Stay Informed

by Alan Pearson [contact information]

• The first agenda item for this BWC meeting, on enhancing international capabilities for investigation, is of particular significance given the failure of the Protocol negotiations and the continuing threat of biological weapons to international security. Since there is no consensus among the States Parties for international action at this time, it would be imprudent not to take advantage of possibilities elsewhere. We congratulate the United Kingdom for issuing proposals in July for strengthening the capabilities of the UN Secretary General, who already has the authority (but little means) to investigate alleged use of biological weapons at the request of any UN member State. It has now been exhaustively demonstrated that WMD investigations can succeed. But successful biological weapons investigations require investigators who are trained, equipped and ready to go without delay when the need arises. The Biological Weapons Convention is not the proper forum for action on the UK proposals, but, you are same diplomats, representing the same countries, who participate in the General Assembly’s First Committee. Action there could provide a measure of security until the BWC recovers from its paralysis.
• In July, the agenda item on infectious diseases provoked interesting exchanges on existing measures for monitoring and responding to outbreaks. However, many countries have vastly inadequate domestic public health systems, and it is a truism to say that infectious disease knows no boundaries. WHO does as much as it can, but experts there admit that they don’t have the resources to accomplish even their minimal goals. Nowhere near enough is being done internationally to combat infectious diseases. Even if we set aside the issue of public health and consider only the biological weapons threat, it is in disease- and strife-ridden countries that terrorists are most likely to find shelter and to test any new weapons they may develop or acquire. Consider, for example, the recent, albeit unconfirmed, reports of chemical and possibly biological weapons in Darfur. It is in the self-interest of every State Party to promote the detection, diagnosis and reporting of disease outbreaks everywhere in the world. Even if the Parties do nothing else at the next Review Conference, they ought to be able to agree under Article X to undertake jointly some new international action against infectious diseases.
• The next meeting of experts from the BWC States Parties is only six months away. As you prepare to discuss the last agenda item, Codes of Conduct for Scientists, please commit yourselves to discussing governmental responsibilities as well, including the development and implementation of codes of conduct for government conducted or sponsored research programs. Most of the scientists you will be talking about either work for governments or are funded by them. What types of projects do your governments ask those scientists to conduct? How do those projects relate to the provisions of Article I? What obligations do those programs, and the scientists participating in them, have vis-a-vis Article I, particularly in terms of dual-use activities? These questions should elicit an interesting discussion next June.
• Finally, we would like to announce and invite you to attend a one-day Symposium on Biochemical Weapons: Scientific, Military, Legal and Policy Perspectives, to be held on June 11, 2005 in Geneva, just prior to the next BWC Experts meeting. The Geneva Forum will join us in sponsoring the event. Additional information about the Symposium will be posted as it becomes available on our website, www.armscontrolcenter.org/cbw , and notices will be sent to Geneva Missions in advance of the Symposium.