Missile Defense in Europe Unproven, Confirms Russian Suspicions
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: August 20, 2008
CONTACT: Travis Sharp
Washington, D.C. – The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation today criticized the Bush administration's missile defense agreement with Poland, noting that the U.S. interceptors slated for deployment in Poland are technologically unproven and only confirm Russian suspicions that the system is really directed against Moscow, not Tehran.
After more than 18 months of hesitation, the United States and Poland on Wednesday suddenly signed an agreement to place American missile defense interceptors on Polish territory. Poland's acquiescence to the missile defense agreement after months of uncertainty is widely believed to be a result of Russia's recent aggressive actions in Georgia.
Unlike U.S. missile defense interceptors currently deployed in Alaska and California, which are powered by three-stage booster rockets, the interceptors planned for Europe will have only two stages. The two-stage configuration has yet to be tested, and many experts have expressed concerns about its readiness for realistic combat scenarios.
"The Pentagon itself has admitted that the effectiveness of the two-stage interceptor cannot be assumed," said John Isaacs, Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Isaacs was referring to a recent report by Dr. Charles McQueary, the Department of Defense's Director for Operational Test & Evaluation.
"At least three flight tests are necessary for any determination of operational effectiveness," said Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (USA, ret.), a missile defense expert who is chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "The Bush administration assumes an untested two-stage configuration will work, but military commanders cannot rely on untested systems."
"Missile defense, of course, is aimed at no one," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated today upon signing the agreement.
"If you believe that statement, you should believe that Russian forces are in Georgia merely to act as peacekeepers," added Isaacs. "If the system was aimed at no one, why was the agreement rushed to completion only days after Russia's brutish use of force against Georgia?"
While Russia should not have a veto over U.S. policy, the United States needs Russia's cooperation now more than ever to address the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program; negotiate deeper, binding, and verifiable reductions of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicle systems; and buttress programs that secure and safeguard Russian nuclear materials.
"Pursuing a system that antagonizes Moscow will make it all the more difficult to achieve these vital national security objectives," Gard concluded.
For more information, see the Center's recent policy briefs:
Russia Looms over U.S.-Poland Missile Defense Agreement
Missile Defense in Europe Falls to Next Administration
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