E-Newsletter Sign Up

Talking Points on North Korean Nuclear Brinkmanship

EmailPrint

Jan 6, 2003

Media Advisory from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation January 6, 2003

Contact: Steve LaMontagne (202) 546-0795 ext.100

As the diplomatic standoff over North Korea’s nuclear program continues to evolve, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation will continue to provide expert insight and analysis. The following talking points are intended to assist in understanding the context in which events are unfolding.

  1. Neither the United States nor North Korea wants a war. Both the United States and North Korea are deterred by the high costs of a possible war on the Korean peninsula. From the U.S. perspective, war would result in tens of thousands of deaths and the likely physical destruction of Seoul. From the North Korean perspective, war would lead to the demise of Kim Jong Il’s regime. U.S. aversion to war on the Korean peninsula, combined with its significant existing military commitments, emboldens North Korea to acts of brinkmanship.
  2. Both countries want to dictate the terms of peace. North Korea wants the United States to sign a non-aggression pact before it makes any move to abandon its nuclear program. Conversely, the Bush administration insists that North Korea must completely and visibly dismantle its nuclear program before any kind of talks can take place, and is leaning on countries such as South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia to adopt similar positions.
  3. The current policy of isolation could backfire. While the United States hopes that international isolation will force North Korea to disarm, other high-risk outcomes are equally possible. First, North Korea could further escalate tensions by taking its nuclear brinkmanship to a more dangerous level, possibly by embarking on a crash program to ramp up its nuclear arsenal, resuming flight testing of ballistic missiles, or even testing a nuclear device. Second, Kim Jong Il’s regime could collapse, creating a refugee crisis. Because South Korea and China want to avoid such a crisis, they are therefore likely to balk at any effort to isolate North Korea politically and economically.
  4. Dialogue is essential. The Bush administration must find a way to enter into dialogue with North Korea without appearing to reward North Korea’s bad behavior or broken promises. The lack of dialogue increases the danger that miscalculations or mistrust could cause nuclear brinkmanship to escalate into war.
  5. The clock is ticking. Unless North Korea decides to reprocess plutonium from 8,000 spent fuel rods sealed and stored as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, it is probably a year or more away from building even one additional nuclear weapon. There is still time for diplomacy to work, but the clock is ticking.
Contribute || Stay Informed