U.S. Should Not Approve Sale of Arrow Missile Defense System to India
India is reportedly interested in acquiring the Arrow theater ballistic missile defense system from Israel. Developed jointly by Israel and the United States, Arrow is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles at high altitudes, and could potentially be used by India to defend against Pakistan’s nuclear-capable Ghauri and Shaheen missiles.
Israel has already sold India the Green Pine radar system, which tracks incoming ballistic missiles and transmits target data to Arrow’s battle management system and interceptors. However, because the U.S. was a partner in the Arrow program, Israel cannot sell the system to India without U.S. approval. The Bush administration has not yet decided whether to allow the sale to proceed.
Given the history of mistrust and conflict in South Asia and the importance of U.S. non-proliferation interests, the U.S. should not approve the Arrow deal.
ARROW WILL FURTHER DESTABILIZE SOUTH ASIA
The introduction of anti-ballistic missile systems such as Arrow into South Asia could further destabilize an already volatile region, increasing the danger of a crisis escalating into a new war. During a crisis situation, such as that which followed last December’s terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, missile defenses could encourage India to pursue more offensive-minded military options. For example, India might be more eager to launch strikes against militant training camps, missile batteries, and other strategic targets located in Pakistan, believing that it can rely on the Arrow system to limit the damage from any retaliatory Pakistani strike to an acceptable level.
Pakistan would likely change its military posture and planning in response to perceived vulnerabilities created by India’s deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. Fearing a crippling stike by India, Pakistan might mate warheads to ballistic missiles and deploy them on high alert. Suspicious of Indian intentions during a crisis, Pakistan might also become more willing to launch a first strike.
ARROW WILL ACCELERATE THE ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA
According to Karl Inderfurth, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, “Were India to proceed with an investment in missile defense, one thing is certain: Pakistan will respond in some fashion, either by increasing its offensive capability to counter such a defensive shield or by pursuing its own form of missile defense wherever they could obtain it. That is an iron law of the action-reaction cycle in South Asia.”
In addition to its destabilizing effect on security in South Asia, an arms race will further impoverish the people of India and Pakistan at a time when both countries should be focusing on poverty alleviation and economic development. According to the United Nations Human Development Index, India ranks 124th and Pakistan 138th out of 173 countries in terms of quality of life— far behind several other developing countries.
THE SALE MAY VIOLATE THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles and related technology. The 33 states that are currently members of the MTCR voluntarily agree to enforce common export control policies on all key equipment, systems, and technologies for missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
Last January the U.S. reportedly asked Israel to defer selling the Arrow to India, in part because of possible conflicts with MTCR export restrictions. According to one administration official, “The Arrow is an MTCR category-one missile” that, while defensive in nature, could be converted into an offensive weapon. Although the Arrow is probably too small to serve as an effective delivery platform for nuclear weapons, some of its key technologies could be used by India to advance its ballistic missile program.
APPROVAL OF THE ARROW SALE WILL UNDERMINE U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
Even if the U.S. determines that the transfer of Arrow to India is permissible under the MTCR, allowing the sale to proceed might still undercut efforts to stop the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology to terrorists and hostile states. Countries that the U.S. considers major ballistic missile supplier states— such as Russia, China, and North Korea— could point to the Arrow sale as evidence that the U.S. is not serious about non-proliferation and therefore has no right to insist that they curtail their own missile exports.
REWARD PEACE, NOT BRINKMANSHIP
Proponents of the Arrow sale argue that India should be rewarded for exercising restraint in its current standoff with Pakistan. However, the crisis is far from over, and tensions could come to a boil at any point. Hundreds of thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops remain deployed along the border between the two countries. Mortar and artillery fire across the Line of Control in Kashmir occurs almost daily, and militant extremists continue to commit acts of terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan has not completely curtailed the activities of these extremists, and India adamantly refuses to enter into any dialogue with Pakistan.
It is appropriate for the U.S. to continue to strengthen military ties with India, especially when the war on terrorism is the focus of such cooperation. However, in the current security environment in South Asia, the U.S. must take a firm stand against the sale of military goods that could further destabilize the region and undermine U.S. non-proliferation efforts. Only after India and Pakistan enter into a serious and sustained dialogue on Kashmir and other issues should the U.S. consider rewarding them with advanced military systems and technologies that are consistent with our international non-proliferation commitments.