Non-Proliferation
Since entering into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the NPT, has remained the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime. In creating a system of mutual responsibilities and an international taboo against the use or threat to use nuclear weapons, the NPT has proven largely successful in stemming proliferation.
But the nonproliferation regime faces new challenges: insufficient protections against the theft or sale of various nuclear materials in states of the former Soviet Union; nuclear black market activity such as the network operated by A.Q. Khan out of Pakistan; threats by North Korea to share nuclear technology with states or non-state actors hostile to the U.S.; and, most recently, violations of IAEA nuclear safeguard standards by Iran, a signatory of the NPT which is pursuing technology for producing nuclear materials as part of a possible quest for a nuclear bomb.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is producing additional challenges to the NPT regime, particularly in the areas of securing and safeguarding nuclear weapons material, as is a pending agreement between the U.S. and India to share peaceful nuclear technology. The U.S.-India deal challenges the legitimacy of the NPT because it would not require India to join the NPT or to undertake any of the disarmament commitments that the P-5 agreed to.
Many experts agree that some type of nonproliferation regime reform is necessary, particularly since certain states have interpreted the NPT as allowing them to acquire nuclear technologies that take them to the brink of acquiring an actual nuclear weapon without explicitly violating the treaty, sometimes referred to as a "breakout capability." Withdrawing from the NPT also carries no penalty, save possible ad hoc action taken by the U.N. Security Council.
Unless nuclear proliferation challenges are effectively addressed and until nuclear weapon states achieve further progress on their disarmament commitments, the future strength of the NPT regime remains in question.
FACT SHEETS
Apr 30, 2008 Nuclear Fuel Recycling: More Trouble Than It's Worth
Apr 28, 2008 Center Applauds Request from Nine Senators to Cut Nuclear Reprocessing Funding
Apr 15, 2008 Potential U.S. Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Fact Sheet
Apr 15, 2008 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Fact Sheet
Mar 31, 2008 Why the U.S.–India Nuclear Accord is a Bad Deal
Mar 5, 2008 History, Design, and Prospects for Improving Pakistan's Nuclear Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ANALYSIS FY2007 - FY2008
Dec 21, 2007 Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Highlights From FY2008 Omnibus Appropriations Bill (S. 2764)
Aug 2, 2007 Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Highlights From House Appropriations Committee Action on the FY 2008 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3222)
May 4, 2007 Analysis of House Strategic Forces Subcommittee Markup: FY2008 Defense Authorization (H.R. 1585)
Mar 2, 2007 Department of Energy Budget Request for FY 2008 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Highlights
Jan 31, 2007 House Continuing Resolution H. J. Con. 20 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Highlights
ADDITIONAL READING
- 10 Reasons to Support a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
This Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation fact sheet briefly provides 10 key reasons to support a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). - NPT Full Text and Background Information
- IAEA Safeguards Agreements & Additional Protocols
- Congressional Research Service, "Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union," updated November 28, 2007.
- Congressional Research Service, "Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements," updated August 9, 2007.
