'Fuzzy' Logic on Missile Defense
In selling its proposal for deploying missile defenses to the American public and the international community, the Bush administration has practiced the art of misdirection by drawing attention away from the four common-sense criteria by which an anti-missile system should be evaluated: cost, technological readiness, the level of the missile threat, and the likely effects on arms control and international security.
The administration’s high-pressure sales tactics include exaggerating the ballistic missile threat, invoking missile defense as a way to move beyond “anachronistic” Cold War nuclear thinking, blaming the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for the system’s poor test record and technical failures, and promising consultations with allies while simultaneously planning to proceed unilaterally with deployment. “Cost” has been treated as an unspeakable four-letter word. Below are some examples of the administration’s misleading and contradictory missile defense rhetoric.
RHETORIC: “I have made it clear to our friends and allies that I think it’s necessary to set aside the ABM Treaty, but I will do so in close consultation with not only members of NATO and EU countries who are not members of NATO, but, as well, with the Russians.” - President Bush, June 13th Press Conference in Brussels
REALITY: Although President Bush has repeatedly vowed to consult with U.S. allies on the subject of missile defenses, other administration statements indicate that the decision has already been made. For instance, in a June 7 address to NATO foreign ministers, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “Deploying missile defenses capable of protecting the U.S., friends and Allies will eventually require moving beyond the ABM Treaty. We understand this conclusion is not welcomed by some. It is simply inescapable.” In light of statements like these, promises of consultations appear to be nothing more than a euphemism for telling our allies to “deal with it.” After President Bush’s NATO visit, one European diplomat commented, “If Bush has already decided to go ahead with breaking the ABM Treaty and building his project, then how are we supposed to believe that these consultations have any meaning?” (Washington Post, June 13)
RHETORIC: “We must achieve release from the constraints of the ABM Treaty.” - Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, July 12 Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
REALITY: According to Philip Coyle, former Pentagon Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, “Until the U.S. government learns whether the technical, budgetary, and operational problems that the National Missile Defense presents can be solved, the ABM treaty is the least of President Bush’s problems.” (“NMD Development is not Hostage to the ABM Treaty,” Center for Defense Information Issue Brief, June 12) The new booster rocket for the NMD interceptor has not even been tested once, and the first flight intercept test with the new booster will not take place before mid-2002. Even if a basic intercept capability can eventually be demonstrated, tests will then have to be attempted at greater distances and against increasingly sophisticated targets with decoys, countermeasures, or debris designed to confuse the system. Philip Coyle estimates that “[s]ome 20 or more flight intercept tests, and hundreds of component and subsystem tests, will be needed before the Pentagon will be ready to attempt realistic operational testing of [a mid-course] NMD system.” While all of this near-term research and testing promises to require considerable time and investment, none of it is prohibited by the ABM treaty. Rather, it will likely be a decade or more before the treaty presents an obstacle to further development.
RHETORIC: “Of course, we’re not going to deploy a system that doesn’t work. What good will that do?” - President Bush, June 13th Press Conference in Brussels
REALITY: Although the currently proposed system has failed two out of three carefully scripted intercept tests, the Administration has indicated in recent days that it may decide to deploy a small group of interceptors by 2004, just before the presidential election. “The president and the secretary [of defense] have made it pretty clear they believe that some missile defense in the near term is in fact better than nothing,” said an Administration official in a June 8 Washington Post..
RHETORIC: “We will not make decisions on systems architecture until our technologies have been tested.” - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, June 7th address in Brussels
REALITY: Any crash program to put in place some elements of a missile defense system before 2004 would likely involve deploying technologies before they are fully tested and therefore in advance of any decision on systems architecture. In fact, the administration is crafting just such a scheme. In the same speech on June 7, Rumsfeld said, “[W]e will likely deploy test assets to provide rudimentary defenses to deal with emerging threats. We will likely continue to improve the effectiveness of any deployed capabilities over time,” implying that the administration may deploy technologies before they are mature and deal with the question of systems architecture only after some elements of missile defenses are in place. This is an imprudent and dangerous “foot in the door” approach to missile defense designed to pave the way for additional spending down the road.
RHETORIC: “Our goal is to deploy defenses against handfuls of missiles, not hundreds…. Such defenses are no threat whatsoever to anyone.” - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, June 7th address in Brussels
REALITY: China currently has only a “handful”- approximately 18- weapons capable of being launched at the U.S., a force that even a limited land-based system could threaten. In order to protect their deterrence, the Chinese would likely accelerate their development of larger and more sophisticated nuclear forces, a buildup that could fuel arms races in South and East Asia.
Moreover, while the administration has tried to calm Russian and Chinese fears by insisting that U.S. missile defenses will be limited, it has tried to make the concept palatable to the Europeans by telling them just the opposite- that the U.S. will deploy missile defenses to protect itself, its allies in Europe and Asia, and its deployed troops overseas, against both rogue state missiles and accidental or unauthorized launches. Such a proposal is anything but limited, and would require considerable time and massive investment, although the administration has given no indication of how much.
RHETORIC: “We need to get over the Cold War, and the legacy of Cold War thinking and approaches that still narrow and restrict our thinking.” - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, June 7th address in Brussels
REALITY: Missile defense itself is very much a legacy of Cold War thinking. Since the 1950s, the U.S. has tried and repeatedly failed to develop effective missile defenses. One system, Safeguard, was constructed in North Dakota in 1975, only to be shut down four months after it became operational. It is not clear that the Bush administration has learned anything from these failures, the cost of which to date exceeds $125 billion. Truly moving beyond the Cold War means de-alerting nuclear forces, making significant reductions in nuclear arsenals and strengthening multinational arms control agreements, not building new weapons.
RHETORIC: “In 1972, we knew of only five countries that had nuclear weapons programs; today we know of twelve.” - Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, July 12 Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
REALITY: Thirty years ago the world had five nuclear powers: the U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, France, and China. Several other countries, including India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea, were already engaged in nuclear research. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of states possessing or seeking nuclear weapons has actually decreased. Although Iran and Iraq can be considered to have nuclear aspirations, several other countries- South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Argentina, and Brazil- have abandoned their nuclear programs and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, the world is hardly the nuclear free-for-all that the Secretary’s language implies.
RHETORIC: “Today, the number of countries pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is growing. The number of countries pursuing advanced conventional weapons is growing. The number of countries pursuing ballistic missile technology is growing. The number of missiles on the face of the earth is growing.” - Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, July 12 Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
REALITY: Most countries developing ballistic missile technology possess systems capable of traveling only modest distances. The only countries that currently possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of hitting U.S. territory as well as nuclear warheads that can be mounted on ICBMs are Russia, Britain, France, and China. The U.S. insists that missile defense is not directed against Russia and China, and Britain and France are U.S. allies. Although North Korea may be developing a longer-range ICBM, there are less expensive and more effective alternatives to missile defense for dealing with this threat. For instance, the U.S. can negotiate an agreement with North Korea that would eliminate its development and export of ballistic missile components and technology.
RHETORIC: “If anything, building effective defenses will reduce the value of ballistic missiles, and thus remove incentives for their development and proliferation.” - Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, July 12 Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
REALITY: Missile defenses do nothing to discourage proliferation, and may make the problem worse by stimulating buildups in offensive nuclear forces around the world. Some countries may simply build more missiles in order to overwhelm the anti-missile system. According to an August 2000 National Intelligence Estimate, China’s nuclear arsenal may increase up to ten times its present size as a response to U.S. missile defenses. A Chinese buildup could in turn spark nuclear buildups in India and Pakistan, with potentially devastating consequences for stability in South Asia.
Another option for overwhelming missile defenses would be to place multiple warheads on individual missiles. Russia could follow through on its threat to equip each of its new Topol SS- 27 ICBMs with as many as three independently targetable warheads, a step that would entail Russia’s withdrawal from the START II agreement, which prohibits multiple-warhead ICBMs. Speaking at a June 18th press conference, Russian President Vladmir Putin promised that “We will reinforce our capability” by “mounting multiple warheads on our missiles” and “that will cost us a meager sum.” And so, he said, “the nuclear arsenal of Russia will be augmented multi- fold.” (New York Times, June 19)
Finally, countries could employ simple and inexpensive countermeasures to confuse the missile defense system. According to a September 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, China and Russia already possess the technology for such countermeasures, and may be willing to sell the technology to interested states. Furthermore, China and North Korea may refuse to cooperate on non-proliferation and increase their export of missile components and technologies to proliferators.
RHETORIC: “I believe the Kyoto Treaty is a flawed treaty. I think that it set unscientific goals.” - President Bush, June 13th Press Conference in Madrid
“There is not a single major technological development in human history that did not begin with a process of trial and error and many of our most successful weapons developments have been marked by testing failures… Failure is how we learn. If a program never suffers test failures, it means someone is not taking enough risks and pushing the envelope. Intelligent risk taking is critical to any advanced development program…” - Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, July 12 Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee REALITY: It is hypocritical to argue, as the Bush administration does, that the Kyoto protocol on global climate change is scientifically flawed and should be opposed, while missile defense should be pursued aggressively despite its more serious scientific flaws. Ironically, a solid scientific consensus exists on the severity of global warming, while no such consensus exists on whether or not “hitting a bullet with a bullet” can ever be done with the necessary degree of consistency to make missile defenses worth the considerable costs, both financial and in terms of lost security.