Pentagon Panel Urges National Missile Defense Delay
An independent team of missile defense experts appointed by the Pentagon has issued a report that is highly critical of the U.S. National Missile Defense program. The November 1999 study is a follow-on to an earlier report by a similar panel that also was highly critical of the program. The 1998 study, which deplored the “rush to failure” in all U.S. missile defense programs, resulted in improvements and a delay in deployment, but, according to the most recent report, many problems have not been solved.
President Clinton has announced that he will decide whether to deploy a National Missile Defense next summer. He will make that decision, according to previous plans, after the Pentagon completes what is called a “Deployment Readiness Review” (DRR).
The new report recommends delaying the deployment decision from the summer of 2000 to 2003. At best, the Pentagon could decide next summer on the program’s “feasibility,” according to the study, but even that “feasibility” decision might have to be postponed.
The report was conducted by a panel of missile defense insiders, individuals who had been involved in missile defense and other Pentagon programs for years and who have strong backgrounds in testing and developing new systems. The panel was headed by former Air Force chief of staff Gen. Larry Welch.
The report came to a number of conclusions:
- The deployment decision now scheduled for the summer of 2000 should be postponed. “Consider DRR [Deployment Readiness Review] event as a system development feasibility review rather than a deployment readiness review.” [p.35] “The NMD [National Missile Defense] program is not structured to produce confidence, by the DRR [Deployment Readiness Review] date [summer of 2000], that the full suite of essential elements will be ready for deployment as planned.” [p.7]
- Any decision in 2000 should be about the ‘feasibility’ of the program; a deployment readiness decision should not come until 2003 at the earliest. “The fact that the system configuration is not fixed until 2001 and the operational version of the EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] will not be tested until FY2003 lead the panel to conclude that the DRR [Deployment Readiness Review] should more properly be considered a Deployment Feasibility Review under the restructured program. If all goes according to the restructured plan, by June 2000, BMDO [Ballistic Missile Defense Organization] will have demonstrated the “feasibility” of a NMD [National Missile Defense] system but not the “readiness to deploy” of the system. The demonstration of readiness to deploy will not come until 2003 at the earliest, when the integrated GBI [ground-based interceptor] (i.e., operational version of the booster and EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle]) is to be demonstrated.” [p.16]
- The summer 2000 deployment decision should be slipped. “The top program risks identified by the LSI [Boeing, the Lead System Integrator] are dominated by schedule concerns — reinforcing our conclusion that further compression of events leading to the DRR [Deployment Readiness Review] must be avoided. Instead, the panel recommends slipping the DRR date to accommodate any further delays in key events leading up to the DRR.” [p.27]
- The managers of the program continue to be over-optimistic. “The panel believes there is a legacy of over-optimism about the state of progress in developing reliable HTK [hit-to-kill] performance… The panel believes that the government and the integrating contractor continue to underestimate the challenge of reliably performing exoatmospheric HTK [hit-to-kill]. Exoatmospheric HTK [hit-to-kill] of ICBM reentry vehicle (RV)—like targets has been successfully demonstrated only twice [Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) and Exoatmospheric Reentry Intercept Subsystem (ERIS)] with at least 8 failures to date [HOE, ERIS, and Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP)]… This reinforced the panel’s judgment that the government and the LSI [Boeing, the Lead System Integrator] were more optimistic than warranted about the state of capability to achieve reliable exoatmospheric HTK [hit-to-kill] capability.” [p.15]
- There is too much concurrency, the process of moving into production and deployment while testing is still incomplete. “High concurrency exists in the requirements, program definition, and system engineering planning—driven by the DRR [Deployment Readiness Review] date. RECOMMENDATION: Recognize that the first DRR [Deployment Readiness Review] milestone Is a deployment feasibility milestone since the decision process is phased over decision milestones through 2003.” [p.36]
- There is fragmentation and confusion about authority in the program. “As noted in this report, instead of unusual clarity, there is unusual fragmentation and confusion about authority and responsibility.” [p.13]
- Problems at Raytheon facility: ‘hardware-poor’ “The visit to the Raytheon facility in Tucson highlighted the impacts of the ‘hardware-poor’ nature of the EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] program. There were no spares, no development articles, and no articles available for parallel activities that could significantly reduce development and test risk. The first article built appears to be the one that will fly … the lack of spare hardware is driving flight test delays. [p.12]
- The program will not know if the interceptor can withstand the launch shock loads until 2003 when the booster rocket and the interceptor are tested together. “One of the highest EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] risk areas is its ability to withstand the environmental loads of the new booster that will fly on IFT [integrated flight test]-7 …We are not certain that the EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] will be able to withstand these loads, and we will not know with any degree of certainty until IFT [integrated flight test] -13, the flight on which the EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] and new booster are first mated together. This flight is planned for 2003.” [p.29]