Summary of Updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq
September 11, 2007
Full text is available here.
As part of the ongoing effort to assess the effect of the "surge" strategy on the stabilization of Iraq, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) submitted in January has been updated to reflect current conditions.
The NIE concludes that the high level of violence found prior to the increase in American forces has been reduced, but that overall violence still remains high, especially against civilian targets. This, combined with the lack of sectarian reconciliation and effective national governmental action, has lead to stagnated progress in improving stability in Iraq.
It is believed that modest gains can be made in the area of security over the next six to twelve months if Coalition forces remain performing their mission of training and counterinsurgency. However, this will likely not reduce the level of violence significantly, nor will it lead to a sudden political reconciliation or more effective government.
The document states that, "Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments."
Recently, increased opposition by Sunni tribal leaders to Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has emerged as a new paradigm to be analyzed. This lack of local support is weakening the hold AQI has had on Sunni areas, but the movement has yet to be widely accepted by the Shia-run national government as they fear these groups will eventually return to armed opposition to the federal state. Some effort has been made by Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's government to form a bond with these tribal leaders but results are still pending. This change of affiliation by Sunni leaders is also seen as being linked to a movement by local leaders to consolidate their power in preparation for a post-Coalition security structure.
This change of heart by Sunni leaders is assessed by the NIE to be the best chance for improved security in the short-term, but it also comes with some risks. If the tribal leaders are successful in routing AQI from their individual territories and establishing strong local security networks without the cooperation and coordination of the Iraqi Government, it is likely that the central government's authority will be reduced.
Otherwise, the progress the NIE presents can be summarized as follows:
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have performed adequately but are not capable of conducting independent operations. Sectarian and insurgent infiltration remains a key problem for the ISF.
The Iraqi Government will become more problematic as Shia factions work to constrain and replace the Maliki government and other sectarian factions continue to undermine the federal state.
The internal and external refugee crisis continues to deepen as sectarian violence continues. Although this has placed severe burdens on provincial governments, some violence has decreased in areas that have become separated on sectarian lines.
External actors, especially Iran and Syria, continue to press their influence inside Iraq's borders. Iran is especially influential as it provides support for the powerful Shia sectarian militia groups with strong connections to the central government. Syria, despite recent crackdowns on destabilizing groups within their own borders, is providing material support for militia groups in Iraq. Ultimately, Turkey, may also intervene directly in order to suppress what they consider to be Kurdish terrorist groups in northern Iraq.
The NIE closes by assessing that "Changing the mission of the Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing a safehaven would erode security gains achieved thus far." There are no predictions made as to what exactly would happen in Iraq if Coalition Forces were to redeploy other than it would depend greatly on the reaction of the Iraqi people. It is stated, however, that this action would put current security progress at risk.