Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Factsheet: Current Status of Iran's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs

by Kingston Reif [contact information]

August 17, 2009

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Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs Remain Shrouded in Secrecy

-- Iran has committed numerous violations of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations.

-- IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei noted in a June 2008 interview that the Iranians “continue to insist that they are interested solely in using nuclear power for civilian purposes. We have yet to find a smoking gun that would prove them wrong. But there are suspicious circumstances and unsettling questions.”^[1]

-- Iran’s lack of transparency is exacerbated by its refusal to abide by the Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA far more intrusive rights of access to suspected nuclear-related information and sites. As the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) notes, “without the Additional Protocol and in some cases additional transparency measures in place, the IAEA cannot provide adequate assurances that a country’s nuclear program is purely civilian in nature.”^[2]

-- According to the latest IAEA report on Iran dated June 5, 2009, Iran continues to:

1. deny the Agency access to the heavy water reactor under construction at Arak;
2. refuse to give the Agency preliminary design information for the planned reactor that is to be built in Darkhovin;
3. refuse to suspend its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the UN Security Council;
4. refuse to cooperate with the Agency concerning the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program. ^[3]

Estimates of the Status of Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

-- Iran does not currently possess a nuclear weapon of any kind.

-- There is no evidence that Iran has made the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon. In order to develop a nuclear device, Iran would have to either remove IAEA safeguards from its enrichment facility at Natanz and its heavy water reactor at Arak (once it is completed), or produce fissile material and develop a bomb in secret. The IAEA continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. There is no evidence that Iran has conducted a nuclear test or is currently developing secret nuclear facilities. However, so long as Iran continues to refuse to adhere to the Additional Protocol, there is no way to know for sure that its program is purely civilian in nature.

-- In the event that Iran makes the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon, the weight of the evidence suggests that Iran will not possess a nuclear-armed ballistic missile capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States for years to come.

• Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a crude nuclear device within six months to a year. Some estimates suggest that it could take Iran much longer than a year – perhaps two to four years – to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon.
  • According to ISIS, Iran achieved the capability to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear device sometime in January 2009. ISIS concluded that Iran has not made the political decision to develop a nuclear weapon; but once such a decision is made, it could make enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon within six months.^[4]
  • Citing Western intelligence sources, The London Times reported on August 3, 2009 that should Iran’s supreme leader “approve the building of a nuclear device, it would take six months to enrich enough uranium and another six months to assemble the warhead.” The sources stated that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003 “because it had achieved its aim – to find a way of detonating a warhead that could be launched on its long-range Shehab-3 missiles.”^[5]
  • A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities released on December 3, 2007 concluded “that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program,” but “at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” It estimated “that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.” More realistically, “Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 timeframe.” The State Department Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) concluded “that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.”^[6] INR reaffirmed this judgment in material submitted by the Director of National Intelligence to the Senate Intelligence Committee in April 2009.^[7]

• One estimate suggests that it could take Iran as many as five additional years and many nuclear tests to develop a nuclear device with an appreciable yield (measured in the tens of kilotons) small enough to fit on a deliverable missile.
  • In a Joint Threat Assessment of Iran’s nuclear and missile potential released in May 2009, a team of U.S. and Russian scientists concluded that Iran could, under optimal circumstances, produce a simple nuclear weapon within a year of deciding to do so. Under less than optimal circumstances, it could take Iran as long as two or three years to produce a simple device. According to the Joint Threat Assessment, without substantial foreign assistance, it could take Iran as many as an additional five years and numerous nuclear tests to develop a warhead with a yield of several tens of kilotons and capable of being fitted on an existing or future Iranian ballistic missile.^[8]

• Without substantial foreign assistance, Iran is not likely to possess a ballistic missile topped with a nuclear weapon capable of threatening all of Europe and/or the United States within the next ten to fifteen years.
  • Iran has devoted considerable time, energy, and resources to developing short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and a space launch vehicle. Iran has developed and deployed at least four different liquid-propellant ballistic missiles and the liquid-propellant two-stage Safir space launch vehicle, which put a satellite in space on February 2, 2009. These missiles use rocket motors based on Russian SCUD and North Korean Nodong missile technology. The Shahab-3 is Iran’s longest-range deployed missile, with an estimated range of 2,000 km. On May 20, 2009, Iran tested the solid-fueled Sejjil-2 missile, which has an estimated range of 2,000 km. Iran’s current ballistic missiles could reach Israel, Turkey, and portions of southeastern Europe.
  • According to the Joint Threat Assessment released in May 2009, “Iran…does not now have a missile capable of delivering a 1,000 kg payload to a range of 2,000 km.” Today, the longest range Iran could deliver such a payload is 1,100 km. Iran could indigenously develop a missile capable of delivering a 1,000 kg nuclear warhead to a range of 2,000 km. However, doing so would depend on the time it would take Iran to develop a nuclear warhead small enough to put on a ballistic missile, which the Joint Threat Assessment estimates to be six to eight years.^[9]
  • In order to threaten all of Europe and the United States, Iran would have to develop far more sophisticated missiles with a much longer range. Claims that Iran is developing such missiles are not supported by the available evidence.
  • Estimates vary as to when Iran might be capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of ranges greater than 5,500 km and depend on continued access to foreign technology, Iran’s economy, Iran’s scientific and industrial base, and Iran’s commitment to developing such missiles.
  1. According to a NIE on foreign missile developments released in 1999, “Iran could test an ICBM in the last half of the next decade using Russian technology and assistance.”^[10]
  2. An April 2009 report of the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center stated that “With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.”^[11]
  3. The Joint Threat Assessment estimates that if Iran decided today that it wanted to develop an ICBM, it “will not be able, for at least ten to fifteen years, to master independently the ‘critical technologies’ for advanced…[intermediate range ballistic missiles] and ICBMs because it does not have the scientific, economic, and industrial infrastructure for developing these critical technologies.”^[12] Even if it could develop such missiles in ten to fifteen years, they would likely be vulnerable to preemptive military attack.

All These Estimates Are Exactly That - Estimates

-- There is no hard consensus as to exactly how close Iran is to acquiring a nuclear weapon, fitting a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile, and/or developing a ballistic missile capable of reaching most of Europe and the United States.

Notes

1. Quoted in Paul Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status,” Congressional Research Service (November 20, 2008), pg. 4.

2. David Albright and Jacqueline Shire et al., “Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable,” Institute for Science and International Security (January 21, 2009), pg. 13.

3. Report by the Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” IAEA Board of Governors (June 5, 2009).

4. Albright and Shire, “Misconceptions about Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Institute for Science and International Security (July 8, 2009).

5. James Hider, Richard Beeston, and Michael Evans, “Iran Is Ready to Build an N-Bomb – It Is Just Waiting for the Ayatollah’s Order,” The London Times (August 3, 2009).

6. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Iran: Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions,” (November 2007).

7. Steven Aftergood, “An Updated Intelligence Review from the DNI,” Secrecy News (August 6, 2009).

8. The EastWest Institute, “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts,” (May 2009), pg. 5.

9. Ibid., pg. 9.

10. See Steven Hildreth, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service (February 4, 2009), pg. 2.

11. See Global Security Newswire, “Iran Could Put U.S. in Missile Range by 2015, Air Force Report Warns,” (June 10, 2009).

12. The EastWest Institute, op. cit., pg. 12.