energy & Water Committee's Reps. Peter Visclosky (D-IN) and David Hobson (R-OH) about DOE's proposed plan led to the cut in funding. The added $41 million to the account containing reprocessing funding brings the allocated funding to this $120 million level. In the Senate, Sen. Pete Domenici (R-NM) had supported full funding of the program.

MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility Construction: $0 until August 1, 2007 (compared to $241.6 million in FY06 and FY07 budget request $368.2 million)

As a compromise between the House and the Senate, no funds will be available to the Department of Energy for the construction of the MOX facility until August 1, 2007. The Mixed Oxide (MOX) facility is to be built at Savannah River Site, SC to convert US warhead plutonium to mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for consumption in two commercial reactors.

The US MOX program is linked to the construction of a MOX facility in Russia. Liability disagreements caused significant delays in this program in Russia, which in turn resulted in delays in the US program and unspent appropriations from previous years.

OTHER PROGRAM FUNDED AT THE SAME LEVEL AS FY 2006 APPROPRIATIONS

Russian Plutonium Disposition: ($34.2 million appropriated in FY06; FY07 budget request $34.7 million)

This funding of $34.7 million allows plutonium disposition activities in Russia to continue through the use of prior year appropriations/balances. This program has operated in conjunction with plans for the US MOX facility.

Elimination of Russian Plutonium Production:($174.4 million appropriated in FY 2006; FY07 budget request $206.7 million)

This funding was provided for shutting down the plutonium producing reactor at Zheleznogorsk to meet a December 2010 completion date.

Non-Proliferation and International Security: $74 million in FY06 (FY07 budget request $127.4 million which in the FY 2007 budget request also included funding for redirecting former nuclear weapon scientists in countries of the former Soviet Union)

This program includes supporting export control measures and giving technical and policy advice during treaty and agreement negotiations. It also supports progress on other transparency measures, such as those related to HEU conversion to LEU.

Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development: $318.8 million provided in FY2006 (FY07 request $268.8 million)

This program includes proliferation detection, explosion monitoring, treaty monitoring and other activities.

US Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) conversion (blend-down to low-enriched uranium (LEU)) (not including construction of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at Savannah River): $91.5 million in FY06 (FY07 budget request $86.9 million)

Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign: $238.7 million in FY06 (FY07 budget request $237.6 million)

The program is aimed at manufacturing and certifying W88 pits by FY07. In addition, it accelerates an interim pit manufacturing capability that is being re-established at Los Alamos National Laboratories. DOE is also using the Pit Manufacturing Capability subprogram to establish the capability to manufacture replacement pits other than the W88 pit and to improve the manufacturing process for the W88 pits.

Modern Pit Facility: $0 (the FY07 did not request any funds for FY07 because Congress did not fund the FY06 request)

DOE was waiting to request funding for such activities until it established a plan for the infrastructure and obtained the results of the plutonium aging studies, suggesting that the money would be requested in the FY08 budget. While the National Laboratories study noted that the plutonium pits would be reliable for at least another 85 years, the Department of Energy is continuing to push for its $150 billion Complex 2030 plan and the Reliable Replacement Warhead program to build a new generation of nuclear weapons.

National Ignition Facility: $140.5 million appropriated in FY06 (FY07 budget request: $111.4 million)

The NIF Project located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories is a stadium-sized 192-beam facility containing the world's largest laser. The laser experiments will assist scientists to validate computer models that predict age-related effects on the US nuclear stockpile. Completion of the NIF is expected in 2009, nine years after work began.

The Directed Stockpile Work (DSW): $1.3 billion in FY06 (FY07 budget request $1.4 billion).

This program conducts, maintains and refurbishes nuclear warheads so "that the nuclear warheads and bombs in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile are safe, secure, and reliable." This program includes the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program and Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition, among others.

Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program: $24.8 million appropriated in FY06 (FY07 budget request $27.7 million)

The initial design proposal competition from the Los Alamos and Livermore National Nuclear Laboratories resulted in the National Nuclear Security Administration deciding to combine elements of the two designs. The stated goal was to decrease the chances of a need to return to testing and to increase the reliability of the arsenal. The initial 18-month study was to redesign the W76. The RRW program is part of the Directed Stockpile Work (DSW).

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP): ($0)

DOE did not request any money for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) for FY07 this year and stated that it had no intent of asking for any funding for the RNEP research in the next five years. Congress, and notably Rep. Hobson, had cut all funding for nuclear bunker buster research in FY05 and FY06.

National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) Administrator indicated that it would continue its work this year on conventional penetrators and that DOD would conduct the controversial sled test, which will be done at a DOD facility, not at one of the nuclear laboratories under DOE jurisdiction.

Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition: $59.4 million in FY06 (FY07 budget request $75 million)

The funding provides for dismantlement, characterization of components, and disposal of retired warheads at Pantex. The Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition program is part of the Directed Stockpile Work.

Test Site Readiness: $19.8 million appropriated in FY06 (FY07 budget request $75 million)

The funding is for maintaining test site readiness at 24 months during FY 2007. (Previously, DOE sought to reduce the test readiness to 18 months at the Nevada Test Site in FY 2005 and FY 2006 but Congress has refused to allow a reduction in time from 24 months to 18 months.)