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Momentum For Delaying Missile Defense

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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD SPECIAL REPORT

Recent events are adding to the pressure on President Clinton to defer a decision on national missile defense deployment to the next Administration. This tide is being propelled by a number of prominent former government officials, political changes across the globe, statements by Republican and Democratic leaders, concerns expressed by our allies, official estimates of a high cost of deploying a national missile defense, internal Pentagon critiques and newspaper editorials around the country.

At this point, however, the Administration has not wavered from its plan to make a deployment decision later this year. The next significant date is early July, when the Pentagon has scheduled its third of intercept 19 tests of the new system.

PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS FOR DELAY

Many prominent individuals — a number of whom have served in high government capacity — are counseling delay. In a June 7, 2000 letter to President Clinton, these individuals wrote: “Recognizing the complexity of the issues that will affect your analysis and ultimate decision, we respectfully urge you to defer a decision to deploy, and not to be forced by artificial deadlines, but to further the debate that has now begun in earnest.” The signers of the letter were:

Governor Bush and a former Pentagon official, argued: “We should not build the system the administration has proposed.” One of his debating partners, James Woolsey, former CIA director gave his pungent comment about the Clinton missile defense plan: “Next to worthless, in my judgment.”

In the Summer 2000 issue of Foreign Policy, John Deutch and John P. White, both of whom served as deputy secretaries of defense under Clinton, and Harold Brown, who was Jimmy Carter’s defense secretary, argued: “Based on military, technical, and geopolitical considerations, we believe deployment of the present NMD system should be deferred.”

Donald Gregg, the Bush Administration’s Ambassador to South Korea, commented on the recent South and North Korean summit meeting in the June, 2000 Washington Post: “A lot of people found it convenient to hang the ‘rogue state’ label on North Korea as a justification for expensive and unproven NMD. If things continue to go well, it will be more difficult to do that.”

In a May 5 Washington Post OpEd, former national security adviser to President Carter Zbigniew Brzezinski called for delay: “The bottom line is that at this stage there is no urgent strategic need for a largely domestically driven decision regarding the deployment of the national missile defense. The issue should be left to the next president—to be resolved after consensus is reached with our allies both in Europe and in the Far East, after more credible evidence becomes available regarding the technical feasibility and probable costs of the national missile defense, and after compelling intelligence estimates are aired regarding the origin, scale and timing of likely new threats to the United States and its allies.”

In an May 4 New York Times OpED, Robert C. McFarlane, national security adviser to President Ronald Reagan, called for delay. McFarlane said: “Still more work is needed before a decision on deployment is made … A delay will also provide useful time in which a new government in Washington can engage with the new Russian government and reach a mutually beneficial basis for modifying the outdated ABM treaty.”

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote an OpEd piece in the February 9 Washington Post. He recommended that a “nationwide missile-defense system should be deployed as soon as is technologically feasible” and suggested postponing negotiations with Russia on modifications to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty until a decision on a missile defense system is made. At the same time, he strongly cautioned: “In the light of recent ambiguous test results and imminent electoral preoccupations, it would be desirable to delay a final technical judgment until a new administration is in place.”

Robert Kagan, contributing editor at the conservative magazine Weekly Standard and former Reagan State Department official, predicted that Bush will not talk much about missile defense on the campaign trail. Kagan told the April 27 CQ Daily Monitor: “Because of its complex nature, ‘[NMD] has never been an election issue as much as many Republicans would like it to be.”

POLITICAL CHANGE ACROSS THE GLOBE

Two of the countries most often cited as new nuclear threats — North Korea and Iran — are undergoing change that may significantly reduce the nuclear menace. In mid-June, the leaders of North and South Korea held an unprecedented summit meeting in Pyongyang. While it is not clear where the summit will lead, it is certainly plausible that some of the Cold War enmity between the two countries will diminish and the desire for nuclear weapons will abate as well.

At the same time, reformers in Iran have won sweeping victories over the hardliners in that country. While it may take a while for Iran’s foreign policy to moderate, some of the impetus for that country to develop weapons of mass destruction may be lost.

REPUBLICANS FOR DELAY

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott has joined the “defer” camp. A June 23, 2000 AP story quoted in the Baltimore Sun stated: “Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, meanwhile, said he is ‘not going to be outraged’ if President Clinton leaves a decision on the system to the next president.”

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms has promised to kill any arms control agreement that President Clinton might negotiate with Russia: “Any decision on missile defense will be for the next President of the United States to make, not this one.” Helms reiterated his position in an Izvestia article reported in the June 14, 2000 Washington Post: “‘Clinton wants an [arms control] agreement, a signing ceremony, a picture shaing hands with President Putin.’ Well, Helms said, ‘the decision on missile defense will be for the next president to make.’”

Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) also called for a delay into the next administration, according to the April 29 Congressional Quarterly.

Helms and Roberts join two other Republican Senators who had previously advocated delay. The February 15 New York Times quoted Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel, a strong supporter of missile defense, as saying “This may be one of the most serious decisions a president of the United States may make in modern times, and if the technology piece isn’t there to look at all of the options, then we have to defer the decision.”

Foreign Relations Committee Republican Gordon Smith of Oregon was quoted in the January 20 New York Times proposing: “We should defer to another administration, Republican or Democrat. We ought not to be giving up more than we should.”

In February, both major Republican presidential contenders indicated that they would welcome a decision by President Clinton to delay deployment. A February 27 Washington Post OpEd by Jim Hoagland reported: “George W. Bush and John McCain have each told me they would welcome a Clinton handoff [of the National Missile Defense deployment decision], not attack it. Their purposes are not altruistic: Each argues he would deploy a more robust, more effective system than Clinton would. But these statements give Clinton useful wiggle room.”

More recently, Bush said at a May 23, 2000 press conference: “The administration is driving toward a hasty decision, on a political timetable. No decision would be better than a flawed agreement that ties the hands of the next President and prevents America from defending itself.”

OTHER COUNTRIES WEIGH IN

At an early June Clinton-Putin summit meeting in Moscow, Russian leader Vladimer Putin weighed in against the American deployment plan. He told a June 4 press conference: “We’re against having a cure which is worse than the disease.”

A few days before, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also weighed in. In a June 1, 2000 press conference, the Chancellor said through an interpreter: “The President then proceeded to, in a very frank way, present his views on the national missile defense program, and I have then gone in and stated my concerns, the concerns being that we have to be very careful that any such project does not re-trigger the process of a renewed arms race.” In the June 2 issue of Berliner Zeitung, Mr. Schröder was even more forceful, saying, “Neither economically nor politically can we afford a new round of the arms race. No one can dispute the Americans’ right to develop what they believe is right for national defense. On the other hand, we are partners in a common alliance.”

Javier Solana, the former secretary general of NATO, who is leading the European Union efforts to build a defense force that would complement NATO, was quoted in the May 2 New York Times warning that national missile defense could “strain trans-Atlantic links” or provoke a “a major crisis with Russia.” Solana admonished: “You have to weigh the consequences for the rest of the world.” The same article quoted British and German leaders as being highly skeptical about national missile defense.

There have been other stories about outright opposition to national missile defense among our allies. The February 15 International Herald Tribune, in an article entitled “Washington’s Pursuit Of Missile Defense Drives Wedge In NATO” wrote “European governments, without exception, oppose the U.S. anti-missile project.”

French President Jacques Chirac has been particularly outspoken against missile defense. Chirac told the December 17 New York Times, “If you look at world history, ever since men began waging war, you will see that there’s a permanent race between sword and shield. The sword always wins. The more improvements that are made to the shield, the more improvements are made to the sword. We think that with these [anti-missile ] systems, we are just going to spur swordmakers to intensify their efforts.”

HIGHER COST ESTIMATE

In a significant development, on April 28, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) delivered a devastating blow to the Administration’s plans for national missile defense. The CBO calculated the costs of building and operating the Administration’s defense system — which would eventually encompass 125 interceptors in North Dakota and Alaska — at almost $60 billion, including the cost of a new satellite system (Space-Based Infrared Systems or SBIRS-low). The Pentagon had insisted for months that the cost of the system over the next six years was a modest $12.7 billion. While the lower figure was accurate over that short time frame, it failed to include the bulk of the costs associated of the program over the next 15 years (comparable to pointing to a $5,000 down payment on a new car when the full costs are $25,000).

The devastating impact of the estimate was affirmed when Pentagon spokespeople and missile defense adherents such as Sen. Thad Cochran (R-MS) and Curt Weldon (R-PA) squirmed and even tried to deny the accuracy of CBO report. Cochran told the Senate on April 27: “I believe it is misleading and confusing. It has given support to critics of the program who also have contributed to the confusion.” However, most objective observers and newspaper stories accepted the $60 billion figure.

Multiple stories also pointed out that Republican politicians have made it clear that if George W. Bush is elected, they intend to push for a much more extensive defense. For example, on April 12, 25 Republican Senators sent a letter to President Clinton criticizing as inadequate the land-based missile defense system planned in Alaska and North Dakota. The letter stated: “The [Administration] approach fails to permit the deployment of other promising missile defense technologies — including space-based sensors, sufficient numbers of ground-based radars, and additional interceptor basing modes, like Navy systems and the Airborne Laser — that we believe are necessary to achieve a fully effective defense against a full range of possible threats.”

The Council for a Livable World estimates that this multi-layered national missile defense could easily cost twice as much, $120 billion or more.

POLLING INDICATES LITTLE DEMAND FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

Results from an April 2000 poll commissioned by the Council for a Livable World show that national missile defense is an extremely low priority for Americans. Moreover, a majority of Americans also prefer waiting until testing of a missile defense system is complete before deciding whether to deploy it.

Improving education (28%), protecting Social Security and Medicare (14%) and improving health care coverage (14%) are all significantly higher priorities than defense-related matters. Even fighting crime/drugs (13%), maintaining economic growth (8%), cracking down on illegal guns (6%), and cutting taxes (6%) rank higher than missile defense and a strong military on the nation’s list of priorities. A mere 1% believe building a national missile defense system to be the most important issue.

After arguments both for and against deploying a national missile defense system this year were presented, a majority support waiting until after the 19 tests are completed. 59% (43% strongly) favor waiting until testing is complete while only 20% (16% strongly) favor deciding this year. One-in-five are undecided (21%). Support crosses demographic lines, with large majorities of both men (59%), women (58%), whites (59%), and non-whites (63%) favor completing tests.

Additionally, not only do Americans not vote on missile defense, but the majority do not actually want it. An ABC.com poll released May 2 shows that a narrow majority (53-44%) do not think the U.S. should build a national missile defense.

TROUBLES FROM WITHIN THE PENTAGON

There have been internal problems with the Administration’s program that have led to a cooling of ardor for missile defenses. Until March, the Pentagon had planned to conduct a formal review of national missile defense in June — called a Deployment Readiness Review (DRR) — with the President’s deployment decision likely to follow later in the summer. Construction at a first site in Alaska would then begin in the spring of 2001, with initial deployment in 2005.

On March 21, however, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, announced that the third intercept test of the National Missile Defense system will be postponed until June 26, a two-month delay from the original April 27 date. That new test date (subsequently pushed back to early July) puts additional pressure on the Pentagon’s recommendation to the President on deployment which will now begin in July rather than June. That schedule gives the Pentagon only half the time it initially planned to analyze the results of the third test.

An internal Pentagon report also helped tilt the balance toward delay. Philip E. Coyle III, the Pentagon’s director of operational testing and evaluation, issued a report to Congress on February 11 that said the Pentagon was facing “unrealistic pressure” and that the program was trying “to meet an artificial decision point in the development process.” He further commented that “this pattern has historically resulted in a negative effect on virtually every troubled DOD development program.”

Coyle highlighted the fact that of the two intercept tests conducted thus far, the second failed to achieve an intercept and the first was at best an ambiguous success. He outlined other concerns with the testing program, including the use of a “surrogate” booster and a developmental version of the kill vehicle in early tests. He pointed out that the pre-deployment decision tests will not be conducted “in a realistic enough manner to support acquisition decisions” and the targets for the kill vehicle “may not be representative of threat penetration, aids, booster or post-boost vehicles.”

On March 7, the New York Times reported the story of an ex-employee of TRW

(a top military contractor) who charged the company with faking tests and evaluations of a key component of the proposed $27 billion anti-missile system and then firing her when she protested. The engineer, Dr. Nira Schwartz, was on the company’s missile defense team in 1995 and 1996 helping design computer programs meant to enable interceptors to distinguish between incoming warheads and decoys. In test after test, the interceptor failed, she alleges, but her superiors insisted that the technology performed adequately, refused her appeals to inform industrial partners and federal patrons of its shortcomings, and then fired her. While TRW did not win the contract, her account raises serious questions about the integrity of all of the Pentagon’s testing criteria.

Schwartz and Ted Postal, an MIT arms expert and former Pentagon official, have charged in June 2000 that the Pentagon’s national missile defense testing program is rigged to hide flaws, and that the system cannot distinguish between enemy warheads and decoys (New York Times, June 9, 2000).

Another important contributor to the tide the report issued by an independent team of missile defense experts appointed by the Pentagon. The November 1999 study reiterated findings from a similar report that also sharply criticized the program. The earlier study, which deplored the “rush to failure” in all U.S. missile defense programs, resulted in improvements and a delay in deployment, but, according to the most recent report, many problems have not been solved.

The November panel, headed by Gen. Larry Welch, USAF (ret.), discussed the restraints of the schedule. The report strongly suggested the possibility of delay: “Do not allow further compression of the schedule. If there are additional slips in key events, adjust the DRR date as needed to avoid regressing to a very high risk schedule.”

The most recent Welch panel report, released in June 2000, gave a more positive evaluation of the program, and said the system could become operational in 2005.. However, the report still describes the program as “very high risk,” and cites several problems it still faces.

DEMOCRATIC CALLS FOR DELAY

In another sign of the rising tide, on June 8, Senator John Kerry (D-MA) delivered a speech on the Senate floor in which he analyzed the four criteria by which the President will base his decision on deployment. Kerry concluded: “We must not rush into a politically driven decision on something as critical as this … I urge President Clinton to delay the deployment decision indefinitely.”

Earlier, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told a Stanford University conference on March 3, “If it were up to me, I would want more time and information. I would delay this summer’s decision.”

In addition, seven Democratic Senators wrote President Clinton urging a delay in this summer’s scheduled missile defense deployment decision. The February 9 letter was signed by Senators Byron Dorgan (ND), Richard Durbin (IL), Jeff Bingaman (NM), Tom Harkin (IA), Patrick Leahy (VT), John Kerry (MA) and Barbara Boxer (CA). The seven Senators urged “substantial further testing before a decision about deployment.” It also suggested the need for “more time to deal with the international consequences of such a deployment,” and argued that the time should be used to consider the concerns expressed by our European allies, as well as Russia and China. Sen. Russell Feingold (D-WI) sent a similar letter calling for delay.

EXPERTS QUESTION THE PROGRAM

A group of 50 Nobel laureates sent a letter to the President on July 6, 2000 stating:

“We urge you not to make the decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system during the remaining months of your administration. The system would offer little protection and would do grave harm to this nation’s core security interests.”

A group of 45 experts on China wrote a letter to the President on June 29, 2000 stating:

“We are concerned that a precipitous decision to deploy would adversely affect U.S. relations with China by unnecessarily increasing tensions between the two countries and provoking a series of negative steps by China that would undermine American security and China’s minimum deterrent.”

A group of 33 experts on Russia wrote a letter to the President on June 9, 2000 stating: “We are writing to urge you not to endorse deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). We believe that current plans for the NMD program may undermine U.S. security and further aggravate U.S. relations with Russia.”

The American Physical Society, a non-partisan organization of scientists, issued an April 29, 2000 statement noting that “The tests that have been conducted or are planned for the period fall far short of those required to provide confidence in the ‘technical feasibility’ called for in last year’s NMD deployment legislation.”

On April 11, 2000, a study released by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies demonstrated that simple countermeasures from new missile states will defeat the planned U.S. national missile defense system. The report, by a panel of eleven independent senior physicists and engineers, also found that the current national missile defense testing program is not capable of assessing the system’s effectiveness against a realistic attack.

NEWSPAPERS EDITORIALIZE AGAINST CLINTON PLAN

The recent events have prompted a new wave of editorials from some of the nation’s leading newspapers. [For the full text of the editorials visit: http://www.clw.org/coalition/bmdeditorials.htm]

The Birmingham News - “The chief of the missile defense program said last week that the Defense Department is bending its own rules to meet congressional and White House deadlines.” (May 15, 2000)

Bangor Daily News - “A minor snag popped up in the first two flight tests of the proposed antimissile defense system. The weapon that will save the world can’t tell the difference between an incoming nuclear warhead and a medium-sized striped balloon. The Pentagon’s remedy is ingenious, at once both obvious and cunning. Keep the balloon, lose the stripes.” (June 13, 2000)

Atlanta Journal-Constitution - “The anti-missile defense system being proposed for deployment in the United States by 2005 would be no more effective than wishful thinking. But it’s going to be a lot more expensive and dangerous. In fact, unless some people in Washington sober up quickly, a few years from now we’re going to look back and shake our heads at the stupidity and cowardice of political leaders who decided to bet billions of dollars - and the nation’s security - on such an untested and immature system.” (May 31, 2000)

Los Angeles Times - “The potential threat does not present an urgency or magnitude to justify a problematical $60-billion investment or the destabilizing strategic consequences of thrusting ahead. The Clinton administration, Congress and the presidential candidates would all be wise to reconsider their embrace of this dubious and dangerous project.” (June 1, 2000)

Christian Science Monitor - “U.S. leaders should conclude, as quickly as possible, that this debate over a missile defense must be handled with patience, listening, and caution, and not with a sense of competition, especially during a presidential electoral campaign.” (June 5, 2000)

The New York Times - “The administration should not rush to meet its own artificial deadline for deciding whether to go ahead with building such a system later this year. The technology has not yet been adequately tested nor have the possibilities for diplomatic agreement been exhausted. Mr. Clinton should not risk unraveling existing treaties by moving too hastily to decide on missile defenses.” (June 6, 2000)

Philadelphia Inquirer - “Mr. Putin crystallized the case against Mr. Clinton’s antimissile missiles Sunday: ‘We’re against having a cure which is worse than the disease.’” (June 6, 2000)

The San Francisco Chronicle - “The United States should not be in a rush to develop a costly, technically questionable program that might end up encouraging a new global arms race.” (June 6, 2000)

The San Francisco Examiner - “Considering all the doubts about the scientific feasibility of even such a limited Star Wars deployment as Clinton proposes, there would seem to be no drawback to dragging out such a discussion for years until the technical possibilities are clearer.” (June 7, 2000)

Chicago Tribune - “Before the United States deploys a weapon that doesn’t work, it ought to evaluate whether a joint project on a more effective, less provocative missile defense might be a stable, successful alternative.” (June 11, 2000)

Boston Globe - “The nation’s defense must not be determined by political spin or defense contractors’ boondoggles. If truly qualified and independent scientists say the Pentagon has been lying about a system that can’t work, that system should be canceled.” (June 14, 2000)

Los Angeles Times- “What’s clearly missing in all the assuring talk about NMD is context. That includes the formidable strategic and political costs of deploying such a system. This supposed security enhancement could well leave the United States far less secure than it is now.” (May 28, 2000)

Washington Post - “The president is right to seek continuing dialogue and cooperation with Russia. But declaring the treaty a “cornerstone” before deciding which, if any, missile defense system makes sense is backward. To pretend that it’s possible to have things both ways sets the stage for more tension than necessary with Russia later on.” (June 6, 2000)

Omaha World Herald - “Establishing a missile defense to protect the United States won’t simply be a matter of solving technological problems. It will also require solving difficult strategic ones.” (May 26, 2000)

Other editorials calling for delay have come from:

OTHER OPPOSITION

On February 25, Ivan Eland, Director of Policy Studies at CATO, the libertarian institute also counseled delay. A supporter of National Missile Defense deployment, Eland stated: “President Clinton should postpone his scheduled mid-summer decision on whether to deploy a national missile (NMD) system. The few tests that will have been completed by that time on the most complex weapon system ever built will show a spotty record of success. More important, no weapon system — and especially a high risk system such as NMD — should be purchased until successfully completing a full test program (including operational test and evaluation). Unfortunately, congressional pressure and electoral politics are pushing the administration into a early and unwise production decision, which will lead to a ‘rush to failure.’”