Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Perspectives: Bloodshed in Iraq

by Travis Sharp [contact information]

Published in ISN Security Watch on October 19, 2006

Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's new four-point peace plan - the so-called Ramadan Plan - endeavors to stem sectarian violence by delegating control over security to local committees. It is hoped that Iraqis will become vested stakeholders in their own security and start taking responsibility for stopping the bloodshed.

The initial compromises required to implement the peace plan are probably insurmountable. Shi'ite-Sunni agreements are painstakingly hard to come by, and the Iraqi Parliament still needs to decide how many members will be on each committee, how influential each member will be, what geographic areas the committees will be responsible for, and what procedures will be used to conduct business.

These are formidable obstacles in a political environment as schismatic as Iraq's. Assuming the political details can be ironed out, we should consider the peace proposal on its merits.

The Ramadan Plan is theoretically attractive because its vision of decentralized committees capable of working both cooperatively and independently actually mirrors the organizational structure of numerous terrorist cells and sectarian militias operating in Iraq.

Despite its theoretical allure, however, the plan won't work because it is essentially a prescription for more militia activity. The committees may convene hoping to inculcate local stability, but all it will take is one unfortunate act of violence to transform a moderate committee into a vanguard for vigilantism. This is not a pejorative evaluation of Iraqis as much as it is a general observation about human nature. When things become more personal - as they undoubtedly would on local committees - they also tend to become more emotional, irrational and reactionary.

The Ramadan Plan is an attempt to develop more democratic institutions in Iraq. As the contentious history of Iraq's Parliament demonstrates, however, democracy is not the most efficient way to achieve rapid reform. The rampant violence in Iraq calls for an immediate overhaul of the security apparatus, not a symbolic attempt to foster local political participation.

Democracy in Iraq is completely meaningless without human security. Local committees with the ability to lodge grievances do not protect innocent Iraqis from foreign jihadists and sectarian death squads. Protect the people with Iraqi security forces and provide basic services first. Then you can worry about local oversight.