Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Beyond the Executive Summary

by Travis Sharp [contact information]

December 28, 2006

The Iraq Study Group's final report has come and gone. James Baker and Lee Hamilton, co-chairs of the blue-ribbon commission, have already testified before Congress and are expected to receive many more invitations over the next few months. Media appearances may continue sporadically but the press blitz that followed the report's initial release has largely subsided.

The report's purposeful focus on a "broad, sustained consensus" was a smart strategy for winning widespread endorsement, but Baker and Hamilton's unified bipartisan message could not trump their lack of a silver-bullet proposal to solve an unsolvable conundrum.

The Iraq Study Group achieved at least some success because it triggered a comprehensive policy review within the White House. Beyond this token political victory, however, there is value in analyzing the report's specific recommendations to understand how they might help bring about an eventual end to American military involvement in Iraq.

SUMMARIZING THE REPORT

The 79 recommendations of the report can be boiled down to two overarching proposals:

1) "New and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region," and

2) "A change in the primary mission of U.S. forces" that will eventually permit the U.S. "to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly." (pp. xiii)

The report acknowledges that America's ability "to shape outcomes is diminishing" and that the U.S. military can do nothing by itself to "bring about success in Iraq." (pp. 32, 70) "Time is running out" on the Bush administration's goal of creating an Iraq that can "govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself," according to the report, but because the chaos in Iraq was "set in motion by American decisions and actions," the U.S. "has both a national and moral interest in doing what it can...to avert anarchy." (pp. 32, 40, 2)

STRENGTHS

The report's greatest success, both politically and in terms of policy formulation, is its willingness to recognize the severity of the crisis in Iraq. The first sentence functions as a harsh wake-up call to all Americans: "The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating." (pp. xiii)

The report goes on to label the state of affairs in Baghdad "dire" and affirms that violence is "increasing in scope and lethality," particularly in the four provinces--Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din--where 40 percent of Iraq's population lives. (pp. 1, xiii, 6)

The assessment that sectarian conflict represents "the principal challenge to stability" is another strength of the report primarily because President Bush continues to claim that infiltration by foreign terrorists and al Qaeda are the primary security problems. (pp. xiii)

The report's recommendations on public diplomacy are also praiseworthy because they are usually brushed aside during larger debates over troop levels and regional actors. There would be little political risk if President Bush were to publicly state that the U.S. "does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq" and "does not seek to control Iraq's oil," as the report suggests. (Rec. 22-23, pp. 61) Skeptical U.S. allies might be reassured that we aren't planning on staying forever and become more cooperative. Transforming our "collection of data about violence" in Iraq so that the U.S. can "provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground" would counter accusations that the Department of Defense distorts the severity of the war through questionable reporting practices. (Rec. 78, pp. 95)

WEAKNESSES

The report adamantly maintains that success in Iraq depends "primarily on the actions of the Iraqi people" working toward "specific objectives--or milestones--on national reconciliation, security, and governance." (pp. 40, xvii) The national reconciliation milestones consist of passing a group of conciliatory laws and holding a referendum on constitutional amendments. (pp. 62-63)

The report itself contains ample evidence that passing these laws, at least in the short-term, is highly unlikely. For instance, Sunnis "did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting process" because they still "believe they should govern" and both Kurdish and Shia leaders "have little commitment to national reconciliation" and "are not working toward a united Iraq" even though they make up approximately 80 percent of the total population. (pp. 18-19) It is unclear what might motivate the sects to abandon their divergent positions, but it is clear that Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's efforts aren't bearing fruit and tit for tat reprisal killings are widening internal schisms.

Hopes for national reconciliation are further undermined by the Iraqi Parliament's woeful track record on passing controversial bills. For example, while embroiled in a debate over the creation of autonomous regions in September 2006, the Iraqi Parliament decided to defer the implementation date on any partition legislation for 18 months. Instead of negotiating a much-needed compromise, this stalling tactic left the issue unresolved and is symptomatic of an institution that functions more often as a forum for pursuing sectarian interest than a legislative body concerned with the Iraqi nation as a whole.

The report's security milestones are tantalizingly vague and consist of increased Iraqi security spending, gradual Iraqi control of the Army and provinces, and eventual "Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support)." (pp. 63) The primary way the U.S. would foment this transition would be to "increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, embedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units." (pp. 70) The report recommends that the "training and equipping mission" should involve "10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 now in this role." (pp. 75, 71)

While pointing out that the training of Iraqi security forces has been "uneven" in terms of advancing "national goals instead of a sectarian agenda," the report basically repackages an "Iraqization" strategy the U.S. has been using since Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi Army three and a half years ago. (pp. 7-8) As ongoing violence indicates, it isn't working and Iraqi forces are still woefully unprepared.

Assigning responsibility to Iraqis is a policy response that ignores a simple reality--the Iraqis can't do many of the things we want them to. Anthony Cordesman, an expert on Iraqi force development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, disputes the report's estimate that 326,000 Iraqis have been successfully trained, putting the figure somewhere below 227,000. (pp. 7; Cordesman, Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War, pp. viii-x) Cordesman asserts that under the best case scenario, embedded American advisors will need 3-5 years to complete their mission. (Cordesman pp. v-vi) Since the report recommends that American combat brigades not withdraw while there are still "force protection" responsibilities, it is hard to see how embedded advisory teams will not require "force protection"--and thus the continued full-scale support of combat brigades--for their entire 3-5 year assignment. (pp. 72)

Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of the report is its failure to accept that the U.S. does not possess the political capital required to carry out the recommended "New Diplomatic Offensive." (Rec. 1, pp. 45) The Bush administration's foreign policy has alienated allies and made the U.S. an international pariah over the past six years. If a skillful diplomat such as former President Bill Clinton was unable to negotiate an Arab-Israeli peace settlement at Camp David in July 2000, it seems impossible that the internationally reviled Bush foreign policy team could pull off an even more complex set of maneuvers.

The report calls for the New Diplomatic Offensive to be launched by December 31, 2006, but ignores the fact that there are gaping personnel holes in top-level U.S. diplomatic positions following a slew of resignations that included Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, head State Department counselor Philip Zelikow, and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, who is rumored to be leaving soon. (Rec. 1, pp. 45)

While the recommendation to create an "International Support Group" is a commendable attempt at multilateralism, countries in the Middle East that have been antagonized and demonized by the Bush administration are unlikely to suddenly cooperate because the U.S. finds itself in a disaster. (Rec. 4, pp. 49) The report argues that Iran will consider assisting us in Iraq because otherwise its "rejectionist attitude...could lead to its isolation," but Iran's ongoing nuclear brinksmanship indicates that international isolation is not something it fears. (pp. 52)

The Iraq Study Group designates the first quarter of 2008 as a tentative target for getting "all combat brigades...out of Iraq" but adds so many caveats and preconditions that troop withdrawal becomes little more than background noise. (pp. 73) For example, only troops "not necessary for force protection" will be removed, but force protection is intentionally left undefined. (pp. 72) Security milestones for the Iraqi Army are dubious and unhelpful, relying on language like "control" and "self-reliance" but proffering no quantifiable metric. (pp. 63) The report even leaves open the possibility of "a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces...if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective." (pp. 73)

The many layers of exceptions and loopholes dilute the impact of a withdrawal date and permit the Bush administration to cherry pick justifications for staying the course and even increasing the baseline American troop presence in Iraq.

The report declares that "If we leave...the long-range consequences could eventually require the United States to return." (pp. 38) These potential consequences of withdrawal are meticulously outlined: greater sectarianism, a humanitarian catastrophe, ethnic cleansing, reemergence of a dictator, regional destabilization and war, a refugee crisis, an increase in terrorist activity, further damage to America's global image, greater political polarization within the U.S., future Iraqi unwillingness to cooperate, and bottlenecked global energy supplies. (pp. 33-36)

But the report fails to follow its own advice: America's ability "to shape outcomes is diminishing" and the U.S. military can do nothing by itself to "bring about success in Iraq." (pp. 32, 70) An iron will cannot always overcome realities on the ground just because the U.S. says so. The situation in Iraq has deteriorated to such an extent that the U.S. cannot prevent every consequence single handedly, but it is also too late and President Bush has made too many mistakes to recruit international assistance. We are stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place.

CONCLUSION

Whether we like it or not, it is time to face an inevitable reality: the U.S. is going to withdraw from Iraq with less than what it would consider a total victory. Whether this means our definition of victory needs to change in light of 21st century warfare or our willingness to use military force needs to be reexamined is a question best left to historians and policymakers in the post-Iraq War world. What is critical to understand right now is that any policy which prolongs our presence in Iraq does not serve our national interest and represents a dangerous disconnect from reality.

The Iraq Study Group's report is a vision for grand strategy but the U.S. is not currently in a position to put grand strategy into practice. At this point, U.S. goals must revolve around a single priority: minimizing the negative impact on American soldiers by bringing them home as soon as possible.

Troop withdrawal sooner rather than later stands as the only viable option. This is not defeatism but a realization that the U.S. has many difficult challenges facing it in the 21st century and our military needs some time to regroup and recover while our civilian leadership determines how the U.S. can both refurbish its international leadership role and reintegrate itself into the international community.