Bio-Chem Weapons Analysis Archive
Memorandum to McCain and Obama: A New Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agenda
The past eight years of the Bush administration have been disastrous for arms control and nonproliferation initiatives. However, the next President can make significant progress in repairing the damage and moving these important issues forward. In this memo to John McCain and Barack Obama, Policy Fellow Jeff Lindemyer outlines four important goals for the next President.
Fiscal Year 2009 Federal Funding for Bioweapons Prevention and Defense
The Administration proposes $6.8 billion in regular funding on bioweapons prevention and defense activities in FY2009. This is an increase of approximately $340 million (5.2%) over the amount appropriated by Congress for FY2008.
The Expanding Range of Biowarfare Threats
In this analysis, Alan Pearson participates in a roundtable discussion, hosted by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, about the impact of scientific advances at the intersection of chemistry and biology and ways to discourage their application for the development of new substances designed to incapacitate or kill.
'Appalling Gap' in Homeland Security Raises Concerns
A recent report issued by the congressionally-mandated Commission on the National Guard and Reserves concluded that there is an "appalling gap" in our readiness to defend ourselves against a catastrophic event within our borders.
Documents on the Department of Homeland Security 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
Titles, descriptions, and links to documents on the Department of Homeland Security 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment.
Background on Bioterrorism Risk Assessment
Historically, bioterrorism threat and risk assessments have emphasized vulnerabilities, consequences, and technology-centric approaches which focus on low-probability high-consequence worst-case scenarios.
Casting a Wider Net for Countermeasure R&D Funding Decisions
Senior Science Fellow Lynn Klotz calls for public debate of policy determinations that he says privilege funding and resources for biodefense over that for naturally occurring infectious diseases and a potential influenza pandemic.
Year in Review: Congress and National Security in 2007
Congress's failure to end the disastrous Iraq War in 2007 masked a series of less visible but nonetheless important triumphs on national security issues.
Scientists Working Group Chair Addresses Biological Weapons Convention Meeting
National implementation of the BTWC requires that States Parties implement Article I prohibiting the production, development, acquisition, stockpiling or retention of biological agents and toxins of types and in quantities that have no prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes in their territory or under their control. NGOs have a role to play.
Incapacitating Chemical Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention
Growing government interest in exploiting advances in the life sciences to develop chemical incapacitants for use in hostage rescue, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and urban warfare threatens to introduce a new category of chemical weapons.
Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Laboratories in the United States
Over the last six years, the Federal government has dramatically increased US research and development activity and infrastructure focused on biological weapons agents.
Safeguarding Synthetics
The damage that might be wrought by some "biohackers" would be much more difficult to deal with than that caused by their computer hacker brethren.
Federal Funding for Biological Weapons Prevention and Defense, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2008
The Administration is proposing an additional $6.77 billion in bioweapons-related spending, approximately $550 million (9%) more than the amount that Congress appropriated for FY2007.
WMD Commission: U.S. Commitment to Cooperative International Action Key to Reducing the Biological Weapons Threat
On June 1, 2006 the international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission released its report "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms."
Balancing Public Health and Bioterrorism Defenses
On Thursday, March 17, 2005 the Scientist Working Group had two letters published in the Washington Post.
750 Scientists Express Concern About Biodefense Funding
The letter expresses concern about the decrease in support for research on basic microbial physiology, genetics, and pathogenesis that has occurred as a consequence of the NIH decision in 2001-2002 to prioritize research on bioweapons agents.
Expert Calls for Safeguarding World Health Organization From Biological Weapons Related Politics
No one should assume that WHO is the last and only resort for investigating the use of disease as a weapon.
Experts Question Merit of Recent Smallpox Exercise
The tabletop simulation used unrealistic assumptions to project massive casualties and scare the public and Western governments into thinking there is a strong potential for an attack that is actually unlikely to occur, the experts said.
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