Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

The Next Korea? Estimated Cost of a Long-Term U.S. Presence in Iraq

by Travis Sharp [contact information]

September 28, 2007

The United States has maintained a military presence in and around Northeast Asia since the 1950s. This has included Army ground combat units in South Korea, Marine Corps ground combat units and aviation equipment in Okinawa, Japan, and Air Force units in both Korea and Japan. Between 1991 and 2004, the United States maintained roughly 80,000 personnel in Northeast Asia, including four brigade combat teams, Army and Marine Corps headquarters and support units, six land-based tactical fighter squadrons, and an aircraft carrier battle group. Fifty years after the Korean War, 30,000 U.S. troops are still stationed along the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

Essex Expeditionary Strike Group participates in Exercise Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration/Foal Eagle (RSOI/FE) 2007. RSOI/FE is a combined/joint exercise conducted annually involving forces from both the United States and the Republic of Korea.
Copyright © U.S. Government, public domain.

President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials have cited Korea as a model for how the United States should shape its long-term presence in Iraq. White House spokesman Tony Snow referenced the "Korean model" in a press conference on May 30, explaining:

You have the United States [in Iraq] in what has been described as an over-the-horizon support role so that if you need the ability to react quickly to major challenges or crises, you can be there, but the Iraqis are conducting the lion's share of the business - as we have in South Korea, where for many years there have been American forces stationed there as a way of maintaining stability and assurance on the part of the South Korean people against a North Korean neighbor that is a menace.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed the comparison, stating that the Korean model would be ultimately preferable to what happened in Vietnam, "where we just left lock, stock, and barrel." Gates added that the Korean analogy "is more a model of a mutually agreed arrangement whereby we have a long and enduring presence but under the consent of both parties and under certain conditions." On September 26, Gates further outlined his vision for a long-term military presence in Iraq, suggesting that a force roughly one-fourth the size of the current U.S. deployment of 170,000 - around 40,000 soldiers - might be in Iraq for years to come.

SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?

Opinions on what the United States should do next in Iraq generally fall into three broad categories. On one end of the spectrum is the Bush administration and its pro-war Republican allies in Congress. This camp has adopted General David Petraeus's recommendation for reducing the American troop presence from its current "surged" high of approximately 170,000 soldiers to the pre-surge level of 130,000 by July 2008.

On the opposite end of the spectrum are anti-war Democrats and their grassroots allies, who believe the United States should have been out of Iraq yesterday. Perhaps the highest-profile spokesman for immediate, comprehensive withdrawal is New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, who advocates withdrawing all American troops from Iraq within six months. Unlike several of his Democratic presidential rivals, however, Richardson is opposed to leaving a residual American military presence in Iraq, emphatically arguing that:

I believe that we need to withdraw all of our troops within six months. That's all of our troops. Other than the customary Marine contingent at the embassy, I would not leave anyone behind. And if the embassy isn't safe, they're coming home too. No airbases. No troops in the Green Zone. No embedded soldiers training Iraqi forces, because we know what that means. It means our troops would still be out on patrol - with targets on their backs.

Positioned between these two entrenched camps are those who believe the United States must "go long" in Iraq, albeit at force levels lower than Petraeus has recommended. Democratic presidential candidates Joseph Biden, Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, and Barack Obama have all espoused different variations of this position, which typically includes force reductions coupled with the transition of the mission to targeted counterterrorism operations, protecting American infrastructure and diplomatic personnel, and training Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

The fullest airing of the go long strategy from a source outside cookie-cutter presidential campaign talking points came earlier this year from the Center for a New American Security in a report titled "Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq." This study suggested reducing the American troop presence in Iraq to about 60,000 by the end of 2008 and transitioning to training ISF by early 2009, just as the next president takes office. The report recommends withdrawing American forces entirely from Iraq by 2012, but calls for an unspecified yet "significant military presence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region."

WHAT WILL IT COST TO "GO LONG" IN IRAQ?

Opinion in both the Democratic and Republican foreign policy establishment is beginning to congeal around some variation of the go long strategy. Differences exist on how many American troops should remain in Iraq and for how long, but there are very few mainstream thinkers calling for the complete withdrawal of American forces from the region. Some especially popular destinations for American soldiers include Iraqi Kurdistan, Kuwait, and/or on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. This type of "over the horizon" basing posture would be similar to Cold War-era deployments in South Korea and Germany that the U.S. still sustains today.

On September 20, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a report that estimated the possible costs to the United States of maintaining a long-term military presence in Iraq similar to that in Northeast Asia. CBO structured its forecast under two separate scenarios: "combat" and "noncombat." Both scenarios contain policies espoused by supporters of the go long strategy, and CBO specifically designed its combat scenario "as a transition phase between current operations and the noncombat scenario."

Under the combat scenario, 55,000 personnel would remain in Iraq, keeping the operational tempo and unit rotation pace roughly equivalent to what it is today. Reserve-component forces would make up a significant portion of deployed units, as is currently the case in Iraq.

Under the noncombat scenario, 55,000 personnel would be deployed to units based permanently in Iraq or neighboring countries like Kuwait. This scenario assumes a zero or near-zero level of combat similar to what American forces have faced in Germany and Japan, assigns 10,000 personnel specifically for training Iraqi military and police units, and does not include the deployment of reserve-component forces.

The final cost forecasts are striking. CBO estimates that the combat scenario would initially cost between $4 and $8 billion for start-up procurement expenditures required to station four much-needed sets of equipment in theater for four heavy brigade combat teams. Annual operation costs under the combat scenario would be approximately $25 billion.

Under the noncombat scenario, CBO estimates that one-time base construction costs of roughly $8 billion would be required to establish the requisite infrastructure for the long-term stationing of American personnel. Annual operation costs for maintaining the noncombat scenario would reach $10 billion.

Personnel costs under the combat scenario exceed those under the noncombat scenario because the incremental costs for deploying reserve-component forces are significantly higher than for deploying active-duty personnel, who receive their full pay regardless of whether or not they are deployed.

CBO also suggests in its report that economic and infrastructure development in Iraq could lead to lower annual operation costs over time. For example, the incremental cost of stationing more U.S. forces in South Korea, with its modern economy, is less than $1 billion annually. Economic growth and infrastructure building seem improbable at least in the short-term in Iraq, however, due to the volatile security environment, which prevents delivery of basic goods such as oil, electricity, sanitation services, and potable water that are necessary for economic development.

In a previous study, CBO reported that having 30,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by the beginning of 2010, and keeping that force level constant through 2017, would cost the U.S. between $481 billion and $603 billion from 2008-2017, with the exact amount depending on the duration of the surge in Iraq. This would bring total spending for global war on terror operations well above $1 trillion since the September 11 attacks. If the U.S. were to have 75,000 troops in Iraq by the beginning of 2013, and maintain that constant level through 2017, CBO estimates the cost would be between $924 billion and $1,010 billion from 2008-2017, bringing global war on terror operations costs closer to $2 trillion since September 11.

CONCLUSION

Putting aside for a moment the strategic pros and cons of prospective American force postures in Iraq, all of the scenarios outlined by CBO involve a long-term military presence in Iraq and require a substantial economic investment by the United States. Now that $42 billion has been officially added to the fiscal year 2008 war-spending request - bringing it to around $190 billion, a 15 percent increase over fiscal year 2007 - funding requested for Iraq and Afghanistan now totals approximately $800 billion over the past four and a half years. This makes the global war on terror the second-costliest conflict in U.S. history in inflation-adjusted terms. Only World War II cost more.

Investing such a sizable portion of American economic resources will have uncertain repercussions years into the future. Policymakers must keep future American economic solvency in mind when crafting current policies, not simply write blank checks that drive the United States further into debt. Continuing to sacrifice American global economic vitality for domestic political purposes - so that politicians can utilize rhetorically-charged words like "victory" and "defeat" that sound good on the evening news but offer no insight into the strategic consequences of the conflict - would be a huge mistake.

While perceptions are an important consideration in international politics, war supporters are on shaky ground when they claim that withdrawal from Iraq will damage America's reputation for strength throughout the world and that no price is too great to pay for "victory" in Iraq. In the 1960s, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations similarly prioritized perceptions over capabilities in their policy of flexible response, an approach that sunk the United States deeper and deeper into the morass in Vietnam.

The continued presence of American military forces in Iraq is actively tarnishing America's reputation abroad. More importantly, the tangential debate over perceptions is overshadowing the enormous damage the Iraq war is doing to American capabilities. Every day the Iraq war continues - expending huge sums of money and breaking the back of the armed forces - U.S. means for achieving future strategic ends are diminished. Unabashed war supporters ought to remember Sun Tzu's admonition on future threats and protracted conflict in the Art of War:

When the weapons have grown dull and spirits depressed, when our strength has been expended and resources consumed, then the feudal lords will take advantage of our exhaustion to arise. Even though you have wise generals, they will not be able to achieve a good result. Thus in military campaigns I have heard of awkward speed but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country has ever profited from protracted warfare.