Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Expert Calls for Safeguarding World Health Organization From Biological Weapons Related Politics

by Alan Pearson [contact information]

January 25, 2005

Since there is no standing international means for investigating suspicious infectious disease outbreaks that might indicate violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, it has frequently been suggested that WHO should undertake that function. Experts in Public Health are generally opposed to this idea because they fear it would impede the access essential to WHO’s mission to promote global health.

It is a common misconception that WHO has a mandate to intervene in response to a serious disease outbreak anywhere on earth. In fact, WHO must be invited by the country or countries affected before it can cross their borders. The blue United Nations passport carried by WHO personnel does not permit entry anywhere without a visa. If countries should perceive WHO operatives as intelligence agents with a dual responsibility to investigate treaty violations as well as health matters, the result could be unwillingness to report outbreaks at their onset and reluctance to request the help of WHO or permit its entry. These reactions would seriously impede efforts to control the global spread of disease. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that WHO must rely heavily on experts provided by member States, frequently experts from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

It is not generally realized that WHO’s chronic lack of adequate funding to carry out its core mission makes it vulnerable to outside pressure. In order to send missions to the field, WHO is dependent on extra-budgetary contributions. These usually come with strings attached.

The report of the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, submitted to the UN General Assembly in December 2004, is the latest example of the pressures on WHO to investigate suspicious events. The Panel, asked to assess current threats to international peace and security and to make recommendations for strengthening collective security, proposes (paragraph 144):

“Given the potential international security threat posed by the intentional release of an infectious biological agent or an overwhelming natural outbreak of an infectious disease, there is a need for the WHO Director-General, through the Secretary-General, to keep the Security Council informed during any suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. In such an event, the Security Council should be prepared to support the work of WHO investigators or to deploy experts reporting directly to the Council, and if existing International Health Regulations do not provide adequate access for WHO investigations and response coordination, the Security Council should be prepared to mandate greater compliance.”

The recommendations of the High-Level Panel will be considered in the fall of 2005 by a summit meeting of Heads of State and by UN bodies.

The existing International Health Regulations (IHR) are indeed inadequate for WHO’s core mission, and have been under revision since 1995. Access in health emergencies is a long-standing issue. After ten years of work, the revised regulations are scheduled to be submitted for adoption at the annual meeting of the World Health Assembly in May of this year. An intergovernmental meeting in November 2004 to review the semi-final draft was unable to reach a decision, however, in part because of concern by some member States that WHO might use its access for purposes other than public health. Consequently, an additional meeting to finalize the draft was scheduled for 21-25 February, 2005.

Ironically, the High-Level Panel’s call for greater access under the IHR is likely to have the opposite effect, unless, before the February IHR meeting, WHO clearly and unambiguously rejects any role in investigating suspicions of treaty violations. If the international health community wishes to influence WHO’s decision, it should make its views known without delay.

No one should assume that WHO is the last and only resort for investigating the use of disease as a weapon. There are other and better options, including the Secretary General’s standing authority to maintain a roster of skilled inspectors and call on them, at the request of any State, for investigating suspicions of biological weapons.