Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

WMD Commission: U.S. Commitment to Cooperative International Action Key to Reducing the Biological Weapons Threat

by Alan Pearson [contact information]

June 1, 2006

On June 1, 2006 the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission released its report "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms." The report represents the culmination of over two years of study and deliberation by the 14 eminent members of the Commission, led by Dr. Hans Blix, former head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This document summarizes the chief findings and recommendations of the Commission with regard to biological weapons. The full report can be found at http://wmdcommission.org.

FINDINGS

• The need for extensive international cooperation to eliminate the threats posed by biological weapons iis more urgent today than ever.i
• The "potentially rising threat" of bioterrorism, coupled with "profound concern that modern economies may be particularly vulnerable to disruption from the deliberate spread of disease."
• The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is "the central component of the overall regime" for "control of the hostile uses of the life sciences." The BTWC completely prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons. (1) There are currently 155 States Parties to the Convention. (2)
• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 "enhances Article IV of the BTWC. "The resolution requires all nations to adopt and enforce laws and domestic controls to prohibit and help prevent the development, acquisition, possession or use of biological weapons by terrorists and other non-state actors.
• "A multifaceted approach [to the biological weapons threat] is required n one that strengthens the multilateral normative and legal prohibition regime, while linking it with other kinds of governmental and non-governmental, national and international measures."
• "A key to progress worldwide would be for the US to commit itself actively to international approaches and instruments." In this regard, "the BTWC remains the only multilateral treaty with a broad consensus that provides an international standard by which biological activities can be judged."

RECOMMENDATIONS

The commission makes numerous recommendations for cooperative international action to reduce the biological weapons threat. Most "aim at making maximum use of th[e] opportunity" provided by the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC. (3) According to the Commission, "in view of the developments since" the last full review of the BTWC in 1991, "the Parties need to carry out a full review during the 2006 Review Conference, reassert the Convention's role as the central component of the overall regime and agree on concrete measures to implement it."

• "The states parties should reaffirm common understandings reached at previous review conferences and take action on all subjects of [BTWC] meetings since 2003. (4) This Review Conference should reaffirm that all developments in the life sciences for hostile purposes are prohibited by the Convention."
• The States Parties should establish "a substantive programme of work" for the next five years, starting with "regular annual meetings from 2007," in order to "consider ways and means to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC." States Parties should also "ensure more frequent reassessment of the implications of scientific and technological developments," because "rapid developments in the life sciences could eventually outpace national and international efforts to prevent, control, or manage the hostile uses of biology."
• "All states not yet party to the BTWC should adhere to the Convention." In order to strengthen the overall regime, States Parties should "launch a campaign to achieve universal adherence by the time of the Seventh Review Conference" in 2011.
• In order "to achieve universal adoption of national legislation and regulations to implement the [BTWC] completely and effectively, the states parties should offer technical assistance and promote best-practice models of such legislation." The Commission notes that ithe effectiveness of the prohibitions of the BTWC depends on the full national implementation of the Convention through national legislation and regulations. Such action would also support UNSC Resolution 1540.
• "As a part of the confidence-building process [within the BTWC] and to promote transparency and harmonization, all states parties should make annual biological-weapon-related national declarations and make them public." The Commission notes that the number of States Parties that submit annual declarations "has never been high and has been declining. Given that the data are not publicly reviewed, little political attention is paid to them and states therefore have little incentive to report."
• "States parties Oe should establish a standing secretariat to handle organization and administrating matters related to the treaty, such as Review Conference and expert meetings." Other potential functions might include supporting efforts to achieve universal adherence to the BTWC, and the coordination and/or provision of assistance with national implementation legislation and with the submission and distribution of national declarations.
• "The BTWC has no standing institution to monitor and oversee compliance and implementation,i or to investigate unusual outbreaks of disease or allegations of biological weapons use. Therefore States Parties should ienhance the investigatory powers of the UN Secretary-General [including] a specialist unit, modeled on the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission [UNMOVIC], to assist in investigating unusual outbreaks of disease and allegations of the use of biological weapons."
• To be "as well prepared as possible" for a biological weapons attack "governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure effective monitoring of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop practical methods of coordinating international responses to any major event that might involve bioweapons. They should strengthen cooperation between civilian health and security-oriented authorities, nationally, regionally and worldwide."
• "Governments should also review their national bio-safety and bio-security measures to protect health and the environment from the release of biological and toxin materials. They should harmonize national bio-security standards" in order to help prevent terrorist access to dangerous pathogens, technologies, facilities and knowledge.

The Commission also makes two non-formal recommendations: 1) "bioindustry can and should" cooperate actively with governments "in preventing abuse of biotechnology," as the nuclear and chemical industries have done to their benefit; 2) "all countries and competent institutions [should] provide bioweapon awareness training for biologists and bio-technologists working in the public and private sectors to raise awareness of the moral issues as well as instilling good practices for maintaining the security of materials, facilities and sensitive technologies."

WMD COMMISSION STUDIES

The WMD Commission requested and published thirteen studies related to biological weapons during the course of their work. These studies can be found at http://wmdcommission.org.

No 1: "Review of Recent Literature on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation" Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), May 2004 (includes a section devoted to biological weapons)

No 14: "Managing the Biological Weapons Problem: From the Individual to the International" Jez Littlewood, August 2004

No 16: "Comparison of States vs. Non-State Actors in the Development of a BTW Capability" Sellstr and Anders Norqvist. October 2004

No 18: "The Global Governance of "Contentious" Science. The Case of the World Health's Organizations Oversight of the Small Pox Virus Research Jonathan B Tucker and Stacy M Okutani, October 2004

No 19: "WMD Verification and Compliance: The State of Play" Foreign Affairs Canada, prepared by VERTIC, October 2004 (includes a long section devoted to biological weapons)

No 20: "WMD Verification and Compliance: Challenges and Responses" Foreign Affairs Canada (includes much discussion of biological weapons)

No 22: "Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment" Gary A. Ackerman and Kevin S. Moran, November 2004

No 23: "Enhancing BWC Implementation: A Modular Approach" Trevor Findlay and Angela Woodward, December 2004

No 26: "A Verification and Transparency Concept for Technology Transfers under the BTWC" Jean Pascal Zanders, February 2005

No 28: "The Central Importance of Legally Binding Measures for the Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)" Graham S. Pearson, February 2005

No 30: "Indicators of State and Non-State Offensive Chemical and Biological Programmes" Edited by Ingrid F 0/00ngmark and Lena Norlander, August 2005

No 32: "National Measures to Implement WMD Treaties and Norms: the Need for International Standards and Technical Assistance" Andreas Persbo and Angela Woodward, August 2005

No 40: "A Standing United Nations Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible" Trevor Findlay, December 2005 (includes extensive discussion of biological weapons)

(1) In order ito exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, "Parties to the Convention agree inever in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."

(2) Sixteen States have signed but not yet ratified the BTWC: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote diIvoire, Egypt, Gabon, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania. There are 24 non-signatory States: Andorra, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cook Island, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Zambia.

(3) To be held from November 20 - Dec 8, 2006 in Geneva Switzerland.

(4) The subjects were: for 2003, national implementation measures, including penal legislation, and national mechanisms to maintain the security and oversight of pathogens and toxins; for 2004, enhancing international capabilities for responding to the alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious disease outbreaks, and national and international infectious disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and response mechanisms; for 2005, the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.